Abstract

All states adopt systems to surveil political activists. How do they decide whom to watch and why? We study the logic of state surveillance using the first complete individual-level database of those monitored by a state -- 152,000 Italians born between 1816 and 1932, encompassing both democratic and authoritarian regimes. We focus on education: exploiting a discontinuous expansion in primary schooling in municipalities above a population and age threshold, we show that cohorts exposed to more years of school experienced an uptick in surveillance. The effect is largest for working classes, who were monitored for longer periods, subjected to harsher measures, and disproportionately targeted when affiliated with communist ideologies. Yet treated cohorts did not become more politically active, indicating that surveillance expanded not in reaction to increased mobilization, but as a preventive strategy rooted in fears of working-class empowerment. These findings reveal how states prioritize surveilling educated individuals who combine mobilization potential with revolutionary grievances, potentially generating inequalities in the capacity of different groups to influence political change.

Reference

Gemma Dipoppa (Columbia University), “The Logic of State Surveillance”, IAST General Seminar, Toulouse: IAST, December 16, 2025, 11:30–12:30, room Auditorium 4 (First floor - TSE Building).