Abstract

Corruption is a pervasive phenomenon that affects the quality of institutions regulating social interactions. It has been proposed that institutional quality and corruption in particular influence generalized trust and cooperation. Yet, there is limited experimental evidence for this top-down influence. Here, we investigated whether second-hand learning about, as well as first-hand experience with, corrupt institutional representatives undermines trust and cooperation. We used a novel experimental paradigm that operationalized institutional representatives as third-party punishers in decision-making interactions. In five studies, we manipulated or assessed dishonesty and corruption of third parties in a modified die-rolling game. In this game, participants were exposed to dishonest behavior of a target who would subsequently serve as the third-party punisher in a trust game (Study 1, N = 540), a prisoner’s dilemma (Study 2, N = 503), and dictator games (Studies 3-5, N = 785). We examined the effects of exposure to corrupt third parties on participants’ trust and cooperation toward unrelated strangers in these tasks. Across our studies, we found consistent evidence that observing or interacting with a corrupt third party decreased generalized trust and cooperation. These findings contribute to interdisciplinary efforts to understand how corruption and institutional quality shape trust within social interactions.

Reference

Catherine Molho ( IAST), “Exposure to corrupt third parties undermines generalized trust and cooperation”, IAST Lunch Seminar, Toulouse: IAST, March 16, 2021, 12:45–13:45, room Zoom.