November 22, 2022, 11:30–12:30
Room Auditorium 4
The scale at which humans cooperate with genetically-unrelated peers remains a fundamental puzzle of human evolution. Some formal theoretical models propose that cooperation can be maintained through consideration of standing and reputation, and further highlight how important interactions between standing and exploitation behaviour can facilitate the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. Here, I will present recent research that empirically examines the predictions of models of positive and negative indirect reciprocity using a network-structured field experiment in two rural Colombian communities. In this experiment, we observe that---at a dyadic-level---individuals have a strong tendency to exploit and punish others in bad standing (e.g., those perceived as selfish), and allocate resources to those in good standing (e.g., those perceived as generous). These dyadic findings scale to a more generalised, community level, with reputations for being generous associated with receiving allocations, and reputations for being selfish associated with receiving costly punishment. These nuanced empirical results illustrate the role that both positive and negative indirect reciprocity, and costly punishment play in sustaining community-wide cooperation networks.
Daniel Redhead (Max Planck Institute), “Reputation, exploitation, and cooperation: Evidence of direct and indirect reciprocity in network-structured economic games in rural Colombia”, IAST General Seminar, Toulouse: IAST, November 22, 2022, 11:30–12:30, room Auditorium 4.