André Blais, Arnaud Dellis, and Michel Le Breton, “Élections : Comportements, Mécanismes et Réformes”, L'Actualité Économique, vol. 1-2, Mars-juin 2017.

Philippe De Donder, and Pierre Pestieau, “Private, social and self insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help”, Journal of Public Economic Theory, vol. 19, n. 1, February 2017, pp. 18–37.

William Gehrlein, Michel Le Breton, and Dominique Lepelley, “The Likelihood of a Condorcet Winner in the Logrolling Setting”, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49, 2017, pp. 315–321.

Michel Le Breton, and Karine Van Der Straeten, “Government Formation and Electoral Alliances: The Contribution of Cooperative Game Theory to Political Science”, Revue d'Économie Politique, vol. 127, 2017, pp. 637–736.

Michael Becher, Sylvain Brouard, and Isabelle Guinaudeau, “Prime Ministers and the Electoral Cost of Using the Confidence Vote in Legislative Bargaining: Evidence From France”, West European Politics, vol. 40, n. 2, 2017, pp. 252–274.

Philippe De Donder, and Francisco Martinez-Mora, “The political economy of higher education admission standards and participation gap”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 154, 2017, pp. 1–9.

Philippe De Donder, and Maria Gallego, “Electoral Competition and Party Positioning”, L' Actualité Économique, 2017.

Philippe De Donder, Soterios Soteri, and Frank Rodriguez, “An Examination of the Links Between Postal Price Constraints, Efficiency, Competition and Public Welfare”, in The Changing Postal and Delivery Sector: Towards A Renaissance, Timothy J. Brennan, Michael A. Crew, and Pier Luigi Parcu (eds.), Edward Elgar Publishing, chapter 4, 2017, pp. 51–66.

André Blais, Damien Bol, Sona Golder, Philipp Harfst, Jean-François Laslier, Laura Stephenson, and Karine Van Der Straeten, “Addressing Europe’s democratic deficit: An experimental evaluation of the pan-European district proposal”, European Union Politics, vol. 17, n. 4, December 2016, pp. 525–545.

Jean-François Laslier, and Karine Van Der Straeten, “Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: A theory for large electorates”, Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47, n. 3, October 2016, pp. 559–587.