Seminar

Accountability Beyond Outcomes: Experimental Evidence on Voters and Executive Performance

Michael Becher

April 3, 2018, 12:45–13:45

Toulouse

Room MS003

Abstract

According to much of political science, leaders have reasons to fear that they will be held accountable by voters for the outcomes they produce. However, it is not clear if there is political accountability for how outcomes are achieved. While executives in many democracies have the power to use restrictive procedures that circumvent the majoritarian legislative process to make policy despite political opposition, executives can be reluctant to use procedural force in lawmaking and often face criticism if they do. How ordinary people assess the legislative performance of the executive is crucial for political incentives and electoral accountability. Drawing on three unusually large and multifaceted survey experiments conducted in France, we find that leadership evaluations reflect trade-offs between competing considerations. Process matters beyond outcomes and party, two variables emphasized by dominant theoretical perspectives. The evidence further suggest that the process effect is consistent with intrinsic preferences for majoritarian decision-making.

Reference

Michael Becher, Accountability Beyond Outcomes: Experimental Evidence on Voters and Executive Performance, IAST Lunch Seminar, Toulouse: IAST, April 3, 2018, 12:45–13:45, room MS003.