Abstract

We assemble original data from 129 countries around the world on the re-election rates of national legislators in recent elections. The data show that incumbent re-election rates increase substantially with a country's level of economic development. Using a political agency model with endogenous entry to interpret this pattern, we argue that as a country develops, the pool of politicians improves. This occurs because better candidates enter the political arena. We use empirical methods to explore mechanisms that could account for the pattern in political entry that we identify.

Miriam Golden is Professor of Political Science. She was educated at the University of California at Berkeley, the London School of Economics and Political Science, and Cornell University. Professor Golden's research is in the area of political economy.

Miriam's webpage

Reference

Miriam Golden (UCLA), “Re-election, Political Selection, and Development”, IAST General Seminar, Toulouse: IAST, November 30, 2018, 11:30–12:30, room MF 323.