Abstract

Political brokers are essential to clientelistic parties, but they may be unreliable agents. In party systems with competing clientelistic parties, brokers’ connections are valuable to multiple parties, and brokers may defect when presented with a superior proposal. When brokers switch, parties’ local linkages erode. This article analyzes how limiting party switching helps parties build more stable linkages to voters. Until recently brokers in Brazil – who also serve as local candidates – frequently changed allegiances. However, an unexpected institutional reform discouraged brokers who had won local elections from switching. Using regression discontinuity designs, I show that compared to their losing counterparts, winning candidates became more dependable party intermediaries only after the ruling. Further, I identify that the exogenously set exit barriers improved prospects for parties unable to enforce loyalty on their own. My findings show that party switching is a cause and not merely a symptom of unstable parties in clientelistic systems.

Replaced by

Lucas Novaes, “Disloyal Brokers and Weak Parties”, American Journal of Political Science, vol. 62, n. 1, January 2018, pp. 84–98.