Aim of the workshop: In strategic interaction, where multiple agents pursue personal objectives,  conflict is bound to arise, as the actions of the individual agents have  an effect on the welfare of the others. In such situations the need arises  for the explicit regulation of individual and collective behaviour which  has traditionally followed two alternative approaches, well-known in the  economics literature: the spontaneous order approach, which studies how norms result from endogenous agreements among rational individuals or how conventions emerge through repeated interactions and learning, and the  mechanism design approach, which studies how norms are exogenously designed  in order to reach desirable properties. The present symposium is motivated by the conviction that the two paradigms to understand norms in strategic interaction are by no means incompatible and can be effectively used together for regulative purposes. The aim of the NAG 2016 workshop is to gather researchers looking at norms in strategic interaction from different perspectives, i.e., philosophy, computer science, game theory, logic, linguistic fostering discussion and interdisciplinary collaboration. Researchers will be given the opportunity of presenting their work in a stimulating environment, without novelty constraints on the contributions.

This event has been funded by a French government subsidy managed by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche under the framework of the investissements d'avenir programme reference ANR-11-LABX-0052.

Reference

Norm, Actions and Games (NAG 2016), France, June 20–21, 2016.