Résumé

For decades, human thinking has been portrayed as an interplay between intuitive and deliberate thought processes. Building on the old adage that the deliberate mind corrects the emotional heart, the dual-process model of moral cognition has posited that utilitarian responding to moral dilemmas (i.e., choosing the greater good) requires deliberate correction of an intuitive deontological response. Similarly, the dual-process theory of altruistic/cooperative behaviour has argued that to arrive at a selfish, non-cooperative response, people have to override their initial, cooperative intuition (e.g., in the public goods game). In this study, I tested dual process theory using moral dilemmas and three economic games (dictator game, ultimatum game, public goods game). Results consistently show that in the vast majority of cases (+70%) in which people opt for a utilitarian/selfish response after deliberation, the utilitarian/selfish response had already been generated intuitively. I believe this evidence forces us to revise the longstanding dual process theory. I show how this leads to a revised model in which moral and cooperative judgments depend on the absolute and relative strength differences between competing intuitive responses.

Référence

Bence Bago, « Toward a general theory of intuitive and deliberative thinking – testing the dual-process theory of moral reasoning and cooperative behaviour », IAST Lunch Seminar, Toulouse : IAST, 23 octobre 2018, 12h45–13h45, salle MS003.