Document de travail

Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists

Ingela Alger et Jörgen W. Weibull

Résumé

Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness. We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and moralists. By altruists we mean people who do not only care about their own material payoffs but also about those to others, and by a moralist we mean someone who cares about own material payoff and also about what would be his or her material payoff if others were to act like himself or herself. It turns out that both altruism and morality may improve or worsen equilibrium outcomes, depending on the nature of the game. Not surprisingly, both altruism and morality improve the outcomes in standard public goods games. In infinitely repeated games, however, both altruism and morality may diminish the prospects of cooperation, and to di¤erent degrees. In coordination games, morality can eliminate socially inefficient equilibria while altruism cannot.

Mots-clés

altruism; morality; Homo moralis; repeated games; coordination games;

Codes JEL

  • C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games
  • D01: Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
  • D03: Behavioral Microeconomics • Underlying Principles

Remplacé par

Ingela Alger et Jörgen W. Weibull, « Strategic Behavior of Moralists and Altruists », Games, vol. 8, 2017.

Voir aussi

Publié dans

IAST working paper, n° 17-69, août 2017