Résumé

What role do emotions play in moral cognition? Leading accounts argue that a multiplicity of emotions, including guilt, outrage, shame, empathy, and even disgust, play an essential role in moral psychology. Here, this chapter argues that many of these emotions are only superficially associated with moral cognitive contents and adaptive challenges, and that only outrage and guilt rigorously qualify as moral emotions—that is, as computational systems that process distinctively moral representations. Outrage functions to reclaim benefits to which one is rightfully entitled; and guilt to compensate others for violations of one’s duties. Shame, by contrast, tracks representations of one’s social status, not representations of one’s moral obligations. Empathy, similarly, tracks cues of fitness-interdependence—an adaptive challenge that differs from, and in fact often contradicts, the respect of moral obligations. This chapter argues, finally, that both evolutionary rationales and psychological evidence for a role of disgust in moral cognition remain inconclusive for now.

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