The Political Logic of Cultural Revival: Ethnic Visibility and Electoral Politics in Malawi

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Abstract

Understanding the relationship between politics and ethnic identity construction, change, and mobilization is central to the study of African politics. Scholars often note that contemporary ethnic groups were politicized, and sometimes constructed, in response to the political incentives of elites. However, because existing research has focused primarily on the elite side of mass mobilization, we know less about *when* and *how* such elite-led attempts at ethnic mobilization actually translate into active political support or lasting cultural change. I address these questions within the context of an ongoing cultural revival among the Lhomwe ethnic group in Malawi. Historically marginalized, the Lhomwe have been aggressively mobilized along ethnic lines since 2008, through the establishment of a formal ethnic association and a new political party. Within this context, I evaluate how and for whom this ethno-political mobilization translates into political support, and whether the campaign of "cultural revival" actually results in systematic cultural change. I argue that the political logic of this cultural revival is aimed at reifying ethnic boundaries, rendering members of the Lhomwe group more "visible." I theorize the ways in which ethnic visibility shapes incentives for ethnic party support, and provide empirical support from an original survey and in-depth interviews with Lhomwe Malawians.

An elite-led cultural revival is underway in Malawi. Since 2008, prominent members of the Lhomwe ethnic group – a historically stigmatized and politically marginalized community – have waged an aggressive campaign to revive the lost heritage of the group, including its language, foods, dances, and chieftaincy. This cultural revival is being spearheaded by a formal ethnic association – Mulhako wa Alhomwe – established in 2008, which has strong ties to a relatively new political party – the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) – founded in 2005. As a result, both scholars and Malawian citizens have characterized this cultural revival as politically motivated, aimed at mobilizing members of the Lhomwe ethnic group to support the DPP (e.g., Kayira and Banda 2013).

But this account is somewhat puzzling from the perspective of existing theories of ethnic politics. Most explanations for ethnic-based political support suggest that citizens expect to receive material benefits when they have a coethnic in a position of political power (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Wantchekon 2003), and indeed there is extensive evidence of such favoritism (Burgess et al. 2015; Ejdemyr, Kramon, and Robinson Forthcoming; Franck and Rainer 2012; Ichino and Nathan 2013). In this strategic explanation of ethnic politics, ethnicity is simply a tool for arranging a *quid pro quo* exchange of political support for material resources. Within this framework, signaling an intent to engage in ethnic favoritism may be necessary in order to garner political support from a particular ethnic community. But ethnic-based favoritism does not require an expensive, overt cultural campaign focused on reviving and promoting a particular culture. The fact that elites engage in explicit cultural revival, as they have in the context of Lhomwe culture in Malawi, suggests that such efforts are about more than signaling an ethnic-based clientelist strategy.

I argue that such cultural revivals may indeed be politically motivated, and lay out the political logic behind such efforts in four parts. First, I challenge a central assumption in many theories of ethnic politics, namely, that ethnic identity is highly visible. In the case of Malawian Lhomwes, for example, ethnic boundaries with surrounding ethnic groups have been quite fluid historically, and the erosion of Lhomwe culture over time has reduced the degree to which Lhomwe ethnic identity is observable (Kayira and Banda 2013; Rashid 1978; White 1984). Second, I argue that variation in ethnic visibility at the individual level is politically relevant, with more visible individuals being more likely to support an ethnic party. This is because visibly "marked" members of the ethnic group have the most at stake in ethnic competition for power and material resources. Third, I suggest that ethnic visibility is a political resource for ethnic elites, precisely because it is associated with greater support for coethnic parties and candidates. As a result, political entrepreneurs should have an interest in trying to increase ethnic visibility among their coethnics. Fourth, I argue

that cultural revivals, like the one underway in Malawi, are one strategy that political elites can use to increase ethnic visibility. By providing "pride as patronage" through a cultural revival, political elites may be able to convince members of historically marginalized groups to adopt cultural attributes that increase the visibility of their own ethnic identity.

I evaluate these expectations using quantitative and qualitative data collected in Malawi. In particular, I fielded an original survey targeted at members of the Lhomwe ethnic group across three Malawian districts. I use the resulting data from 1,254 respondents, 892 of whom are Lhomwe, to explore the relationship between ethnic visibility and support for the DPP political party, as well as capture indicators of cultural change in the wake of the ongoing cultural revival. These survey data are complemented by rich, in-depth interviews with members of the Lhomwe ethnic group, leaders of the Mulhako wa Alhomwe ethnic association, and a number of customary and traditional authorities.

I find that there is significant variation in ethnic visibility among Lhomwes in Southern Malawi, and that ethnic visibility is indeed a very strong predictor of support for the DPP political party. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in ethnic visibility is related to a three percentage point increase in expressed support for the DPP. This positive correlation between visibility and ethnic party support holds for each constituent indicator of the ethnic visibility index. It is also robust to controlling for other drivers of party supporting, including perceptions of DPP government performance, strength of ethnic identification, and geographic characteristics associated with the likelihood of targeted ethnic patronage.

This strong association between ethnic visibility and ethnic party support provides a clear political incentive for an elite-led cultural revival aimed at increasing visibility. But, while I find that the cultural revival increased pride in Lhomwe ethnic heritage, it does not seem to have resulted in increased ethnic visibility via cultural change. In particular, I show that the rate at which Lhomwe parents gave their children Lhomwe-signaling names – a costly and rather permanent investment in ethnic visibility – actually *fell* in response to the cultural revival and DPP rule. However, this pattern is driven by the minority of Lhomwe citizens who did not respond to the cultural revival with increased pride. Among those whose pride did increase in the wake of the cultural revival, there is no drop-off in the use of Lhomwe names – but neither is there an increase. In the case of public self-identification and investment in the Lhomwe language, there is some modest evidence that the cultural revival has increased visibility. However, the cross-sectional nature of the data limits my ability to draw firm conclusions from those patterns. Thus, on the whole, the cultural revival does not seem to be resulting in increased visibility. In the paper's conclusion, I discuss the potential implications of this finding for the broader theoretical framework, and outline the next stages

of the research.

The theoretical framework and findings from this project make three important contributions to the study of ethnic politics in Africa and beyond. First, the theoretical framework treats visibility not as an inherit characteristic of ethnic identity, but as a variable, and one that has important political implications. Recognizing ethnic visibility as a political resource, and one that can potentially be influenced by political and social action, establishes a new line of research on the the political processes aimed at influencing ethnic identifiability. While this project focuses on the role of elite-led cultural revivals, there are potentially other means available to political actors seeking to reify the boundaries between ethnic communities.

Second, this project advances the study of ethnic politics by moving beyond mere voting. Most research on ethnic politics focuses on a single form of ethnic political mobilization – ethnic voting – largely because it is observable at regular intervals and during times of peace. However, as a result, we know much less about the causes and implications of other forms of ethnic political mobilization, such as cultural and social associations organized along ethnic lines. There is therefore a need for research focused explicitly on whether and how these types of ethnic organizations relate to more overt forms of ethnopolitical mobilization; the findings reported here are one effort in that direction.

Third, this research on the political nature of cultural revival in contemporary Malawi contributes to our understanding of the origins of ethnicity in Africa. Despite a common portrayal of African politics as being inherently mired by tribal animosities, most scholars attribute the centrality of ethnicity in politics to elite level political competition for political support. However, most accounts of the origins of politicized ethnicity are historical, case-based analyses that rely on archival sources (e.g., Ranger 1983; Vail 1991). While such historical case studies are invaluable for documenting elite incentives, they are unable to identify the mechanisms through which elite attempts at ethnic mobilization succeed for two reasons. The first is that the body of evidence built from multiple case studies of particular ethnic groups suffers from selection bias – no one writes histories of failed attempts at ethnic mobilization. However, we cannot draw conclusions about how elites succeed in mobilizing ethnicity for political gain by only studying successful cases. The second reason is that historical case studies rely heavily on archival and other written records, which represent elite rather than mass perspectives. In Africa, most evidence is drawn from the records of European missionaries and colonial administrators, or from the writings of mission-educated African elite (Vail 1991). But not only did the perspectives of such individuals likely deviate significantly from those of ordinary people, in many cases their writings were explicitly aimed at fomenting ethnic mobilization rather than objectively documenting it (Connor

1990). To derive information about mass sentiments from such documents thus requires an act of "historical imagination" (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). In short, historical records lack non-elite perspectives, and are thus ill-suited to reveal the processes through which ethnic-based appeals succeeded in changing the preferences or practices of ordinary people. Because the mobilization of the Lhomwe population is quite recent and ongoing, it offers a unique opportunity to address fundamental open questions about the process of ethnic mobilization as it evolves, and perhaps fails, and to collect the attitudes, motivations, and behaviors of those involved.

Inducing Ethnic Visibility through Cultural Revival

The Assumption of Ethnic Visibility

Ethnic and tribal identities form the basis of political organization in many Sub-Saharan African countries, where ethnic affiliations are strongly correlated with vote choice (Carlson 2015; Posner 2004), partisanship (Ferree 2006; Huber 2012; Ishiyama 2012), policy preferences (Lieberman and McClendon 2012), provision of government services (Burgess et al. 2015; Ejdemyr, Kramon, and Robinson Forthcoming), and allegiances during civil conflict (Denny and Walter 2014). In explaining why ethnicity is so central to politics in many contexts, scholars often focus on two features of ethnicity that make it useful as an organizing principle: stickiness and visibility (Fearon 1999a; Chandra 2012). According to Chandra (2012), stickiness is the "property of being difficult to change credibly in the short term," while visibility "refers to the availability of raw data even in superficial observation" (p. 14). She later specifies what she means by superficial observation: "a glimpse of features and dress, a snatch of speech, a glance at a name" (p. 121). As Chandra also points out, the two properties are related – the visibility of many ethnic markers render them rather sticky.

While many scholars highlight the importance of ethnic visibility, they typically do not mean that ethnic markers must be attributes that we literally observe with our eyes. As Horowitz (1985) notes, "color and phenotype are not the only visible cues, and in any case reliance need rarely be based on visible cues alone" (p. 45). Ethnic cues may include phenotypic traits inherited at birth (e.g., skin color), physical attributes acquired during one's lifetime (e.g., body modifications), behavioral characteristics (e.g., dress), or numerous forms of non-visible signals (e.g., language, names, food preferences) (Horowitz 1985). Thus, to say that ethnicity is visible simply means that, within a given context, ethnic identities are discernible, perceptible, legible, or identifiable.

Examples of the pervasiveness of this assumption are abundant. Chandra (2004) argues that the "cultural diacritica that uniquely accompany ethnic identities render them more visible than nonethnic identites" (p. 78). Horowitz (1985) asserts that it is "generally true" that "even in a government office or a bar association, far from the village life, [ethnic] origins can easily be detected" (p. 45). Young (2002) tells us that one's ethnic identity will "usually be known by those in socially proximate locations" because "even if one aspires to ethnic anonymity, numerous cues permit others to read one's cultural attachment" (p. 15). Fearon (1999b) similarly notes that "common markers of ethnicity – physical appearance, speech and other manners – can be difficult or impossible for an individual to misrepresent" (p. 5). Koter (2016) notes that "one's ethnicity is usually easy to decipher" (p. 4) and Caselli and Coleman (2013) tells us that "ethnicity is readily observable" (p. 165). Even scholars who do not discuss visibility or identifiability explicitly seem to implicitly assume that ethnic identity is common knowledge. For example, Posner (2005) discusses how ethnic identity change is constrained to identities within a particular individual's "ethnic repertoire," because ethnic claims beyond that are not credible. This implies that an individual's true ethnic identity (or, in this case, identities) is legible to others.

For Hale (2004), it is the very visibility of ethnicity, and its correlation with other, less visible attributes, that makes it socially and politically relevant. Other scholars similarly posit a central role for ethnic visibility. For example, Chandra (2004) argues that ethnicity provides a useful cue for coordination and enforcement of patronage systems in low information and weakly institutionalized political systems precisely because it is easily observed. In this framework, ethnicity's visibility helps to coordinate whom a citizen should support politically and which constituents a politician should favor materially (Posner 2005; Chandra 2004, 2012). Such visibility also proves useful for exclusion. Fearon (1999b) argues that political patronage works best when networks are able to exclude non-members and there is a high cost of entry. The fact that ethnic identities are visible and stable makes them attractive candidates for organizing patronage politics.

Ethnic visibility is also central to existing explanations of violence, and support for coethnic politicians induced by the fear of violence. For example, Caselli and Coleman (2013) argue that visible ethnic distinctions make armed conflict more likely, because such visibility provides *ex ante* assurance that non-members can be excluded from the spoils of victory after conflict. Ethnic visibility may also induce political support for a particular party or candidate via the prospect of violence. If that party or candidate is associated with a particular ethnic community, and the members of that ethnic community are identifiable to non-members, then visible ethnic group members can be held collectively responsible for the

party or candidate's political actions. Under such conditions, members of the ethnic group, ostensibly associated with the party, have strong incentives to actively support that ethnic party, even if that support is not genuine (de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast 1997; Padró i Miquel 2007).

Political Implications of Variability in Ethnic Visibility

But, is ethnicity actually visible? Despite its centrality to theoretical accounts of ethnicity's political utility, a small body of existing work shows that ethnicity is not as visible as many theories assume. For example, American undergraduates across several universities were only able to identify Jewish students about half of the time (Allport and Kramer 1946), and rates of correct ethnic attribution did not differ among Jews and non-Jews (Lindzey and Rogolsky 1950). Habyarimana et al. (2009) report that Ugandans living in Kampala correctly classified their coethnics only about two thirds of the time, and incorrectly classified non-coethnics as members of their own group at a non-negligible rate (11%). Similarly, Harris and Findley (2014) report that South Africans correctly identified coethnics only 45% of the time, and non-coethnics significantly less often.[1]

The fact that, empirically, ethnicity is not as visible as many theories assume has led some to question the validity of such theories, or reject them completely. However, in my view, demonstrating variability in ethnic visibility does not mean that existing theories that rely on an assumption of ethnic visibility should be discarded. Instead, a consideration of ethnic visibility as a variable should help explain when such theories will hold, namely, among the the individuals, groups, and ethnic boundaries for which ethnicity is indeed observable.

For example, patronage-based theories of ethnic politics should lead us to expect not only that clientelist networks will tend to be ethnic in low information contexts, but that variation in ethnic visibility *within* ethnic groups should be related to ethnic party support. This is because it is the most ethnically visible who are most likely to benefit from the patronage rewards if an ethnic party wins office. Similarly, the logic through which ethnic visibility induces ethnic party support under the threat of collective accountability should mean

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[1]In response to such low rates of ethnic identifiability, most of these scholars have attempted to identify characteristics associated with an improved ability to discern the ethnicity of others. In particular, a series of studies demonstrated that individuals with more prejudicial views of ethnic minorities were better able to identify members of that ethnic minority, which was typically attributed to their increased sensitivity to ethnic cues (Allport and Kramer 1946; Lindzey and Rogolsky 1950; Dorfman, Keeve, and Saslow 1971). Similarly, Harris and Findley (2014) find that South Africans' ability to correctly classify the ethnicity of others increased with strength of attachment to their own ethnic group. These studies thus demonstrate that individuals differ in their ability to ethnically identify others, with those most invested in ethnic distinctions performing the best.

that more ethnically visible individuals will demonstrate the strongest support for ethnic leaders. This is because the most ethnically visible are at the highest risk of being victimized in ethnically-targeted violence, like the kind that followed the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections. For both these reasons, when ethnicity is relevant for politics, ethnically visible citizens should mobilize greater support for coethnic elites and ethnic parties than their less visible coethnics; they have the most to gain and the most to lose in the outcome of ethnic competition for power and material resources.

In short, I contend that variation in ethnic visibility is itself politically relevant. This recognition pushes the study of ethnic politics beyond the question of *why* ethnicity is politically relevant, and towards a better understanding of *among whom* ethnicity is politically relevant. It also forces us to focus theoretically and empirically on the political processes that leverage, constrain, or manipulate ethnic identifiability.

Ethnic Visibility as a Political Aim

Recognizing ethnic visibility as a political resource raises the question of whether political actors are able to influence the degree to which members of their own ethnic community are identifiable as such. In particular, because political elites stand to benefit from increased ethnic visibility, in the form of greater support from coethnics, we should expect them to try to strategically increase ethnic visibility through concerted political and social action.

Past research has documented the role that political elites can play in cultural change, as they emphasize some cultural features over others in their mobilization efforts (e.g., Brass 1979; Chandra 2012). But in such cases, the political aim is typically to expand or redefine membership rules in ways that benefit elites in a particular context. Instead, I argue that reifying ethnic differences – and, as a result, increasing ethnic visibility – could itself be a political aim, rather than (solely) changing the size or composition of the ethnic group.

But, given that increased ethnic visibility benefits political elite precisely because it constrains their coethnic citizens, why would non-elites "comply" by adopting or emphasizing markers of ethnic belonging? I propose that one strategy for inducing increased visibility via individual-level cultural change is to engender cultural pride. In particular, in contexts where an ethnic community has been marginalized and denigrated in the past, cultural pride may itself be seen as a form of patronage. One rather straightforward way to deliver such pride is through an elite-led cultural revival focused on renewing and celebrating the lost heritage of a particular ethnic community. The consumption of this form of "pride as patronage" by citizens will, in turn, result in increased ethnic visibility. For example, if elites can increase

the pride that an individual feels in their ascriptive identity, they may be more likely to express that pride by publicly expressing their ethnic identity, adorning themselves in ethnic regalia, increasing their use of the ethnic language, or giving their children ethnically-marked names.

In short, elite-led cultural revivals can result in cultural changes that are advantageous to generating an ethnic base of political support. This is because in contexts where ethnic differences are quite minor, ethnic reification is necessary in order for ethnicity to have the property that ostensibly makes it useful as a means to mobilize political support – visibility.

Theoretical Expectations

This discussion suggests a number of empirical expectations. First, ethnic visibility should be related to ethnic party support, with more identifiable individuals expressing stronger support for coethnic parties and candidates. Second, elite-led cultural revivals should increase pride in ethnic belonging, especially among members of low-status groups. Third, elite-led cultural revivals should be associated with individual-level cultural change that results in increased ethnic visibility. Finally, the effect of cultural revival on ethnic visibility should be stronger among individuals for whom the cultural revival increased ethnic pride.

Cultural Revival in Malawi

I explore these theoretical expectations within the context of Malawi. In particular, I focus on the Lhomwe cultural revival, spearheaded by an ethnic association, Mulhako wa Alhomwe, and its association with formal politics. After Bakili Muluzi, the first president elected under multi-party democracy, lost his bid to abolish term limits in 2002, Bingu wa Mutharika was chosen to succeed him as the 2004 United Democratic Front (UDF) presidential candidate (Dulani 2011). Mutharika was a relatively unknown political actor who had spent most of his career as a technocrat in international organizations. Many assert that Mutharika was chosen precisely because of his low profile, and that Muluzi planned to rule by proxy via Mutharika (Dulani 2011; Ntata 2012). After winning the 2004 election, Mutharika proved to be a bad puppet: he broke from Muluzi almost immediately, culminating in the establishment of a new party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), headed by Mutharika in 2005. Despite widespread defections to the DPP within parliament, Mutharika ruled with a minority government during his first term.

In 2009, Mutharika won a second presidential contest, this time by a significantly wider margin. While previous elections revealed strong regional voting patterns in Malawi (Chirwa 1998; Ferree and Horowitz 2010; Kaspin 1995) – most ethnic groups voted as a bloc but most parties represented multiple groups – Mutharika secured sizeable support from all three regions, portending the end of regional voting in Malawi (Ferree and Horowitz 2010). However, in the course of Mutharika's second term (2009 until his death in 2012), his party and his government arguably became more and more ethnically defined. Mutharika hailed from the Lhomwe ethnic group in southern Malawi, and accusations emerged in 2009 of ethnic favoritism toward the Lhomwe in all facets of government. In addition, Mutharika publicly embarked on a Lhomwe cultural revival, including the establishment of a Lhomwe ethnic association, Mulhako wa Alhomwe, and the creation of a new chieftaincy. This section reviews the history of the Lhomwe ethnic group in Malawi, the recent rise in their cultural and ethnic mobilization, and the relationship between this cultural revival and the politics of the DPP.

Lhomwe History in Malawi

The Lhomwe ethnic group is generally believed to originate from the Namuli Hills in the central part of what is now Mozambique, and first immigrated to lands within the borders of present-day Malawi between 1570 and 1625 in response to widespread drought and famine (Boeder 1984). This first wave of Lhomwe migrants were assimilated into indigenous ethnic groups, including the Mang'anja and the Yao. While the Lhomwe roots among members of these other ethnic groups is often disputed (Rashid 1978), many Lhomwe today reference such populations as being "really Lhomwe" rather than Yao or Mang'anja.

Beginning around 1899, another wave of Lhomwe immigration from Portuguese East Africa into Nyasaland (Malawi) was driven by the encroachment of the Portuguese colonial state, the imposition of harsh taxation and forced labor, and the advancement of slave raiding into Lhomweland (Boeder 1984; White 1984). In addition to these push factors, Lhomwe within Portuguese East Africa were actively recruited by the Nyasaland colonial government to work on European estates in southern Malawi in order to grow tea, coffee, cotton, and tobacco (Boeder 1984; White 1984). The Lhomwe were seen as a desirable labor force because they were willing to perform difficult work at very low wages due to their tenuous position as immigrants.

These Lhomwe migrants, like those that came before them, often settled under chiefs and headmen from other ethnic groups, especially the Mang'anja and Yao (White 1984). Given

the location of estates and available land, most of these newly arrived immigrants settled in Mulanje and Thyolo districts, as well as, to a lesser degree, Blantyre, Chiradzulu, and Zomba districts. In most of these areas, their vulnerability as immigrants resulted in the Lhomwe serving as a captive labor within the *thangata* system, in which labor was exchanged for access to land (White 1984). Because Mulanje was relatively sparsely populated (due to previous conflicts between the Ngoni, Yao, and Portuguese), Lhomwe were sometimes able to access land to grow cash crops in Mulanje, freeing them from having to work on European estates (Boeder 1984). By 1931, it is estimated that almost 250,000 Lhomwe had settled within colonial Nyasaland (Boeder 1984). It is the descendants of this population to which most people are referring when they talk about the Lhomwe population in Malawi today. In general, Mulanje, Thyolo, and Phalombe (previously part of Mulanje) districts are seen as the heart of the "Lhomwe belt."

From the beginning, Lhomwe in Malawi occupied the lowest economic and social rungs of society. Those who settled under Mang'anja chiefs often contributed manual labor to his gardens, and were, as a result, referred to disparagingly as *akapolo* (slaves) (Bandawe 1971; Boeder 1984). Those who settled among the Yao were referred to as *nguru*, a derogatory term derived either from a specific dialect of Lhomwe (Boeder 1984) or from a Yao word meaning "speaker of an unintelligible language" (Bandawe 1971). In fact, for many years, the Lhomwe were referred to by the colonial government and most Nyasaland subjects as Anguru rather than Lhomwe. The British colonial administration also saw the Lhomwe as one of the least socially desirable groups in Nyasaland, referring to them as "poor specimens" and "the dirtiest people of all," as well as asserting that they were a "low caste race, whose ignorance makes them at once savage and timid" (colonial reports cited in Boeder 1984).[2] These types of negative stereotypes were exacerbated by the concentration of Lhomwe on agricultural estates, where prospects of manual labor reduced investments in education. Such stereotypes against the Lhomwe persisted until recent times, with many Malawians characterizing the Lhomwe as retrogressive and uneducated, very involved in witchcraft, and as snake-eaters and cannibals (Kamwendo 2002).

Historically, the Lhomwe were a politically decentralized, matrilineal society with authority

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[2]In the editorial prelude to Bandawe's (1971) memories, Pachai quotes a 1910 Nyasaland colonial handbook as stating: "The immigrant Anguru rarely or never form communities of their own when settling in British territory, but prefer to attach themselves to prominent Yao or Anyanja chiefs, in return for whose protection they usually perform a certain amount of menial labour. The status of these Anguru strangers in a Yao or Anyanja village is somewhat peculiar. They are often described by other natives, and indeed describe themselves as *'akapolo'* (slaves), a misleading term, however, in this case since their personal rights and liberties are hardly ever curtailed to any oppressive degree, although their racial inferiority causes them to be held in some measure of contempt and relegates them naturally to an inferior position as compared with more intelligent tribes."

resting with individual village headmen and elders within the community (Boeder 1984). Given their origins as labor migrants and the general disrespect in which the Lhomwe were held by the colonial government, the government did not recognize any Lhomwe headmen during most of the colonial period, disadvantaging Lhomwe representation under indirect rule (Boeder 1984). The only formal political mobilization of the Lhomwe during colonial times was the creation of the Lhomwe Tribal Representative Association (LTRA) in 1943, led by Lewis Mataka Bandawe (Bandawe 1971). Created to be a voice for Lhomwe concerns, the organization also sought to interpret and enforce colonial policy among the Lhomwe people. The main achievement of the LTRA was to successfully petition the colonial government to change its official name for the Lhomwe people from *Anguru*, which was seen as derogatory, to *Alomwe* in 1945 (Boeder 1984). The group had, at its peak, 200 members, and was disbanded in 1947 in favor of the newly formed, pan-ethnic Nyasaland African Congress (Boeder 1984).

While not explicitly mobilized along ethnic lines, two important uprisings against the Nyasaland colonial government were carried out primarily by Lhomwe subjects. First, the famed Chilembwe uprising of 1915 relied heavily on 'Anguru' laborers, who comprised the majority of Chilembwe's congregation (White 1984). As a result, in the aftermath of the Chilembwe uprising, many Lhomwe stopped self-identifying as Nguru/Lhomwe, and began to call themselves Yao to offer some protection from colonial reprisals (White 1984). Second, in 1953 there was an uprising in southern Malawi against the colonial government in general, and the Central African Federation, in particular. Lhomwe, referred to as "immigrants from Mozambique," were officially blamed for the uprising and ensuing riots (White 1984). Excluding these two events and the brief existence of the LTRA, the Lhomwe were not politically mobilized in any meaningful way prior to 2008 (Matiki 1996; Kamwendo 2002; Kayira and Banda 2013).

Why were the Lhomwe less politically mobilized than other groups in Malawi? Vail and White (1991) argue that colonial rule in Malawi, and its reliance on ethnically-defined intermediaries, created ethnic classifications within Malawi. However, such classifications were mobilized into full blown ethnic identities only "when and where a group of African intellectuals were available to give specific cultural definition to the supposed 'tribe' and to communicate this vision through education" (p. 152). They argue that there was unevenness in the supply of such intellectuals, and the educational infrastructure to disseminate their ethnic ideologies, due to differences in the missionaries who operated in different regions of Malawi. In particular, the combination of particular mission outposts and local elite incentives resulted in the creation of both the Tumbuka and Ngoni ethnicities in northern Malawi.

In southern Malawi, colonial institutions and the Yao chieftaincy together produced a similar "awakening" of the Yao ethnic group. But for other groups, including the Lhomwe, the lack of an educated class, or incentives to promote ethnic consciousness among them, meant that the potential emergence of widespread ethnic identification did not arise.

In addition to the lack of political mobilization, Lhomwe cultural traditions have been slowly eroded since their settlement in Malawi for a number of reasons. First, the loss of Lhomwe cultural traditions, including dances, initiation rites, and language, resulted from assimilation with ethnic groups among whom the Lhomwe settled and intermarried. This cultural loss was noted as early as 1922 in colonial records (White 1984). Second, while all languages other than Chichewa were suppressed during the first thirty years of Malawian independence (Forster 1994; Chirwa 1998), the decline of Chilomwe was especially steep. Matiki (1996) found that very few Lhomwe could speak Chilomwe in 1996, and those who could were almost exclusively older people. In addition to Hasting Kamuzu Banda's Chichewa-only language policy, Matiki (1996) attributes Chilomwe's decline to the greater economic prospects of Chichewa and the fact that Chilomwe was not taught in schools or used politically. In addition, Chilomwe was looked down upon by speakers of other languages: Boeder (1984) reports that the Chilomwe "th" is rare among Bantu languages, and as a result the groups among whom the Lhomwe settled thought Chilomwe sounded like the "mutterings of a drunk." Third, there was a marked loss of Lhomwe surnames by wholesale name changes or adaptations of spelling and pronunciations to sound more Chichewa (Matiki 1996).[3] Today, most Lhomwe know when, how, and by whom their name was changed. During Banda's era, Malawians from many different ethnic groups changed their surnames to a Chichewa version in order to reduce perceived discrimination, but this seems to have been especially true for the Lhomwe (Kamwendo 2002; Kayira and Banda 2013). Fourth, the negative stereotypes about Lhomwe among other Malawians led to a sense of general shame in Lhomwe identity (Matiki 1996; Kamwendo 2002; Kayira and Banda 2013), which tended to exacerbate the loss of cultural markers outlined above. Many Lhomwe today recall feeling embarrassed to say they were Lhomwe, and would often try to pass as a member of another group (Kayira and Banda 2013).

Cultural Revival: *"Alhomwe, Alhomwe, noophiya!"*

Between 2008 and the present, the relative "silence" of the Lhomwe "majority" (Boeder 1984) has been broken. There is a general sense that a Lhomwe cultural revival is underway

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[3]For example, the name Mkorongolhiwa would be changed to Ngongoliwa, and Komiha would become Ligomeka.

(Kayira and Banda 2013), marked by the creation of an active cultural association (Mulhako wa Alhomwe) and the wholesale creation of a Lhomwe chieftaincy.

Mulhako wa Alhomwe was created between 2007 and 2008 (reported dates differ) and officially launched with Mutharika as its founder and patron in 2008. Mulhako wa Alhomwe was established as a trust with the goal of preserving and celebrating the traditions of the Lhomwe ethnic group (Ntata 2012). "Mulhako" means "door" in Chilomwe, and thus the name of the association refers to itself as the gateway to Lhomwe culture. The Mulhako wa Alhomwe association is headquartered on a large plot of land in Chonde, Mulanje District, in the heart of the Lhomwe belt. The motto of the group, prominently displayed on a billboard outside their headquarters, is *"Alhomwe, Alhomwe, noophiya!"*, which in Chilomwe means "Lhomwes, Lhomwes, we are here!"

At its inauguration, Mutharika claimed that "Mulhako is non-political: it is about promoting Alhomwe cultural and traditional values including our language" (Ntata 2012, p. 159). Its focus on cultural preservation, and its independence from politics, has been a key refrain among Mulhako leadership ever since. Towards that end, Mulhako partnered with the Malawian National Intangible Cultural Heritage Committee (NICHC), established in the 1994 constitution, to have the "intangible cultural heritage" of the Lhomwe, especially the *tchopa* dance, recognized by UNESCO (2009). In addition, with financial assistance from the government, Mulhako wa Alhomwe established a small cultural museum in Chonde and began raising livestock in order to make traditional drums and attire (Zeze 2015). To try to stall the extinction of the language, Chilomwe classes were offered at the Chonde headquarters beginning in 2009, with plans to extend these schools across the country in 2011, although this has not yet happened. Finally, in 2015 Mulhako wa Alhomwe announced that they would begin broadcasting a radio station from the Chonde headquarters.

In addition to these smaller cultural initiatives, the main program organized by Mulhako wa Alhomwe is the annual festival hosted every October at the headquarters in Chonde, which began in 2011. At the multi-day festival, there are *tchopa* dance competitions, Lhomwe traditional foods and beer, and representations of Lhomwe cultural heritage (e.g., clothing, tools, etc.) on display. In addition, there are various speeches by Mulhako leadership and government officials. Mulhako wa Alhomwe leaders claim to bring almost all of the Lhomwe in Malawi to the Chonde grounds each year, although there are no reliable estimates of attendance. While the festival is purportedly funded through donations (K80 million, ∼$178,000 US, this year), there is a widespread belief that much of the financial support comes from the government.

In addition to the creation and efforts of Mulhako wa Alhomwe, the Lhomwe cultural revival has also been aided by government bolstering of Lhomwe chiefs. In particular, Bingu wa Mutharika installed the first Lhomwe paramount, Chief Mkhumba, on October 25, 2008 (Kayira and Banda 2013). At the 2014 Lhomwe festival, Peter Mutharika (Bingu wa Mutharika's younger brother and now president) installed the first Lhomwe traditional authority, TA Ngongoliwa, who is very active in the leadership of Mulhako wa Alhomwe. Since the death of Paramount Chief Mkhumba in 2014, it is widely expected that TA Ngongoliwa will be promoted to Paramount Chief.

Political Mobilization: *Mulhakolism*

In 2009, Mutharika's reelection marked the least regionally defined voting patterns in Malawi's history, with Mutharika's DPP receiving 66% of the national vote (Ferree and Horowitz 2010). Mutharika's widespread support in 2009 has typically been attributed to the ruling party's concerted efforts to appeal to voters beyond ethnic and regional lines. They have done this through the use of universalist programs, such as the fertilizer subsidy, and symbolic concessions to the cultural legacies of other ethnic groups (Ferree and Horowitz 2010). These efforts were driven by the president's unique position after breaking away from the party of his predecessor in order to form his own party, forcing him to reach out to other opposition parties with strong support in regions outside the DPP's southern stronghold.

After winning this national mandate, however, Mutharika's second term was decidedly different. Mutharika was warned by an aid in June 2009 that an "emerging opinion" was arising, especially in the south, that the DPP was a "Lhomwe party" (Ntata 2012, p.149). Mutharika surrounded himself with the leadership of the Mulhako wa Alhomwe cultural organization, and started edging out non-Lhomwe members of the DPP, including his vice president, Joyce Banda. In addition, Mutharika filled the upper ranks of his government with fellow Lhomwe: according to one media account, all thirteen executive positions and seventeen heads of government institutions were held by Lhomwe in Mutharika's second term (*Nyasa Times* 2009). In addition, the perception that the Lhomwe belt was disproportionately favored by Mutharika grew, especially with the establishment of a new technical university (the Malawi Institute for Science and Technology) in Thyolo district.

There is now a sense that the DPP is the most ethnically-defined party in Malawi's history. While in the past you could fairly accurately predict someone's vote choice by knowing his or her ethnicity, multiple ethnic groups voted for the same party. In the theoretically framework of Huber (2012), such patterns are considered "group-based" ethnicization of

politics. Many now argued that the DPP is moving instead to a context where the bulk of the party's support comes from a single ethnic group, the Lhomwe. In Huber's framework this is referred to as "party-based" ethnicization, and non-Lhomwe Malawians fear that this form of ethnic politics will be more dangerous than previous regional blocs.

Bingu wa Mutharika died in office in 2012, and Joyce Banda, his estranged vice president, replaced him, despite efforts to install Mutharika's younger brother instead (Dionne and Dulani 2013). In 2014, that younger brother, Peter Mutharika, was elected president with 36% of the vote, and the DPP won 50 of 193 parliamentary seats. This election saw a return to a regional pattern to voting, reminiscent of the first three elections in Malawi's multiparty era (Dulani and Dionne 2014). While Peter Mutharika is perhaps less invested in Mulhako wa Alhomwe and the Lhomwe cultural revival than his elder brother, even he has been regularly accused of favoring the Lhomwe, a particular manifestation of tribalism referred to colloquially as "Mulhakolism."

Observable Implications

Applying the theoretical framework to this particular case results in the following hypotheses:

- Ethnic visibility among Lhomwe citizens should be positively correlated with support for the DPP political party.
- Mulhako wa Alhomwe efforts at cultural revival should be associated with increased pride in Lhomwe identity.
- The Lhomwe cultural revival should be associated with changes in individual-level cultural attributes that increase the visibility of their ethnic identity.
- The effects of the cultural revival on ethnic visibility should be strongest among the Lhomwe for whom ethnic pride increased.

Data

To evaluate these expectations, I carried out a multi-method research project with three major components. First, I fielded an original survey targeted at members of the Lhomwe ethnic group across three districts of Malawi in October and November 2016. Second, I collected in-depth oral histories from elderly members of the Lhomwe ethnic group in all surveyed communities. Third, I interviewed relevant elite actors, including Mulhako wa Alhomwe leadership and Lhomwe traditional authorities. Data were collected in collaboration

with the Institute for Public Opinion Research (IPOR), a non-profit research organization located in Zomba, Malawi, in fall 2016 and summer 2017. The following sections provide more information about the different sources of data.

Original Survey

Face-to-face surveys were conducted with 1,254 Malawian citizens over 18 days in October and November 2016, 892 of whom reported their ethnicity as Lhomwe (71%). Respondents were sampled from thirty-six different Lhomwe-majority localities across three Malawian districts: two in the Lhomwe heartland, Mulanje and Thyolo Districts (75% and 76% Lhomwe, respectively), and one with a sizable Lhomwe population outside the homeland, Machinga District (28% Lhomwe).[4] Figure 1 shows the location of these three districts and the distribution of Lhomwe citizens.

Across these three districts, there are 1,036 census enumeration areas where at least 60% of the population is Lhomwe: 20 in Machinga, 497 in Mulanje, and 519 in Thyolo (National Statistics Office of Malawi 2008). The process of random selection of respondents occurred in five stages. First, from these 1,036 Lhomwe majority localities, 36 localities were randomly selected, stratified by district, with 6 in Machinga, and 15 each in Mulanje and Thyolo. For each selected locality, I randomly selected three geographically adjacent localities as backups. Backup enumeration areas were used in cases where the team was unable to work in a particular locality (e.g., due to a funeral) or where there were not enough households within a particular enumeration area (e.g, enumeration areas within commercial estates). As a result of utilizing these backups, and on-the-ground uncertainty about enumeration area borders, respondents in the sample were actually drawn from 55 different enumeration areas, a few of which were not Lhomwe majority. Figure 1 shows the location of the respondents interviewed.

Second, each of the selected localities was randomly assigned to be visited before or after the annual Mulhako wa Alhomwe cultural gathering on October 30, 2016 (discussed in greater detail below), again stratified by district so that roughly half of the localities within each district were visited prior to the Mulhako event. Third, I randomly assigned the particular day on which each locality would be visited, with two localities visited per day. Fourth, within each locality, the research team randomly selected households using the random walk method, and alternated the gender of the desired respondent. Finally, respondents were randomly selected from among all adults of the designated gender with each selected household by

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[4]The survey instrument was piloted in Lhomwe-majority areas of Zomba district.

Figure 1: Research Field Sites

assigning a number to each adult and asking the head of household to select a card without seeing the numbers. Our response rate was 99%, with only 8 selected respondents declining to participate. Table A.1 of the appendix shows basic descriptive statistics for the entire

sample.

Because the primary population of interest was Lhomwe citizens, we focused our sample on Lhomwe majority localities. However, we knew that a sizable minority of the randomly selected participants would not be Lhomwe. Because we did not want to create local tension by excluding non-Lhomwes residents of selected communities from our sample (Dionne, Harawa, and Honde 2016), we used a separate survey template for non-Lhomwe respondents.[5] The inclusion of non-Lhomwe respondents can also shed light on perceptions of the Lhomwe cultural revival among non-Lhomwe living in Lhomwe-dominated localities, though most analyses focus on the self-identified Lhomwe subsample.

Survey interviews were carried out face-to-face by eight trained enumerators from the Institute for Public Opinion Research in Zomba, Malawi working in two teams of four. Because of the potential for large enumerator-ethnicity effects on survey questions about ethnicity (Adida et al. 2016), I sought to employ enumerators who themselves hailed from the Lhomwe ethnic group: in the end, six of the eight enumerators were Lhomwe. Survey responses were collected via Open Data Kit (ODK) on electronic tablets.

The survey included three different modules: one on standard demographics (including gender, age, ethnicity, education, etc.), one on ethnic practice and identification (including strength of ethnic identification, participation in and recognition of ethnic practices and rituals, behavioral investments in ethnic identity, perceptions of ethnic visibility, etc.), and one on political attitudes and behavior (party support, perceptions of the government, etc.).[6]

Qualitative Data

In addition to the survey, qualitative data were collected in two ways. First, the research team collected oral histories from 36 elderly Lhomwe individuals, one within each of the randomly selected localities in which survey data were collected. While survey respondents constituted a random sample, the oral history respondents were recruited with the help of the village headman. In each locality, the group village headman was asked to suggest a potential respondent over the age of 65 and who would be aware of local history. This selection procedure ensured that we were able to talk to well informed elderly individuals that were able to report on local histories. These in-depth interviews collected information about changes over time in Lhomwe (and sub-group) ethnic consciousness, political mobi-

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[5]The survey template was automatically generated within the ODK software based on a respondent's answer to the question of his or her ethnicity.

[6]The entire survey instrument is available at `http://bit.ly/2kXjTul`.

lization, group membership rules, and experiences with discrimination and marginalization over time. The oral histories asked elderly Lhomwe individuals about events during their lifetime, as well as accounts told to them personally by previous generations (e.g., parents, grandparents, older neighbors, etc.). Second, I conducted in-depth interviews with current and former leaders of the Mulhako wa Alhomwe ethnic association and with Lhomwe traditional authorities. The interviews focused on a respondent's connection to Mulhako wa Alhomwe or the chieftancy; their assessment of that organization's success in meeting its goals; their perceptions of the recent Lhomwe cultural mobilization and its implications; and their own understanding of the connections between Mulhako wa Alhomwe, the DPP, and the Lhomwe chieftaincy. Oral histories and interviews were audio recorded, transcribed, translated (if required), and coded.

RESULTS

This section reports three sets of findings. First, I describe the measurement of ethnic visibility and its correlates. Second, I show the relationship between ethnic visibility and support for the DPP political party, controlling for other factors that may drive party support. Third, I evaluate whether the cultural revival has actually increased ethnic pride and Lhomwe ethnic visibility.

Ethnic Visibility

The survey included four different indicators of ethnic visibility. First, respondents were asked, "If a stranger heard your first/given name, could he know that you are Lhomwe just based on that name?" Around a third of Lhomwe respondents (34%) reported that their given name signaled their Lhomwe identity. Second, they were asked the same question about their surname – "If a stranger heard your last/surname, could he know that you are Lhomwe just based on that name?" – and 47% felt that their surname was obviously Lhomwe. Third, respondents were asked, "Do other people ever assume that you belong to a different ethnic group than the Lhomwe?" This question was reverse coded, and 86% of Lhomwe respondents reported that they are never mistaken for a non-Lhomwe. Fourth, respondents were asked "Which of the following statements is closest to your view: 'I see myself as quite similar to most other Lhomwes' or 'I see myself as quite different from most other Lhomwes.' By this measure, 56% of Lhomwe respondents see themselves as "typically Lhomwe."

Table 1 shows the relationships between these four variables in the form of correlation co-efficients. Lhomwe-signaling first and last names are correlated, but otherwise there are only weak relationships. Lhomwe first names are associated with a lower likelihood of being mistaken for a member of another group, and a Lhomwe surname is associated with feeling typically Lhomwe. If we think about ethnic visibility as a latent construct, then the two name indicators should be considered formative measures (factors affecting the latent variable), while the other two indicators are instead reflective (factors affected by the latent variable), because experiences with misidentification and feelings of ethnic typicality are likely formed by latent ethnic visibility. Given such difference in measurement types, I have used two different methods for creating a visibility index: a simple additive index ranging from 0-4 and a first principal component.[7] In the main analyses, I report results for the PCA-based index, but results are replicated in the appendix using the additive index.

Table 1: Correlation Matrix of Lhomwe Visibility Indicators

	Lhomwe First Name	Lhomwe Surname	Rarely Mistaken	Similar to Others
Lhomwe First Name	1.00			
Lhomwe Surname	0.48***	1.00		
Never Mistaken for Non-Lhomwe	0.07*	−0.01	1.00	
Typical Lhomwe	0.07	0.10**	0.01	1.00

$^*p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$

Source: Survey data from 817 Lhomwe Malawians.

As seen in Table A.1, there is significant variation in ethnic visibility among the survey sample. This variation in ethnic visibility is also apparent in the oral histories. For example, when asked if Lhomwe identity was discernible, one respondent told us, "it is very difficult to tell." Many respondents noted ambiguous boundaries between Lhomwes and neighboring groups like the Yao and Mang'anja. For example, one respondent said, "there are many Mang'anjas who are living like Lhomwes" and others said, "all I can say is that we are all the same, we are not different people" and "the outward appearance is not any different." Other respondents painted a different picture of Lhomwe identifiability. For example, one woman recounted meeting a fellow Lhomwe outside the Lhomwe-majority area and knowing immediately that they were coethnics: "You see, I went to Mangochi where I met a fellow Lhomwe. When we met, I just knew she was Lhomwe and she knew I was without prior talks."

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[7]The first principal component has an eigenvalue of 1.51. While all four indicators load positively onto this component, the names indicators are much stronger drivers of the index than rates of being misidentified or ethnic typicality.

What explains this variation in visibility, and who among the Lhomwe are most visible? The data suggest two drivers of ethnic visibility. First, the oral histories show that **language and accent** are among the strongest signals of Lhomwe identity. One respondent told us, "the body is the same but the tongue is different." Even when Lhomwe speak the national language, Chichewa, they may be identified by their accent. For example, one respondent said, "The way we speak Chichewa is different to the rest and people would easily notice that we are Lhomwes." Others gave specific examples of *how* Lhomwes speak differently, for example, "Lomwe suck their teeth when speaking" or "We don't emphasis on words when speaking, for instance, for 'dza' we say 'za'" or "As I speak, my tongue is twisting in a unique manner, which makes it easy for one to know that I am Lhomwe." Among survey respondents, 63% claimed to speak or understand Chilhomwe and 14% reported Chilhomwe as their first language. Language capacity in Chilhomwe was also assessed directly by having any respondent who claimed to speak or understand Chilhomwe listen to a 45 second MBC Radio 1 news clip in Chilhomwe which was broadcast on Saturday, October 8, 2016.[8] The news clip describes a donation made by a group of Asian businessmen in Lilongwe to vendors who had lost their wares in a fire a few weeks before. Respondents listened to the audio clip and then answered two open-ended comprehension questions. Overall, 47% of Lhomwe respondents understand Chilhomwe well enough to answer at least one comprehension question correctly. All three measures of Chilhomwe ability are positively associated with ethnic visibility, though the relationship is stronger for first language speakers ($r = 0.17, p < 0.01$) than self-reported ability ($r = 0.06, p = 0.12$) or objective competency ($r = 0.10, p < 0.05$).[9]

Second, respondents' **ethnic heritage** also seems to shape visibility. Among the 892 Lhomwe respondents, only 579 (65%) reported that all four grandparents were Lhomwe, although virtually all (96%) had at least two Lhomwe grandparents. Consistent with the group's matrilineal kinship system, rates of reported Lhomwe heritage among Lhomwe self-identifiers differed across grandparents: 94% of Lhomwe respondents had Lhomwe maternal grandmothers, 91% maternal grandfathers, 84% paternal grandmothers, and 80% paternal grandfathers.[10] Ethnic visibility was significantly higher among Lhomwe respondents with

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[8]Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC) Radio 1 broadcasts news programming primarily in English or Chichewa, the official and national languages, respectively. However, brief news overviews of about five minutes each are broadcast each day in six different Malawian languages, including Chilhomwe.

[9]There were different degrees of association with the different individual indicators of visibility. First-language Chilomwe speakers were more likely to have Lhomwe first names (51% vs. 31%, $t = 4.45, p < 0.001$) and Lhomwe surnames (59% vs. 45%, $t = 2.88, p < 0.01$), and were more likely to see themselves as typically Lhomwe (64% vs. 55%, $t = 1.90, p < 0.10$), but were no less likely be mistaken for a member of another group. Both self-reported and objectively assessed Chilhomwe competency were only associated with Lhomwe surnames and Lhomwe typicality, but were unrelated to Lhomwe first names and being misidentified.

[10]Over a third (35%) of non-Lhomwe respondents reported having at least one Lhomwe grandparent and 9% reported having a Lhomwe maternal grandmother, which would traditionally mean that they are Lhomwe

four Lhomwe grandparents than those with mixed heritage ($t = 5.28, p < 0.001$), and "pure" Lhomwe ancestry was significantly correlated with each of the four components of the visibility scale.

In contrast, ethnic visibility is uncorrelated with geographic and demographic characteristics of respondents' surroundings, including residence within the "Lhomwe belt", the size of the Lhomwe ethnic group within one's enumeration area, and distance to the Mulhako wa Alhomwe headquarters in Chonde, Mulanje. Ethnic visibility is also unrelated to individual level characteristics such as gender, age, education level, employment, or length of village residence.

Ethnic Visibility and Ethnic Party Support

To capture party support, respondents were asked whether they felt close to any political party, and, if so, which party. Two-thirds of Lhomwe respondents (67%) expressed closeness to a political party and, among those, 94% felt close to the DPP.[11] Overall, 62% of Lhomwes felt close to the DPP.[12]

To evaluate the relationship between ethnic visibility and support for the DPP, I use a multi-level linear model with enumeration area random effects.[13] Model 1 of Table 2 shows that the ethnic visibility PCA index is positively correlated with support for DPP. In terms of substantive effect size, a one standard deviation increase in ethnic visibility ($sd = 1.22$) is associated with a three percentage point increase in the likelihood of supporting the DPP political party. Model 2 of Table 2 includes enumerator fixed effects, and Model 3 accounts for individual level characteristics (gender, age, education, employment, and long-term village residence). Models 4 through 7 show that all four components of the visibility index are individually associated with increased DPP support. Table A.2 of the appendix shows the same pattern of results for the additive index of ethnic visibility.

I next evaluate whether the association between ethnic visibility and ethnic party support is

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by matrilineal custom. In the future, I plan to look at characteristics of these "potential Lhomwes" (non-Lhomwe identifiers who have some Lhomwe heritage), and compare them to Lhomwe identifiers with mixed heritage, in order to better understand how the Mulhako wa Alhomwe led cultural revival is perceived among "potential Lhomwes" with mixed ethnic heritage.

[11]The survey also included an endorsement experiment that will be used to measure latent levels of support for the party.

[12]This was significantly higher than DPP support among non-Lhomwes (55%, $t = 2.25$, $p < 0.05$). This ethnic difference in DPP party support also holds outside the Lhomwe belt, where we see similar levels of support for DPP among Lhomwes.

[13]A linear probability model is used for ease of interpretation, but models estimated using a multi-level logistic model are included in Table A.3 of the appendix.

robust to controlling for other drivers of party support, some of which would be correlated with ethnic visibility. Other potential drivers of support for the DPP include evaluations of government performance (as DPP is the ruling party), strength of Lhomwe identification, and geographic characteristics that facilitate ethnic targeting. Perceptions of government performance were captured by asking respondents, "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say?" followed by twelve different performance dimensions: managing the economy, improving living standards of the poor, creating jobs, keeping prices down, improving basic health services, addressing educational needs, providing water and sanitation services, ensuring everyone has enough to eat, making sure that all cultural groups in Malawi benefit equally from development, fighting corruption in government, maintaining roads and bridges, preserving the cultural heritage of Malawi, and providing a reliable source of electricity. For each dimension, respondents were asked to rate government performance from very poorly to very well, and I average responses across all twelve categories for a single measure of government performance. Respondents were also asked about whether the country was going in the right direction or not.[14] Finally, respondents were asked whether their living conditions now were better than ten years ago. Table A.4 of the appendix shows that all three measures of government performance are strongly, positively related to support for the DPP. However, controlling for perceptions of government performance does not reduce the effect of ethnic visibility.

Strength of ethnic identification was captured using the standard Afrobarometer question, which asks respondents how strongly they identify in national versus ethnic terms, with larger numbers indicating stronger ethnic identification relative to national identification. Respondents were also asked their level of agreement with five standard statements regarding ethnocentricism, which I combined into a single index using principal component analysis.[15] Table A.5 of the appendix shows that while strength of ethnic identification (relative to national) is not related to support for the DPP, ethnocentricism is. However, the effect of ethnic visibility is not affected by the inclusion of these variables.

The ethnic politics literature would also predict that geographic and demographic factors

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[14]The question read: "Think about the current direction of our country. Some people might think the country is going in the wrong direction. Others may feel it is going in the right direction. So let me ask you about the overall direction of the country: Would you say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction?" Respondents could also give a neutral/neither response.

[15]The five statements were (1) Most other cultures are backward compared to my culture, (2) Most people would be happier if they lived like people in my culture, (3) People in my culture can learn a lot from people of other cultures (reverse coded), (4) I dislike interacting with people from different cultures, and (5) Lifestyles in other cultures are just as valid as those in my culture (reverse coded).

should drive party support. In particular, areas that are likely to benefit from ethnic patronage – because they have have a higher concentration of a particular ethnic group or because they are closer to the party's core geographic area of support – should demonstrate higher levels of support (Ichino and Nathan 2013; Ejdemyr, Kramon, and Robinson Forthcoming). Appendix Table A.6 shows that residing within the "Lhomwe belt," having a high proportion of Lhomwes, and being close to the Mulhako wa Alhomwe headquarters are all unrelated to supporting the DPP. Again, the inclusion of these covariates does not affect the estimates on ethnic visibility.

Taken together, these results demonstrate that DPP party support is strongest among members of the Lhomwe ethnic group who are identifiable as Lhomwe, as expected theoretically.

Cultural Revival, Ethnic Pride, and Changes in Ethnic Visibility

Given that ethnic visibility is strongly associated with party support among Lhomwes, DPP party leaders and politicians have political incentives to increase the visibility of Lhomwes. Because of the ethnic fluidity and demographic integration of the Southern region of Malawi, the context prior to this cultural revival was one of ethnic ambiguity and low visibility. Thus, in order to increase ethnic visibility, Lhomwe political elites must reify the cultural differences between Lhomwes and neighboring groups, as well as convincing nominal Lhomwe group members to make their ethnic identity common knowledge by adopting visible markers of ethnicity.

I have argued that the mechanism through which elites compel individuals to increase the visibility of their own ethnicity is increased pride in their identity. In particular, the cultural revival may "work" because the cultural pride induced from the top is expressed in ways that increase ethnic visibility. Thus, a first order question is whether the Mulhako wa Alhomwe led cultural revival has resulted in increased pride in Lhomwe heritage. Oral history respondents certainly felt that this was the case. One told us, "'Mulhakho wa Alhomwe has helped us to become proud because at first we were not free to show our culture, but Mulhako wa Alhomwe gave us a platform on which to show off our cultural traditions." Others noted, "it has changed the thinking because the Lhomwe name is now respected" and "now Lomwes are living freely because no one is degrading them."

Survey respondents were explicitly asked whether their pride in being Lhomwe had increased, decreased, or stayed the same after the establishment of Mulhako wa Alhomwe: 77% reported increased pride, 19% no change, and only 4% felt less proud of their Lhomwe identity after the founding of Mulhako. Respondents were also asked if they had personally benefitted from

the Mulhako wa Alhomwe organization and, if so, how. For those who reported a personal benefit (17%), their open ended explanation of that benefit was coded into categories. The vast majority (89%) of the benefits given were non-material, and focused on Mulhako's role in teaching Lhomwes about their own cultural traditions. However, a subset of the non-mateiral benefits focused on Mulhako's efforts at increasing Lhomwe pride (e.g., "my pride in our culture has increased," "I am now proud to be Lhomwe," or "increased self confidence"), as well as improving their cultural standing nationally (e.g., "Lhomwe people are now recognized in Malawi," "I am no longer being insulted," or "we are now respected as aLhomwe"). Overall, 3% of the sample mentioned benefiting from Mulhako in this way.

Evaluating changes in ethnic visibility investments over time within the context of a cross-sectional survey is quite challenging. I address this challenge by constructing a longitudinal dataset on a single, rather costly and sticky signal of Lhomwe ethnic identity – giving children ethnically-marked names. I leverage variation in children's birth years, and thus whether the naming decision was made before or after the Mulhako wa Alhomwe led cultural revival. If the cultural revival is effectively increasing ethnic visibility, we should observe an increase in the frequency with which Lhomwe parents give their children Lhomwe names. I also briefly consider other indicators of cultural change and increased visibility, including public self-identification and language investments, but these other indicators are only captured cross-sectionally.

Ethnically-Marked Names

Ethnically-marked names offer an example of a fairly visible and rather "sticky" form of investment in ethnic visibility. Prior to the revival, the rate of Lhomwe names had decreased steadily over time. One of the oral history respondents told us, "We used to have names like Olapeula, Olamaliyango, which will never be heard of today." The revival of Lhomwe names has indeed been encouraged as part of the cultural revival: one of the founders of Mulhako wa Alhomwe, who was a long serving DPP member of parliament told me, "When I was a politician, they used to make an issue, whenever I'd address rallies to say, 'Please give your children [Lhomwe] names. Let them be proud of where you have come from.' "

To determine whether this public signal of ethnic identification has increased in response to the cultural revival, I construct a longitudinal dataset of the frequency of Lhomwe children's names over time. This dataset is based on asking survey respondents the given names and birth years of each of their children. We collected this information for 2,847 children across the 796 Lhomwe respondents with at least one child. Figure 2 shows the distribution of

children's years of birth: after the year 2000, we have names for roughly 100 children per birth year.[16] First and middle names were then coded as signaling Lhomwe ethnic identity or not by five Chilhomwe speakers. Across the 2,847 children, 7% had a first or middle name that signaled Lhomwe identity.

Figure 2: Distribution of Years of Birth

This panel dataset can be used to determine how the frequency of Lhomwe names has changed over time. Figure 3 graphs the proportion of children with Lhomwe names over time from 2000-2016. Recall that the DPP was founded in 2005, Mulhako wa Alhomwe was founded in 2008, and DPP was out of office from mid-2012 to mid-2014 after Bingu wa Mutharika's death. If the provision of Lhomwe names was increasing in response to DPP and Mulhako led cultural revival, we should expect to see an uptick in the frequency of Lhomwe names between 2005 or 2008 and 2012, and again starting in 2014. In contrast, the patterns in Figure 3 suggest the exact opposite – that the elite-led cultural revival and the success of the DPP party actually *reduced* the proportion of Lhomwe children given Lhomwe names.

This drop in the use of Lhomwe names after the start of the cultural revival is confirmed in a regression framework. I regress Lhomwe-name choice on an indicator of post-revival (2008-2016) within a multi-level linear model with enumeration area and parent (respon-

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[16]The decreased number of children born to respondents in 2003 and 2006 is likely a result of significant famine in 2002 and 2005 (Menon 2007).

Figure 3: Proportion of Lhomwe names given over time.

dent) random effects.[17]. Model 1 of Table 3 shows that the use of Lhomwe-signaling names decreased by three percentage points after the start of the Lhomwe cultural revival in 2008 compared to the pre-revival period of 2000-2007.

I next evaluate whether this drop in the use of ethnic names is mediated by the degree to which the cultural revival induced ethnic pride. To do so, I interact the period dummy with a respondent-level indicator of feeling increased pride in response to the cultural revival. Model 2 of Table 3 shows that the drop in Lhomwe names is driven entirely by the Lhomwe respondents who report that Mulhako wa Alhomwe has not increased their ethnic pride: among this segment of the sample, the reduction in Lhomwe name usage drops by seven percentage points. While this drop is absent among Lhomwes whose cultural pride was increased by Mulhako, there is also not an increase in rates of Lhomwe names.

In the case of Lhomwe names, ethnic visibility seems to be *decreasing* in response to the Lhomwe cultural revival and DPP electoral success. This suggests that many rural Lhomwe citizens are resisting elite efforts to increase their ethnic visibility.

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[17]Results are replicated using logistic mixed-effects modeling in Table A.7 of the appendix

Other Indicators of Increased Ethnic Visibility

The evidence above suggests that the cultural revival is failing to increase ethnic visibility via increased adoption of ethnically marked names. However, there are potentially other, less costly ways in which the cultural revival could be increasing visibility. I consider two additional means of increasing visibility: public self-identification and investment in learning Chilhomwe.

First, cultural pride induced by the elite-led revival could lead to increased ethnic visibility simply by more Lhomwe **publicly demonstrating their identity**. One's ethnic identity could be signaled publicly by wearing Mulhako wa Alhomwe *zitenje* (colorful cloth worn as wraps by women or made into clothing for both genders, see Figure A.1 of the appendix), by attending Mulhako wa Alhomwe fundraisers and events, or verbally discussing one's ethnicity with others. One of the Mulhako wa Alhomwe leaders noted the surprise at learning who among his social circle were Lhomwe in the wake of the cultural revival: "But after 2008 that's when we saw other people and we were like, 'ah, so he's Lhomwe?' and 'wow, she's a Lhomwe, too!?"'

Among survey respondents, 18% had attended one of the Mulhako wa Alhomwe annual cultural gatherings at the headquarters in Chonde, many of them more than once. Attending the event creates common knowledge among other attendees about one's ethnicity identity, and potentially provides information to non-Lhomwe neighbors left behind. In addition, 8% of survey respondents reported owning the Mulhako wa Alhomwe cloth. Both attending the annual event (20% vs. 13%, $z = 2.18$, $p < 0.05$) and possessing a Mulhako cloth (9% vs. 5%, $z = 2.03$, $p < 0.05$) were more likely among individuals who felt that their own pride in being Lhomwe had increased since the founding of Mulhako.

Another potential change in ethnic visibility could result from **learning the Chilomwe language**. As shown above, existing variation in ethnic visibility was strongly related to Chilomwe capabilities, so increasing Chilomwe competency and use is likely to result in increased visibility. A revival of the Chilomwe language was a cornerstone of Bingu wa Mutharika's original justification for founding Mulhako wa Alhomwe, and both former and current leaders of the group highlight this as a key goal. An oral history respondent told us that "Mulhakho wa Alhomwe has freed us to speak Chilhomwe. Most of us had [previously] buried ourselves into Chichewa."

But, are people actually learning the language? Among the survey respondents who could understand the Chilomwe clip that we played (47% of the Lhomwe sample), 26% reported that they had learned the language as a teenager or adult. While I cannot determine *when*

these individual actually learned the language, and thus whether it was in response to the cultural revival that began in 2008, these respondents are the only ones who could have learned Chilomwe in response to the revival. The likelihood of learning Chilomwe later in life is statistically higher among respondents who reported greater pride in their Lhomwe identity after the founding of Mulhako wa Alhomwe (47% vs. 38%, $z = 2.14$, $p < 0.03$).

In contrast to giving children Lhomwe names, this section provides some modest evidence that the cultural revival may have increased visibility through public displays of identity and investments in learning the language. However, these results must be treated as preliminary because temporality, and thus causal order, is impossible to determine with this data, and almost certainly runs both ways. Nevertheless, these patterns of association are consistent with increased visibility resulting from revival-induced pride.

Discussion

This paper advances a theory about the nature of ethnic visibility, its political utility, and the incentives it creates for political elites. I show that ethnic visibility, at least among the Lhomwe of Malawi, cannot be assumed, as it varies quite a bit across members of the group. Further, I find that this variation is politically consequential: ethnically visible Lhomwe are much more likely to support the Lhomwe ethnic party, the DPP, than their less visible coethnics. This association between ethnic visibility and ethnic party support drives the political logic of engaging in cultural revival. However, the cultural revival does not seem to be working in the sense of increasing ethnic visibility, at least not in the form of giving children ethnically-marked names. What accounts for this failure?

It is, of course, possible that the Lhomwe cultural revival simply represents a failed political strategy. However, there are other possibilities. One is that the revival is increasing ethnic visibility, but in more modest ways or among particular subgroups. Giving one's child an ethnic name is a strong and fairly permanent signal of ethnic identity, and may thus be too costly for the party to induce. Perhaps there is more success in more modest and flexible markers of ethnic identity, such as patterns of dress, modes of association, or other contextual signals of identity. It may also be that the rural population that my sample represents is not the main target of this cultural revival. In particular, it may be that success at increasing ethnic visibility is most pronounced in urban rather than rural settings. When asked about whether Lhomwe names are on the rise or not, one of the founders of Mulhako wa Alhomwe told me, "I've noticed that increase among city, I mean urban dwellers. You know the uptake has been slow in the village, interestingly enough. In the village, there is still this concern

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over so-called 'Christian names', and it's only slowly now increasing. I think that [Lhomwe names] will pick up there as well, but it was mostly the better educated people in the cities who would see the value of this." Thus, it will be important to capture the degree of cultural change induced by the revival among urban Malawians moving forward.

A second possible interpretation of the "failure" of cultural revival to induce ethnic visibility is that a different political logic altogether is at work. Instead of the cultural revival being aimed at increasing ethnic visibility, it may instead be solely a form of "pride as patronage" that has differential value among citizens. If the value of this newfound ethnic pride is higher among ethnically visible members of the group, which could be the case if they were subject to more intense past discrimination, then we would also expect to observe stronger support for the party at the helm of the revival from more visible members of the group. Disentangling these possibilities is crucial for the next stages of this research.

Table 2: The relationship between ethnic visibility and support for the DPP political party among Lhomwe respondents.

	Support DPP						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Ethnic Visibility Index	0.032**	0.036***	0.033**				
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)				
Lhomwe First Name				0.077**			
				(0.035)			
Lhomwe Surname					0.063**		
					(0.032)		
Never Mistaken for Non-Lhomwe						0.090*	
						(0.048)	
Typical Lhomwe							0.092***
							(0.033)
Male			−0.039	−0.042	−0.036	−0.031	−0.026
			(0.035)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)
Age			−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
			(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Years of Education			0.006	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.005
			(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Employed			0.045	0.037	0.042	0.033	0.033
			(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Village Resident, 15+ Years			0.060	0.055	0.055	0.054	0.045
			(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.039)
Constant	0.639***	0.707***	0.681***	0.645***	0.632***	0.576***	0.625***
	(0.023)	(0.045)	(0.080)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.091)	(0.079)
sd(Enumeration Area)	0.109***	0.095***	0.089***	0.091***	0.087***	0.084***	0.088***
	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
sd(Residual)	0.467***	0.453***	0.450***	0.452***	0.454***	0.454***	0.454***
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Enumerator Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enumeration Areas	54	54	54	54	54	54	54
Individuals	817	817	803	857	866	837	867

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the respondent expressed support for the DPP political party. All models are linear mixed-effects models with enumeration area random effects and enumerator fixed effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
$^{*} p < 0.10$, $^{**} p < 0.05$, $^{***} p < 0.01$

Table 3: **The relationship between the timing of the Lhomwe cultural revival and giving children ethnically-marked names (2000-2016).**

	Given a Lhomwe Name	
	(1)	(2)
Born During Cultural Revival	−0.027***	−0.074***
	(0.010)	(0.019)
Increased Pride After Revival		−0.044*
		(0.024)
Born During Revival × Increased Pride		0.063***
		(0.022)
Constant	0.033*	0.068**
	(0.019)	(0.029)
sd(Enumeration Area)	0.028***	0.030***
	(0.014)	(0.013)
sd(Parent)	0.140***	0.141***
	(0.007)	(0.007)
sd(Residual)	0.173***	0.165***
	(0.004)	(0.004)
Enumerator Effects	Yes	Yes
Enumeration Areas	54	54
Parents (Respondents)	612	572
Children	1626	1504

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for a child being given an ethnically-marked Lhomwe first or middle name. Both models are linear mixed-effects models with enumerator fixed effects, parent (survey respondent) random effects, and enumeration area random effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

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Appendix to:

The Political Logic of Cultural Revival: Ethnic Visibility and Electoral Politics in Malawi

List of Tables

Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	N
Demographics					
Male	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00	1253
Age	38.06	15.46	18.00	100.00	1226
Number of Children	3.30	2.29	0.00	22.00	1240
Years of Education	5.35	3.68	0.00	19.00	1244
Employed	0.34	0.48	0.00	1.00	1245
Born in District	0.88	0.32	0.00	1.00	1246
Village Resident, 15+ Years	0.76	0.42	0.00	1.00	1243
Ethnicity					
Lhomwe	0.71	0.45	0.00	1.00	1254
Proportion of Grandparents of Same Ethnicity	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00	1254
Ethnic vs. National Identity	2.69	1.22	1.00	5.00	1230
Ethnocentricism	−0.00	1.20	−1.89	2.61	831
Increased Pride After Revival	0.77	0.42	0.00	1.00	816
Ethnic Visibility					
Ethnic Visibility Index	−0.00	1.23	−1.58	1.94	817
Ethnic Visibility Index (Additive)	2.18	1.08	0.00	4.00	892
Lhomwe First Name	0.34	0.47	0.00	1.00	871
Lhomwe Surname	0.47	0.50	0.00	1.00	880
Never Mistaken for Non-Lhomwe	0.86	0.34	0.00	1.00	852
Typical Lhomwe	0.56	0.50	0.00	1.00	882
Politics					
Close to a Political Party	0.67	0.47	0.00	1.00	1233
DPP Supporter	0.60	0.49	0.00	1.00	1254
Government Performance	2.08	0.67	1.00	4.00	1237
Country Moving in Right Direction	0.29	0.46	0.00	1.00	1208
Life Better Than 10 Yrs. Ago	2.38	1.25	1.00	5.00	1228
Children					
Lhomwe Name	0.07	0.26	0.00	1.00	2847
Male Child	0.49	0.50	0.00	1.00	2800
Born During Cultural Revival	0.37	0.48	0.00	1.00	2486
EA-Level Characteristics					
Urban, EA	0.09	0.28	0.00	1.00	147
Diversity (ELF), EA	0.23	0.19	0.01	0.58	147
Percent Lhomwe, EA	0.82	0.19	0.13	0.99	147
Distance to Mulhako, EA	41.01	36.34	6.69	125.14	147

Table A.2: The relationship between ethnic visibility (additive index) and support for the DPP political party among Lhomwe respondents.

	Support DPP		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ethnic Visibility Index (Additive)	0.055***	0.059***	0.057***
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.015)
Male			−0.032
			(0.034)
Age			−0.001
			(0.001)
Years of Education			0.006
			(0.005)
Employed			0.036
			(0.038)
Village Resident, 15+ Years			0.043
			(0.039)
Constant	0.506***	0.582***	0.571***
	(0.040)	(0.050)	(0.081)
sd(Enumeration Area)	0.114***	0.091***	0.083***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
sd(Residual)	0.468***	0.454***	0.452***
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Enumerator Effects	No	Yes	Yes
Enumeration Areas	54	54	54
Individuals	892	892	877

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the respondent expressed support for the DPP political party. All models are linear mixed-effects models with enumeration area random effects and enumerator fixed effects. Individual-level control variables include gender, age, years of education, employment, and an indicator for long-term local residence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Figure A.1: Photos of Mulhako wa Alhomwe zitenje (cloth).

Table A.3: The relationship between ethnic visibility and support for the DPP political party among Lhomwe respondents (mixed effects logistic model).

	Support DPP						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Ethnic Visibility Index	0.150**	0.175**	0.164**				
	(0.064)	(0.068)	(0.069)				
Lhomwe First Name				0.371**			
				(0.174)			
Lhomwe Surname					0.298*		
					(0.156)		
Never Mistaken for Non-Lhomwe						0.422*	
						(0.227)	
Typical Lhomwe							0.447***
							(0.160)
Male			−0.204	−0.217	−0.183	−0.160	−0.137
			(0.173)	(0.167)	(0.166)	(0.168)	(0.165)
Age			−0.007	−0.005	−0.006	−0.006	−0.006
			(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Years of Education			0.030	0.037	0.029	0.030	0.026
			(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.025)
Employed			0.216	0.183	0.208	0.166	0.163
			(0.196)	(0.190)	(0.189)	(0.191)	(0.189)
Village Resident, 15+ Years			0.289	0.270	0.266	0.259	0.220
			(0.198)	(0.192)	(0.190)	(0.194)	(0.191)
Constant	0.609***	0.931***	0.796**	0.616	0.565	0.291	0.534
	(0.107)	(0.218)	(0.395)	(0.385)	(0.381)	(0.438)	(0.386)
sd(Enumeration Area)	0.258**	0.219*	0.190*	0.201*	0.180*	0.168*	0.187*
	(0.121)	(0.113)	(0.106)	(0.107)	(0.101)	(0.098)	(0.101)
Enumerator Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enumeration Areas	54	54	54	54	54	54	54
Individuals	817	817	803	857	866	837	867

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the respondent expressed support for the DPP political party. All models are logistic mixed-effects models with enumeration area random effects and enumerator fixed effects. Individual-level control variables include gender, age, years of education, employment, and an indicator for long-term local residence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.4: The relationship between ethnic visibility and support for the DPP political party among Lhomwe respondents, controlling for perceptions of government performance.

	Support DPP					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ethnic Visibility Index		0.035** (0.014)		0.034** (0.014)		0.032** (0.014)
Government Performance	0.109*** (0.025)	0.109*** (0.026)				
Country Moving in Right Direction			0.223*** (0.036)	0.214*** (0.037)		
Life Better Than 10 Yrs. Ago					0.040*** (0.013)	0.037*** (0.013)
Constant	0.442*** (0.093)	0.465*** (0.096)	0.674*** (0.077)	0.691*** (0.079)	0.575*** (0.083)	0.609*** (0.085)
sd(Enumeration Area)	0.085*** (0.022)	0.084*** (0.023)	0.078*** (0.023)	0.077*** (0.023)	0.084*** (0.023)	0.085*** (0.024)
sd(Residual)	0.450*** (0.011)	0.445*** (0.011)	0.445*** (0.011)	0.441*** (0.011)	0.453*** (0.011)	0.448*** (0.012)
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enumerator Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enumeration Areas	54	54	54	54	54	54
Individuals	869	796	855	787	868	796

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the respondent expressed support for the DPP political party. All models are linear mixed-effects models with enumeration area random effects and enumerator fixed effects. Individual-level control variables include gender, age, years of education, employment, and an indicator for long-term local residence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.5: The relationship between ethnic visibility and support for the DPP political party among Lhomwe respondents, controlling for strength of ethnic identification.

	Support DPP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Ethnic Visibility Index		0.030**		0.029**
		(0.014)		(0.014)
Ethnic vs. National Identity	0.021	0.019		
	(0.013)	(0.014)		
Ethnocentrism			0.029**	0.031**
			(0.014)	(0.015)
Constant	0.612***	0.637***	0.656***	0.664***
	(0.083)	(0.086)	(0.079)	(0.081)
sd(Enumeration Area)	0.089***	0.091***	0.086***	0.088***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)
sd(Residual)	0.455***	0.450***	0.452***	0.446***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enumerator Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enumeration Areas	54	54	54	54
Individuals	872	798	821	753

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the respondent expressed support for the DPP political party. All models are linear mixed-effects models with enumeration area random effects and enumerator fixed effects. Individual-level control variables include gender, age, years of education, employment, and an indicator for long-term local residence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.6: The relationship between ethnic visibility and support for the DPP political party among Lhomwe respondents, controlling for geographic and demographic factors.

			Support DPP			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Ethnic Visibility Index		0.033**		0.033**		0.034**
		(0.014)		(0.014)		(0.014)
Lhomwe Belt, EA	−0.008	−0.003				
	(0.057)	(0.059)				
Percent Lhomwe, EA			−0.085	−0.044		
			(0.111)	(0.115)		
Distance to Mulhako, EA					0.000	0.000
					(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	0.667***	0.684***	0.735***	0.721***	0.652***	0.674***
	(0.098)	(0.100)	(0.127)	(0.131)	(0.079)	(0.081)
sd(Enumeration Area)	0.088***	0.089***	0.085***	0.088***	0.088***	0.089***
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
sd(Residual)	0.456***	0.450***	0.456***	0.450***	0.455***	0.450***
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Ind. Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enumerator Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Enumeration Areas	54	54	54	54	54	54
Individuals	877	803	877	803	877	803

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not the respondent expressed support for the DPP political party. All models are linear mixed-effects models with enumeration area random effects and enumerator fixed effects. Individual-level control variables include gender, age, years of education, employment, and an indicator for long-term local residence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table A.7: The relationship between the timing of the Lhomwe cultural revival and giving children ethnically-marked names, 2000-2016 (mixed effects logistic model).

	Given a Lhomwe Name	
	(1)	(2)
Born During Cultural Revival	−0.877**	−2.024***
	(0.341)	(0.706)
Increased Pride After Revival		−0.904
		(0.740)
Born During Revival × Increased Pride		1.518*
		(0.815)
Constant	−6.301***	−5.947***
	(1.005)	(1.255)
sd(Enumeration Area)	0.480	0.832
	(0.578)	(0.771)
sd(Parent)	6.945***	8.029**
	(2.494)	(3.127)
Enumerator Effects	Yes	Yes
Enumeration Areas	54	54
Parents (Respondents)		
Children	1626	1504

Note: The dependent variable is an indicator for a child being given an ethnically-marked Lhomwe first or middle name. Both models are mixed-effects logistic models with enumerator indicators, parent (survey respondent) random effects, and enumeration area random effects. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$