

Why did the Democrats Lose the South?

Bringing New Data to an Old Debate

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Abstract

After generations of loyalty, Southern whites left the Democratic party *en masse* in the second half of the twentieth century. To what extent did Democrats' 1960s Civil Rights initiatives trigger this exodus, versus Southern economic development, rising political polarization or other trends that made the party unattractive to Southern whites? The lack of data on racial attitudes and political preferences spanning the 1960s Civil Rights era has hampered research on this central question of American political economy. We assemble such data, drawn largely from little used Gallup surveys dating back to 1958. From 1958 to 1961, conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic identification among Southern whites, a correlation that disappears after President Kennedy introduces sweeping Civil Rights legislation in 1963. We find that defection among racially conservative whites explains all (three-fourths) of the decline in relative white Southern Democratic identification between 1958 and 1980 (2000). We offer corroborating quantitative analysis—drawn from sources such as Gallup questions on presidential approval and hypothetical presidential match-ups as well as textual analysis of newspapers—for the central role of racial views in explaining white Southern dealignment from the Democrats as far back as the 1940s.

Keywords: Party identification; Civil Rights movement

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“To many citizens of the South, a Republican is a curiosity. They may have heard about the Negro undertaker who goes to Republican conventions; or the eccentric railroad official who came from Ohio; but a genuine, breathing Republican is a rarity in most of the counties of the region.” – Alexander Heard, “A Two-Party South?” 1952

1 Introduction

After generations of loyalty and despite the general stability of Americans’ party identification in adulthood, Southern whites left the Democratic party *en masse* in the second half of the twentieth century.¹ As illustrated in Figure 1, at mid-century white Southerners (defined throughout as residents of the eleven states of the former Confederacy) were 25 percentage points more likely to identify as Democrats than were other whites, a gap that disappeared by the mid 1980s and has since flipped in sign.² Despite the massive, concurrent enfranchisement of Southern blacks, who overwhelmingly favored the Democrats from 1964 onward, the resulting shifts in aggregate Southern political outcomes were stark: to take but one example, in 1960, *all* U.S. senators from the South were Democrats, whereas today all but three (of 22) are Republican.

This paper explores why this political shift occurred and in particular what share of it was driven by racially conservative Southern whites’ reaction to the Democrats’ 1960s Civil Rights initiatives, as opposed to other changes during the period (e.g., economic development in the South, rising polarization between the parties with respect to other issues). This central question of American political economy remains unresolved. On one side are researchers who rely on more qualitative sources (interviews, speeches, party platforms, correspondence and other historical sources) and conclude that Civil Rights was the prime cause. While the Democratic party had been unequivocally associated with segregationist Jim Crow policies from the end of Reconstruction until the middle of the twentieth century, as early as the 1940s the Northern wing of the party began to support some pro-Civil Rights positions. These scholars argue that Democratic presidents’ introduction and signing of the Civil Rights (1964) and Voting Rights (1965) Acts—outlawing, respectively, segregation in public accommodations and racial barriers to voting, both of which in practice occurred primarily in the South—triggered the permanent exodus of many white Southerners from the party.

On the other side are scholars whose more quantitative methods (e.g., analysis of the

¹Political scientists have found partisanship, like religion or ethnicity, to be a stable part of an adult’s identity. The canonical reference is Campbell *et al.* (1966), with a more quantitative treatment by Green *et al.* (2004).

²Authors’ calculation using Gallup micro data (more information on this data source is provided in Section 3). The eleven states of the former Confederacy are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.

American National Election Survey as well as county- and Congressional-district level election outcomes) point to factors other than Civil Rights as the chief cause. These scholars most often argue that economic development in the South made the redistributive policies of the Democrats increasingly unattractive. Indeed, the *a priori* case for factors besides Civil Rights is compelling. Southern dealignment, though much accelerated during the 1960s, was (and perhaps still is) a slow moving trend.³ As we detail in Section 4, voters viewed Civil Rights as the most important issue facing the country for a fleeting two to three year period, undermining the case that it could be the underlying cause of a fifty-year trend. Moreover, Southern dealignment coincides with massive economic catch-up in the region—from 1940 to 1980, per capita income in the South rose from 60 to 89 percent of the U.S. average—which would predict a movement away from the more redistributive party.⁴ Beyond economic catch-up, scholars have argued that demographic change (driven by both Northern Republican migrants and younger voters coming into the age of majority post-Jim Crow) and the liberalization of the Democratic party on other issues such as abortion and welfare pushed whites in the region out of the party.⁵

That disagreement could remain on the cause of this historic realignment may seem surprising, but data limitations have severely hampered research on this question. Until recently, consistently worded survey questions on racial attitudes—from *before* and after the major Civil Rights victories of the 1960s—have not been widely available. For example, as we review in the next section, those authors using the cumulative ANES to address the role of racial views on party alignment typically begin their analysis in the 1970s, well after the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts.

In this paper, we employ a little used data source that allows us to analyze political identification and racial attitudes back to the 1950s. Beginning in 1958, Gallup asks respondents “Between now and ..[election]... there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates. If your party nominated a well-qualified man for president, would you vote for him if he happened to be a Negro?” Fortunately for our purposes, the wording has remained consistent and the question has been asked repeatedly since that date.⁶ We refer to those who do not answer in the affirmative as having “racially conservative views.”⁷

Having identified our measure of racial attitudes, we then define the pre- and post-periods

³We use the term “dealignment” instead of “realignment” in this paper as we focus on Southerners *leaving* the Democratic party—whether to join the Republicans, adopt independent status, or support third-party candidates such as Strom Thurmond or George Wallace.

⁴Authors’ calculation, *Statistical Abstracts*, various years.

⁵We detail each of these arguments in the next Section.

⁶Changes are very minor and are discussed in detail in Section 3.

⁷We borrow this terminology from Feinstein and Schickler (2008).

by determining the moment at which the Democratic Party is first seen as actively pursuing a more liberal Civil Rights agenda than the Republican Party. Conventional wisdom of the race-as-cause view states that President Johnson famously “lost the South” with his signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, marshaling contemporaneous media sources, survey questions on respondents’ views on issue importance and parties’ positions on racial equality, we identify instead the Spring of 1963—when John F. Kennedy first proposed legislation barring discrimination in public accommodations—as the critical moment when Civil Rights is, for the first time, an issue of great importance to the majority of Americans and an issue clearly associated with the Democratic Party.

The central part of our exploration of the role of racial views in explaining white Southern dealignment focuses on a triple-difference analysis: how much of the pre- versus post-period decrease in Democratic party identification among Southern versus other whites is explained by the differential decline among those Southerners with conservative racial attitudes? We find that racial attitudes have little if any explanatory power for non-Southern whites’ party identification in either period. In the South, conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic identification in the pre-period, but this correlation is wiped out between August 1961 and August 1963 (the last poll of the pre- and the first poll of the post-period, respectively). Most important to the question at hand, the entire 17 percentage-point decline in Democratic party identification between 1958 and 1980 is explained by the 19 percentage point decline among Southern whites with conservative racial views. Extending the post-period through 2000, 77% of the 20 percentage-point drop is explained by the differential drop among Southern whites with conservative racial views. This pattern of results is robust to controlling flexibly for socioeconomic status measures included in the Gallup data and is highly evident in event-time graphical analysis as well.

We complement this main result with a variety of additional evidence corroborating the central role of racial views in the decline of the white Southern Democrat. Whereas Gallup only asks the black president question every one to two years, it asks its signature “presidential approval” question roughly once a month during our sample period. We can thus perform a high-frequency analysis surrounding our key moment of Spring of 1963 by correlating presidential approval for the Democratic president (John F. Kennedy) in the South versus the non-South, with the daily count of newspaper articles that include the President’s name along with terms related to Civil Rights. The most striking result is the 35 percentage point drop in his support among whites in the South (compared to no change among other whites and a rise among all blacks) between the April 6th and June 23rd 1963 Gallup polls (which correspond to a surge of articles covering Kennedy’s support of protesters during Martin Luther King’s Birmingham campaign in May and the president’s televised proposal

of the Civil Rights Bill on June 11th). Smaller Civil Rights moments (e.g., the integration of Ole Miss in September 1962) also match up to significant dips in Kennedy’s relative approval among Southern whites. Even when we flexibly control for the influence of other events and issues—allowing Southerners to have different reactions to news regarding Cuba, the Soviet Union, Social Security, etc.—Civil Rights retains its overwhelming explanatory power in predicting divergence in his popularity among Southern whites relative to other whites.

The 1960s not only witnessed watershed moments for Civil Rights, but also other important political and social changes. However, we find little role for coincident trends in explaining white Southern dealignment from the Democratic party. For example, recent work argues the 1960s marks the end of a period of political consensus between Democrats and Republicans, especially on economic and redistributive issues (McCarty *et al.*, 2006). If white Southerners were always more conservative, then rising polarization may explain why they differentially begin to leave the Democrats in the 1960s. Yet we find that—except for issues involving racial integration and discrimination—whites in the South and elsewhere have indistinguishable preferences on both domestic and foreign policy in our pre-period. Moreover, while the 1960s also saw the political organization of women and other minority groups, we find no evidence that white Southerners who have negative views of women, Catholics or Jews differentially leave the Democratic party in 1963—the exodus is specific to those who are *racially* conservative. Finally, we find no role for Southern economic development in explaining dealignment—no matter how flexibly we control for income, suburbanization or other proxies, economic development can explain essentially none of the relative decline in white Southern Democratic identification.

Finally, we make some progress on quantifying the role of racial attitudes in party identification during earlier decades. While our central data source begins in 1958, the evolution of the Democratic Party on Civil Rights has a longer history. As is evident in Figure 1, Southern whites begin to leave the Democrats before our main analysis period begins, especially in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While our data from this earlier period is decidedly more limited and thus results should be viewed more cautiously, we again find that racial conservatives lead the exit. We show that white support of Democrat Harry Truman’s 1948 candidacy in the South versus elsewhere is inversely related to media mentions of his name alongside Civil Rights terms (and in particular takes a nosedive after he introduces Civil Rights legislation in February of 1948). In a 1952 cross-section, we show that Southerners who had *left* the Democratic party by that date were more likely to have racially conservative views than those who remain. We again find no role for income growth in explaining this earlier period of dealignment.

While scholars disagree on its underlying causes, few discount the vast impacts of South-

ern dealignment on American politics and in particular economic policy. As McCarty *et al.* (2006) write, “had the Democratic Party maintained the allegiance of southern voters, the Republicans would have been denied an electoral majority for their low-tax and anti-regulation platform.” We provide evidence that the allegiance broke down over *racial* issues, not due to Southern economic development or disagreements over (non-race-related) policy. Our work thus supports the hypothesis that racial fractionalization helps explain “American exceptionalism” in terms of limited redistribution and the lack of a strong, socialist party (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Lee and Roemer, 2006; Luttmer, 2001).

Our findings further shed light on redistributive patterns within the US. First, race-based dealignment offers an explanation for why the poorest part of the country now serves as the base for the Republicans, the party less supportive of redistribution.⁸ Second, our findings provide a potential explanation for why—in stark contrast to the median voter model’s prediction (Meltzer and Richard, 1981)—redistribution in the US has receded since the 1970s, even as income inequality has risen. Our results suggest that a large voting bloc left the more redistributive political party over largely *non-economic* issues, reducing political support for redistributive policies just when theory would predict that they should begin to become more popular.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the debate between the more qualitative “Civil-Rights-as-cause” and more quantitative “other-trends-as-cause” sides of the literature. In Section 3, we introduce the Gallup micro data, and in particular our key question on racial attitudes. In Section 4, we justify our use of the Spring of 1963 as the key moment that separates the “pre-” and “post-periods.” In Section 5, we present results both from the triple-differences analysis as well as the high-frequency analysis on Kennedy’s approval. In Section 6, we more directly address the remaining arguments of the research arguing for causes besides Civil Rights. In Section 7 we offer some concluding thoughts and ideas for future work.

2 Debate Over the Role of Race in Southern Dealignment

The literature on the role of race in Southern politics is vast, and our attempts to summarize it here cannot do it proper justice. Almost all reviews start with V.O Key’s *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Key memorably wrote, “[w]hatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro”

⁸A recent policy manifestation of this pattern is the refusal of almost all Southern states to expand Medicaid coverage to poor adults under the Affordable Care Act, despite the fact that the South remains the poorest region of the country, even when considering only whites (authors’ calculation using 2013 ACS).

(Key Jr, 1949). Drawing on hundreds of interviews with Southern politicians and journalists, the book provides a state-by-state analysis of how race influenced Southern politics, but given its 1949 publication cannot directly speak to the coming large-scale 1960s dealignment. Carmines and Stimson (1989) is a modern update on this seminal work, using historical material (e.g., interviews, party platforms, and speech transcripts) as well as some survey tabulations to argue that race was the motivating factor in the dealignment, as “racially conservative white southerners felt betrayed” when President Lyndon Johnson, a Texan, navigated the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA).

Those who argue against Civil Rights as the main cause of dealignment emphasize the lack of quantitative evidence. Shafer and Johnston (2009) are quite emphatic in this regard: “Yet if these propositions [our quantitative approach] appear almost elementary as an analytic strategy, they bump up against an established literature of Southern politics—charming and richly contextualized, but also unsystematic and deeply inbred.” While we do not endorse their critique of the qualitative evidence on Southern politics, we are in complete agreement that, to date, the argument that Civil Rights triggered Southern Dealignment rests on little if any quantitative evidence.

While some papers in the quantitative literature argue for the primacy of racial attitudes in explaining dealignment, the majority argue that the role of Civil Rights and race has been vastly overstated.⁹ We group their arguments into four main categories.

Economic development in the South. While not the focus of their seminal work on political polarization, McCarty *et al.* (2006) argue that the conventional wisdom overstates the role of race and Civil Rights in explaining dealignment, writing that “pocketbook voting is an important part of the story of the dramatic switch of partisan allegiances in the South.”¹⁰ Shafer and Johnston (2009) go further, arguing that Democratic Civil Rights victories, by introducing a strongly Democratic black voting bloc to the South, in fact *slowed* the natural process of dealignment.¹¹

⁹Quantitative papers that conclude that racial views are key to dealignment include Valentino and Sears (2005), who use the GSS and cumulative ANES to show that, in the South relative to elsewhere, whites report more racially conservative views and that racial views have greater predictive power for whites’ party identification. McVeigh *et al.* (2014) use county-level data to show that the presence of a Ku Klux Klan chapter in 1960 predicts higher vote shares for Goldwater (in 1964), George Wallace (in 1968), and more generally for Republicans in the elections since.

¹⁰For example, they use Congressional District election outcomes data to show that “[b]y the early 1970s, southern districts represented by Republicans were considerably more well-heeled than those represented by Democrats. The median family income was about \$4,500 greater in real terms in Republican districts than in Democratic ones.”

¹¹Shafer and Johnston (2009) won the annual best book award by the Race, Ethnicity, and Politics Section of the American Political Science Association. They show via cross tabulations that, relative to the 1950s, in more recent decades it is *economically conservative* Southern whites who identify

Interestingly, economists who have studied Southern economic development lay out a reverse chain of events, arguing that both major Civil Rights victories and large-scale dealignment *preceded* major economic catch-up in the region. Wright (2013) contends that employment and public accommodations desegregation in fact *caused* economic growth, by allowing businesses to, respectively, hire from larger pools of workers and serve larger pools of customers. Besley *et al.* (2010) argue that political competition brought on by the Voting Rights Act made the region's politicians propose more pro-growth economic policies.¹²

Changing selection into the South. The South experienced net in-migration after 1960. Given the large Democratic advantage in the South during much of the 20th century, in-migrants from the non-South would tend to be more Republican (McCarty *et al.*, 2006, Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2001 and Trende, 2012). Age has also been considered as a dimension of dealignment that weakens the race case: Wattenberg (1991) argues that Southern whites who came of age since Jim Crow have in fact driven the dealignment.

Issues other than Civil Rights. Did Southern whites leave the Democratic Party, or did the Democratic Party leave Southern whites, by taking more liberal positions on redistribution, free speech, abortion and issues other than Civil Rights? Both Beck (1977) and Campbell (1977) uses the 1960s ANES data to argue against racial issues as cause by graphically depicting a similar pattern of support amongst Democrats and Republicans among white Southerners with differing views on integration. Wolfinger and Arseneau (1978) note that in the aftermath of the Civil Rights period white Southerners who opposed segregation were more likely to vote Democratic than those who supported segregationist policies. The authors also point to a decline in the importance of the racial policies amongst ANES respondents. Finally, Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) demonstrate that in the post-Civil Rights period ideology (how liberal or conservative the respondent is), as well as views on social welfare and security, are better predictors than racial views of Southern white partisanship.

The timing of dealignment. Trende (2012) argues that the slow-moving nature of Southern dealignment undermines the argument that Civil Rights was the prime trigger, given that Congress passed the major pieces of Civil Rights legislation in a concentrated

as Republican (they generally do not compare this trend to that among non-Southern whites). In a wide-ranging critique of Shafer and Johnston, Kousser (2010) argues that growing social desirability of progressive racial views may mean that in more recent years racially conservative whites merely adapt the language of economic conservatism.

¹²In related work, Alston and Ferrie (1993) argue that certain aspects of Southern economic development should have made Democratic policies *more* attractive to whites in the region. In particular, the mechanization of cotton production in the 1960s meant that Southern elites no longer needed a large labor force whose loyalty they once ensured in part by informally providing black workers with public goods such as medical care and protection from violent whites and were thus more open to Democratic public safety net programs.

period in the mid-1960s. He concludes that “the gradual realignment of the South had been going for nearly forty years by 1964 and continued at a glacial pace after that.” He points to the 1960 election as a key piece of evidence for secular causes: “That [Republican Richard] Nixon could do so well in the South while part of an administration that had finished desegregating Washington, argued that segregation was unconstitutional before the Supreme Court ... implemented [desegregation] with a show of force in Little Rock, and pushed through the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 seems astonishing, until you realize that economics, rather than race, was primarily driving the development of Southern politics at the time.” Section 6.3 analyzes the timing of dealignment in detail.

Although both large and contentious, the literature on the cause of dealignment has a clear gap: Due to the limitations of standard data sets, existing quantitative work is unable to examine racial attitudes before Civil Rights was a key political issue (and often not until several years after that). Even Shafer and Johnston, the authors perhaps most associated with the argument that economic development triggered dealignment, write: “Introducing racial attitudes...will prove more difficult....because there is less substantive consistency in the opinion items asked by the [A]NES in the realm of race policy for the full postwar period.” Due to this limitation, a standard econometric decomposition of the share of dealignment accounted for by those with conservative racial views has not been possible.

As we describe in the following section, we have identified a consistent measure of racial attitudes dating back to 1958 by turning to a data source little used by social scientists.

3 Data

An ideal research design would employ panel data on white voters to compare the extent to which holding conservative racial views in the pre-period (before the Democratic party is associated with Civil Rights) predicts leaving the Party in the post-period, in the South versus the rest of the country. To the best of our knowledge, such panel data do not exist. We instead use repeated cross-sectional surveys from Gallup (and later the restricted-access version of the GSS) that each have the following key variables: a consistently worded measure of racial attitudes, party identification, state of residence and race.¹³

¹³The National Opinion Research Center (NORC) began fielding racial attitudes questions as early as May 1944, with some series continued into their modern-day GSS. But these early surveys do not contain party identification, so are unhelpful in studying dealignment. These data can be found on the website of the Roper Center.

3.1 Gallup Surveys

Gallup, Harris and other commercial, academic and media surveys have been cataloged and in many cases made available for download on the website of the non-profit Roper Center at Cornell University.¹⁴ The over 22,000 surveys (as of this writing) deposited at Roper date as far back as 1935 and cover topics such as foreign relations, health, economics, politics, and—most relevant for our purposes—social issues including racial attitudes. As social scientists are not widely familiar with these older Gallup data, Appendix Table A.1 compares our main Gallup regression sample to the IPUMS, splitting the sample by region and decade. Demographics for each of these subsamples are reassuringly similar between the two data sources. We hope that one contribution of our paper will be to increase awareness and usage of Roper’s resources.

As noted in the introduction, beginning in 1958 Gallup repeatedly asks respondents whether they would vote for a qualified man (“person,” in more recent years) who happened to be Negro (“black”). Online Appendix Table 1 documents the exact wording of this item separately by survey date, as well as the wording of the question preceding it (often asking about willingness to vote for members of other demographic groups).¹⁵ While there are some small variations year to year, they are relatively minor, especially compared to other surveys during this time (we detail the deficiencies of the ANES in this regard in Appendix B). For ease of exposition, we refer to this survey item as the “black president question.”

In addition to consistency, a second advantage of the black president item is that Gallup fielded it quite frequently during our key sample period. The question is asked in nine separate surveys between 1958 and 1972. While the question is asked less frequently after 1972, we are fortunate that beginning in 1974 we can include the geo-coded restricted-use version of the GSS (see Online Appendix Table 2 for exact wording and preceding question in the GSS). As such, between 1958 and 1980 (2000), the black president item (as well as the other variables we need for the analysis) was collected by either Gallup or GSS on 14 (29) separate occasions.¹⁶

A final strength of the black president item is its specificity: it refers to a single, hypothetical (at least during our key sample period) concept. For example, the GSS has, since 1972, asked whether the government should “help” blacks, which is not only vague but also

¹⁴See <http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll-database/>. Access is free to affiliates of institutional subscribers.

¹⁵See http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/kuziemko/files/online_appendix_0.pdf. for the exact wording and other details of all racial attitudes questions used in the paper.

¹⁶The GSS fields this question in 1972 as well, but only beginning in 1974 are state identifiers available.

might be interpreted differently in 1972 than in 2000. Similarly, Gallup also queries white respondents—much less frequently than they do about a black president—about whether they would move if blacks came to reside next door or in their neighborhoods in great numbers.¹⁷ But responses to these questions will vary not only by feelings about racial equality but also by the actual integration of one’s present neighborhood, not to mention housing density (“next door” is a different concept in an apartment building versus a farm). The black president question suffers from no such contextual bias: it should be interpreted similarly for Southerners and non-Southerners, rich and poor, urban and rural. Nonetheless, as we demonstrate in Appendix Table A.2, views toward a black president are highly correlated with other GSS measures of racial attitudes, including questions on interracial socializing, school integration, government aid to blacks, and blacks “pushing” themselves into places they are not wanted.

While we believe the Gallup data have allowed us to make an important step forward in answering the question at hand, they are not without their limitations. The most important given our context is limited control variables for income and place of birth (given the arguments that Southern income growth and Northern migrants played key roles in dealignment). To rule out income and migration as alternative hypotheses we turn to alternative data sources, most frequently the ANES, a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional survey of the political and social opinions of voting-age Americans conducted in the fall of most midterm and all presidential election years.¹⁸

3.2 Summary statistics

Table 1 provides summary statistics for our basic Gallup analysis sample (whites age 21 and above who live in the continental US) from 1958 to 1980 (our standard sample period, though we demonstrate robustness to various endpoints), by pre-and post-period.¹⁹ We once again see the large decline in Southern Democratic Party affiliation across the two time periods. (Please see Online Appendix Table 3 for the exact wording of the party identification questions in the basic Gallup sample, by survey date, as well as the wording of the preceding

¹⁷Gallup also poses, again less frequently than the black president question, questions on school integration, but unfortunately only to parents of school-aged children, greatly reducing sample sizes.

¹⁸The ANES does not include state identifiers until 1952, so we cannot use earlier years in our analysis.

¹⁹Both Gallup and GSS claim to be nationally representative surveys of adult Americans. We use the provided survey weights—the GSS for all years and Gallup for 1968 forward—to adjust for sampling error. We are indebted to Jeff Jones at Gallup for his instructions on weighting older Gallup surveys. To establish a stable sample of voters, we exclude those under age 21 as well as Alaskans and Hawaiians, as they were not eligible to vote in early years of our sample period.

question.) Not surprisingly, we also see a concurrent increase in education and urbanicity in both regions. Table 1 also describes our ANES sample—while levels occasionally differ from Gallup due, in part, to different variable definitions, we see the same trends over time and region.

In Appendix Figure A.1 we graph the responses to the black president over time in the combined GSS and Gallup samples, denoting the data set from which each point is drawn. Note that this figure includes non-whites, whereas unless noted all of the analysis that follows does not. In years where we have both GSS and Gallup data, the shares willing to vote for a black president are nearly identical, suggesting that both surveys are collecting data from very similar (presumably representative) universes. The series as a whole depicts a marked increase in stated views on racial equality, at least as measured by this question.²⁰

While Appendix Figure A.1 is interesting in demonstrating the rapid change that occurred in attitudes toward race relations nationally, Figure 2 introduces the views of our analysis sample, separately for the South and non-South.²¹ While only about ten percent of white Southerners are willing to vote for a black person at the series' beginning (versus just under forty percent of whites elsewhere), whites in both regions increase at the same (rapid) rate through about 1970, after which point there is more rapid (though never complete) Southern catch-up.

For completeness, in Appendix Figure A.2 (a) and (b) we graph for all available years the other two Gallup survey questions on racial attitudes: the questions that ask whether the respondent would move if a black person moved next door or if blacks moved into the neighborhood in great numbers. The same pattern of substantial (but incomplete) Southern convergence holds.

4 Methodological Approach

4.1 Defining pre- and post-periods

Before 1958, we do not have any consistent, repeated measure of racial attitudes, and thus our main analysis is restricted to 1958 and beyond (we return in detail but with poorer

²⁰In 1958 fewer than forty percent say they would be willing to vote for an equally qualified black candidate, where by 1975 that share is just over eighty percent, a rate of change more rapid than the more recent evolution on same-sex marriage. Over the seventeen-year period between 1996 and 2013, support for gay marriage in Gallup polls rose from 27 to 54 percent, a slightly slower pace in both absolute and proportional terms. See <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1651/gay-lesbian-rights.aspx>.

²¹In this focal sample we have roughly 2,000 observations per survey in the Gallup data and 1,200 observations per survey in the GSS data.

data to earlier episodes of dealignment in Section 6.3). To define pre- and post-periods for our main analysis sample, we need to identify the moment during this period when voters' views of the parties' Civil Rights positions undergoes its most substantial change. A useful benchmark for attitudes toward the parties at the beginning of the period comes from an April 1960 Gallup survey in which voters did not discern meaningful differences between the parties on this issue. The plurality of voters (28%) said the Republican Party was "doing the most for Negroes," 25% said the Democrats, with 19% saying there was no difference and the remainder saying they had no opinion.²² Nor did American elites appear to view Civil Rights as a pressing issue at the time. For example, in all four presidential debates of 1960, only a single question on the issue was asked.

Evidence from the ANES: The shift occurs between 1960 and 1964. To pin down the point during our sample period when views on the parties' positions most significantly shift, we would ideally employ a consistent repeated survey question that asks respondents which party they believe will do more to promote equality between whites and blacks. Unfortunately we were unable to find such a question. We come close, however. Using the individual-year files of the ANES, we can compare a 1960 item asking "which party is more likely to stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same schools" with 1964 and 1968 items asking which party is more likely to "see to it that white and Negro children go to the same schools." Figure 3 shows that in 1960, only 13% of Southern whites see the Democrats as the party pushing for school integration, 22% say Republicans, and the rest see no difference. Non-Southern whites see essentially no difference between the parties on this issue in 1960.

A dramatic shift occurs sometime between 1960 and 1964. By 1964, 45% of Southern whites now see the Democrats as more aggressive on promoting school integration, whereas the share seeing Republicans as more aggressive has fallen to 16%. Non-Southerners' assessment shifts similarly. The large gap in voters' perception of the parties on school integration that emerges in 1964 holds steady in 1968.²³

It is perhaps puzzling *a priori* that voters would have changed their views so dramatically by 1964, given that the majority of Congressional opposition to the 1964 CRA came from Democrats. However, this correlation is entirely driven by Democrats' over-representation in the South. Within the South (indeed, within state), Democratic legislators were more likely

²²Summary statistics from Gallup survey fielded March 30 to April 4, 1960, accessed online via ipoll. Dataset ID: 1960-0626.

²³ANES also asks a question related to employment and housing discrimination in the same three surveys. While we prefer the school integration question because it is worded more consistently, we find an essentially identical pattern (whites recognizing a major shift in the party's relative positions between 1960 and 1964). Results available upon request.

to support the CRA than were their Republican counterparts (see Appendix Table A.3).²⁴ As such, even by 1964, a white Southerner surveying the local political landscape would have seen Democrats as more hostile to racial conservatism than a local politician from the nascent Southern wing of the Republic party, consistent with the views of the ANES respondents. We return briefly to Southern Republicans in Section 6.3.

Evidence from newspapers: The shift occurs in Spring of 1963. The ANES cannot tell us at what point between 1960 and 1964 the Democrats are first viewed by voters as the party of Civil Rights. To further pinpoint that moment, we use higher-frequency data, but these data admittedly provide less direct evidence.

The leader of the Democratic party during most of the 1960 to 1964 period was President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy was not a consistent supporter of Civil Rights throughout his presidency. Just as his Republican predecessor Eisenhower sent federal troops to forcibly integrate Little Rock Central High School, Kennedy intervened to end the violence against both the “freedom riders,”—the protesters who organized to integrate interstate bus service— in 1961, and James Meredith, who integrated the University of Mississippi in 1962. But Kennedy also disappointed movement leaders with his inaction, including a January 1962 press conference pledging not to move ahead of public opinion on Civil Rights and his appointment of segregationist federal judges in the South. Thus, it is unlikely that voters would have predicted his June 1963 proposal of sweeping Civil Rights legislation, even a few months before that date.

Unfortunately we do not have polling data that directly speaks to the evolution of voters’ perception of Kennedy’s commitment to the issue. Instead we turn to the *New York Times* to track his progression on the issue, employing both a more narrow and a broader search to address Type I and Type II error concerns. Specifically, in Figure 4 we tally daily counts of articles in which (1) “President” and “Kennedy” and “civil rights” appear or (2) “President” and “Kennedy” and *any* of the following terms: “civil rights,” “integrat*,” “segregat*,” where the asterisk is a “wildcard.”²⁵ The two series tell similar stories. Outside of two short-lived spikes—when the administration intervenes on behalf of the freedom riders (Spring 1961) and James Meredith (fall 1962)—the first two years of Kennedy’s administration see few mentions of his name alongside civil rights terms.

However, the number of articles begins a steep incline in May 1963, when the nation’s

²⁴Indeed, *all* Southern Republicans in Congress (one in the Senate, eleven in the House) voted ‘nay’ on the 1964 CRA (as did the then-Democrat Strom Thurmon, who switched to the GOP two months later). Among Southern Democrats, 83 (20) out of 91 (21) in the House (Senate) who voted, voted ‘nay.’

²⁵We searched for words “President” and “Kennedy” to exclude articles that *only* mention Robert Kennedy, though in practice there is little difference.

attention turned to Birmingham. Local black activists had organized a shopping boycott of the city’s segregated stores in the weeks leading up to Easter. By early April, Martin Luther King arrived in the city and the movement grew into a series of marches and sit-ins aimed at over-running the local jails to force the city into negotiations to integrate employment and public accommodations. By early May, the Birmingham police responded with beatings, water hoses and dogs, attacks that did not spare even young children and that were captured live for a television audience. These images drew Robert Kennedy and other administration officials to Birmingham, a move interpreted by local whites as intervention on behalf of the protesters.²⁶

The number of articles reaches its pinnacle the following month when President Kennedy enters the Civil Rights conversation with a televised proposal of legislation to end segregation (“The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city, or State, or legislative body can prudently choose to ignore them”). And while the number of articles drops slightly from that mid-June high it remains elevated above pre-May 1963 levels throughout the remainder of his presidency. Thus the *NYT* evidence points to spring 1963 as the moment when the leader of the Democratic party becomes firmly linked with Civil Rights.

Further corroborating evidence. The *NYT* data may reflect the views of a narrow, elite group of East Coast editors and may not reach, much less reflect the views of, average voters. In Appendix Figures A.3 we tally the number of articles with the term “civil rights” for the two Southern papers for which we can do textual analysis, the *Dallas Morning News* and the *New Orleans Times-Picayune*. Again, we see Spring (in particular June) of 1963 as the moment when articles including “civil rights” and “President Kennedy” skyrocket.

A related concern is that newspapers, regardless of their regional focus, reflect the decisions of editors, not the sentiment of the general public. We thus complement our newspaper analysis with polling data. In the years 1950-1980, Gallup asks over 100 times “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?” Unfortunately, as we detail in the figure notes (Appendix Figure A.4), there are inconsistencies with the coding from one survey to the next, so we are cautious in interpreting these data points. Nonetheless the figure demonstrates that 1963 marks the beginning of a great (but temporary) swell in the share of American’s calling civil rights the country’s most important issue.

In summary, the ANES data show that views on the parties’ racial policies shift dramatically between 1960 and 1964. Media coverage of the issue during this period was mostly flat until a dramatic and sustained increase beginning in the Spring of 1963, and we thus con-

²⁶See, e.g., a contemporaneous summary of the events in Birmingham, “The Birmingham Story,” *NYT*, May 26, 1963.

clude that this moment was the key turning point when voters would first see the Democrats as the party on the more liberal side of the Civil Rights issue.

4.2 Estimating equations

Having defined a pre- and post-period for our 1958 to 1980 sample period, the empirical strategy for our main set of results is straightforward. We first estimate the total amount of decline from the pre- to post-period in Democratic identification among white Southerners relative to other whites via the following regression:

$$D_{ist} = \beta_1 South_s \times Aft_t + \gamma X_{ist} + \lambda_s + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ist}, \quad (1)$$

where D_{ist} is an indicator for person i identifying as a Democrat, $South_s$ is an indicator for residency in a Southern state, Aft_t is an indicator for being observed after April 1963, X_{ist} includes controls (which we will vary in robustness checks), and λ_s and μ_t are state and year fixed effects, respectively.²⁷

We then estimate a companion regression:

$$D_{ist} = \tilde{\beta}_1 South_s \times Aft_t + \tilde{\beta}_2 South_s \times Aft_t \times NoBlackPrez_i + \tilde{\gamma} \tilde{X}_{ist} + \lambda_s + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ist}. \quad (2)$$

In equation (2), the $South_s \times Aft_t$ interaction is now interacted with $NoBlackPrez_i$, an indicator variable for being unwilling to vote for a black president.²⁸ The vector \tilde{X} now includes all lower-order terms of this triple interaction and the remaining notation follows that in (1). The estimate of $\tilde{\beta}_2$ reflects the dealignment coming from those with conservative racial views, and comparing the estimate of β_1 in (1) with that of $\tilde{\beta}_1$ in (2) allows us to measure the share of Southern dealignment accounted for by those with conservative racial views.

5 Results

We first present the main results from estimating equations (1) and (2) and then provide corroborating evidence using other Gallup data.

²⁷As we are interested in dealignment from the Democratic Party, we code Democrats as 1 and Republicans, independents and other responses to party identification as 0.

²⁸In practice we code both “no” and “don’t know” as 1 for this measure. In no year do more than ten percent of respondents answer “don’t know.”

5.1 Results using the “black president” question

Regression results. Table 2 presents the main results of the paper. For completeness and to provide a baseline, col. (1) replaces state fixed effects with a *South* dummy and uses only Gallup (as opposed to adding GSS) data from 1958 to 1980. Whereas Democrats enjoy a 23-percentage-point pre-period advantage among whites in the South relative to the rest of the country, that advantage falls by 65% in the post-period. In col. (2), we show that the *South* \times *Aft* coefficient falls by 99% once the triple interaction term is added, which is itself highly significant and negative, indicating that essentially all the pre- vs. post-period decline in Democratic identification among white Southerners comes from those with conservative racial views leaving just as the national Democratic Party’s policies seek to end *de jure* segregation in the region.

The lower-order terms of the triple interaction are of interest in their own right. The positive, significant coefficient on *South* \times *No Black Prez* highlights the strongly conservative racial views that characterize the pre-period Southern Democratic party. Note also that the insignificant coefficient on *No Black Prez* indicates that in the pre-period racial views were not predictive of party identification among whites outside the South; the insignificant coefficient on *No Black Prez* \times *After* indicates that the limited predictive power of racial views outside the South continues in the post-period. Readers, of course, should note take this “non-result” to mean that race, racial views, or integration policy did not have political repercussions outside of the South. Civil Rights progress outside the South often came via different branches of government and was scattered across localities and time and is in fact the subject of a concurrent project.

In the remainder of Table 2 we explore the robustness of this result. In cols. (3) and (4) as well as all remaining columns we add state fixed effects. The comparison of *South* \times *After* across specifications is even more striking: in col (3) the coefficient is larger in magnitude than in col (1), but the inclusion in col. (4) of *NoBlackPrez* and its interactions actually makes the *South* \times *After* coefficient flip signs (though its magnitude is tiny). The resulting point estimates suggest that the 18.6 percentage-point decline among Southerners with conservative racial views (very) slightly *overpredicts* the 16.7 percentage-point relative decline among white Southerners. In Cols. (5) and (6) we add basic controls: fixed effects for gender, age (in ten-year bins), city-size (twelve categories), and educational attainment (six categories), which barely moves the coefficients of interest.

Col. (7) adds interactions of *South* \times *Aft* with age, a high school completion dummy, and a city size (categorical) variable (as well as all lower-order terms of these triple interactions). This specification tests whether the strong, negative coefficient on *South* \times *Aft* \times *NoBlackPrez* is merely picking up differential trends in the South along these other dimen-

sions. For example, we might worry that, say, rural Southerners differentially turn against the Democrats in the post-period for reasons *independent* of Civil Rights. If rural Southerners happen to have more conservative racial views, we would estimate a negative coefficient on $South \times No\ Black\ Prez \times Aft$ even absent any true reaction to Civil Rights. In fact, even after allowing age, education and urbanicity to have different effects in the South, different effects in the post-period, and different effects in the South in the post-period, the coefficient on $South \times Aft \times NoBlackPrez$ barely changes (note that adding the additional triple interactions means that the coefficient on $South \times Aft$ no longer has any natural interpretation).

In the remaining columns, we add the GSS data (as control variables are not consistent across the two datasets, we do not include them). Comparing cols. (8) and (9) to cols. (3) and (4) shows that the results are nearly identical in this larger, pooled dataset. In the final two columns we keep the GSS data and extend the series to 2000. The point estimates suggest that the decline in Democratic identification among those with conservative racial views explains three-fourths of the 19.5 point relative decline in the South over this longer period.²⁹

Graphical results. Figure 5 shows the variation underlying our regression results in an event-time figure. Specifically, for each survey date, we present the coefficient from regressing our Democratic identification indicator variable on *NoBlackPrez*, separately for Southern and non-Southern whites. As we would expect, the figure echoes the regression results (conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic party identification in the South in the pre-period, an association that is wiped out in the post-period) but unlike those results can show the shift is better described as a one-time decline—occurring sometime between the 1961 and 1963 survey dates—and not a secular trend. While the decline between the last pre- and first post-period surveys are dramatic, the shape of the figure is noisy and certainly not a perfect step function as our model would have literally predicted. In particular, it appears there may have been some over-reaction in the first post-period survey in August of 1963 (perhaps due to its timing just two months after Kennedy’s June 11th televised introduction of Civil Rights legislation) and a bit of a rebound by the next poll in 1965. But despite some noise, a clear break emerges at some point between August of 1961 and August of 1963.³⁰

²⁹We conclude our analysis period in 2000. After Illinois State Senator Barack Obama’s 2004 Democratic convention speech, heightened talk of his Presidential bid may have transformed the black president item from a hypothetical question to a referendum on a particular individual. To the extent Jesse Jackson’s less successful Democratic primary bids in 1984 and 1988 had a similar effect, they offer another reason we favor the 1958-1980 sample period.

³⁰We omit the confidence intervals in the main figure to avoid clutter. However, Appendix Figure A.5 includes error bands.

We note two things about this “break” from the Democratic Party among racially conservative Southerners. First, it did not lead to the extinction of the Southern white Democrat. Some racially conservative whites remained in the party and moreover over time fewer white Southerners identified as racially conservative (and indeed some racially liberal Southern Democratic politicians such as Jimmy Carter successfully engineered winning black-white coalitions in the region). Second, the break does not imply a simultaneous one-for-one embrace of the Republicans, as moves to Independent and other parties are captured in the null of our Democratic identification dummy. In fact, as we demonstrate in Appendix Table A.4 the Southern *increase* in Republican identification, while still highly significant, is slightly less than half the *decrease* in Democratic Party adherence over our sample period, as many former Democrats initially claimed independent status. As our focus is on *dealignment* from the Democratic party, we leave to future work whether the so-called “Southern Strategy” developed by Republicans during the Nixon administration was responsible for converting these former Democrats into Republicans, though as noted we discuss the rise of Southern Republicans toward the end of the paper.

For our purposes, the key conclusion from the analysis so far is that a significant number of racially conservative Southern Democrats left the party just at the moment its national leaders proposed sweeping Civil Rights laws.

Robustness checks. Perhaps the key concern about our approach so far is that while the black president question is worded consistently over time, the *true attitudes* of those who respond “yes” may change because of the increasing social desirability of progressive racial views over the sample period.³¹ For example, suppose that post-period Southerners feel cowed by national public opinion and become less truthful in answering the black president question, adding noise. We might then worry that the large decline in its positive correlation with Democratic identification is *not* because racially conservative Southerners had bolted, but is instead due to attenuation bias in the post-period driving the correlation toward zero. (Of course, given the pattern in Figure 5, the decline in its informational content would have to be highly discontinuous.)

We address this concern in two ways in Table 3. First, as shown in Figure 2, from 1958 to about 1970, the South-versus-non-South gap on this question remains relatively stable, suggesting that social desirability bias may work similarly by region during these earlier years (and it seems fair to assume this bias was simply *smaller* during earlier years and thus

³¹Empirical evidence supports this concern. Kuklinski *et al.* (1997) use a clever between-subject approach whereby the racial views of any one individual cannot be detected but the racial views of large groups can be. They show that these “unobtrusive” measures of racial attitudes show white Southerners to have significantly more conservative racial views than other whites, whereas standard survey questions (subject to social desirability bias) show much smaller differences.

less concerning). Cols. (1) and (2) demonstrate that our main result is largely unchanged when we limit our sample to this shorter period, not surprising given the patterns presented in Figure 5.

Second, we use pre-1963 data to *predict* conservative racial views and then substitute this predicted black president response for the actual response. Put differently, we ask, *is Southern dealignment driven by the type of person who would have given racially conservative answers in the pre-period*, regardless of how that person answers the black president question in later, more politically correct years. In cols. (3) and (4) we show that our results look quite similar when instead of individuals’ *actual* responses to the black-president question we *predict* responses using demographic characteristics. In the final two columns of the table we demonstrate the robustness of our results to augmenting our prediction equation to include views on other minority groups (col. 5) and to additionally allowing the impact of both education and occupation to vary with age (col 6).³²

Beyond considering composition bias, we perform a few more robustness checks for the main Table 2 results in Appendix Table A.4. While we use linear probability models for ease of interpretation, our results hold using probit instead. We vary the group of non-Southern states that serve as our control and in fact find that our results hold regardless of which region of the country we compare to the South. We also note (results available upon request) that results are nearly identical between men and women, and those older or younger than age forty.

5.2 Higher-frequency results from Gallup

The results of Figure 5 point to a sharp decline in the association of conservative racial attitudes and white Southern identification with the Democratic Party between the summers of 1961 and 1963, the last pre-period and first post-period surveys that include the black president question, respectively. Gallup does not ask the black president question at a sufficiently high frequency that we can pin the key shift to the Spring of 1963, the moment when, we earlier argued, voters first firmly connect the Democrats to Civil Rights. We now turn to alternative Gallup questions and a modified empirical strategy to more finely pinpoint the transition moment of white Southern Democratic allegiance. We lose the ability to stratify the analysis by racial attitudes, but we gain higher-frequency measures of Americans’ responses to political news.

Presidential approval. During the 1960s, Gallup asked the following question roughly

³²By “views on other minority groups” we mean questions about whether you would vote for a presidential candidate who was either Jewish or Catholic. We use these questions in greater detail in Section 6.1.

every month: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way President _____ is handling his job as President?”³³ We find 25 usable surveys that ask Kennedy approval, a question we use to examine how Southern white approval (relative to non-Southern white approval) responds to presidential Civil Rights news.

Figure 6 tracks Kennedy’s approval among whites, separately for the South and non-South, as well as the difference. The most striking element of the figure is the more than 35 percentage point drop in Southern approval between the April 5 and June 23 surveys in 1963, more than half of which occurs between the two polls (May 25 and June 23) that surround Kennedy’s televised June 11 Civil Rights address.³⁴ By contrast, non-Southern white approval is flat during the same period.³⁵ Thus this high frequency data provides evidence to pinpoint spring 1963 as a critical moment for dealignment. Note, however, that even the smaller events in the Civil Rights timeline noted earlier (the Freedom Riders and James Meredith) create wobbles in Kennedy’s relative popularity in the South.

We formalize the analysis of Figure 6 in the regression analysis of Table 4. We regress approval among Gallup respondents on the average number of articles per day linking the president and Civil Rights during the week of the survey, allowing the effect to differ for Southerners and non-Southerners.³⁶ We begin with the more narrow, “Civil Rights” classification. The negative coefficient on articles mentioning “Civil Rights” in col. (1) indicates that Kennedy’s approval falls in both regions the more his name is mentioned alongside the issue. However, the interaction term indicates that the decrease is nearly four times larger for Southerners. The point estimates suggest that, if a week were to average an additional article per day that mentions Kennedy and civil rights than some baseline period, we should expect non-Southern white approval to fall by 1.53 percentage points and white Southern approval to fall by 7.13 percentage points relative to their baseline levels.³⁷

³³In most surveys the possible valid responses are only approve or disapprove.

³⁴We define “survey date” as the midpoint of the period the survey is in the field, or the day preceding the theoretical midpoint in the case of an even number of days in the field.

³⁵Black approval (Appendix Figure A.6) slightly increases, but is subject to ceiling effects.

³⁶The modal survey is in the field for six days. However, we do not know on which day each respondent is interviewed. We match the midpoint of the survey date to the number of hits during the period three days before through three days after the midpoint.

³⁷Note that our specification, taken literally, suggests that respondents have zero memory of events before the window of the Gallup survey in which they participated. While this assumption is certainly incorrect, we know of no work that calibrates the proper look-back window and rate of decay of current events on respondents’ attitudes and opinions (and of course choosing the rate of decay that maximizes our results would have been improper). We have explored robustness of our results to varying respondents’ “memories.” The coefficient on $South \times Articlecount$ and its significance increases as we add previous days to the window up to about two weeks, and then starts to fall. When we include additional lags of search terms, the association of hits and approval

In col. (2) we add survey date fixed effects and an interaction between *South* and article counts of Kennedy alongside several “placebo” issues (the main effects of these placebo issue article counts as well as the Civil Rights article count are absorbed by the survey-date fixed effects). There are few issues that create significantly divergent reactions for whites in the South versus elsewhere. While Southern whites appear to react more positively (toward Kennedy) upon news related to the USSR, they react negatively on Cuba, making it hard to discern a consistent pattern on international relations or Communism. White Southerners react more positively to news linking Kennedy and agricultural policy (perhaps not a surprise given its differential importance in the South), but the coefficient is less than one-third the size of our Civil Rights interaction. These coefficients echo results we present in Section 6.1 that in the pre-period, whites in the South had few policy disagreements with whites elsewhere except for Civil Rights. More important to the question at hand, adding these controls in fact only increases the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction between *South* and Civil Rights articles. In col. (3) we repeat the col. (2) analysis using the more expanded “Civil Rights terms” search. The interaction term remains negative and significant, though is about one-fourth smaller.

False positives, especially for the expanded “Civil Rights terms” search, could attenuate results. We thus had two RAs code, based on their own judgment, whether each article put Kennedy on the liberal side of the Civil Rights issue, on the conservative side, was mixed, or whether the article was a ‘false hit.’³⁸

Col. (4) suggests that, relative to baseline, an additional article per day placing Kennedy on the side of Civil Rights (as judged by our RAs) reduces his relative support among white Southerners by over eleven percentage points, consistent with substantial attenuation bias in col. (3). Finally, in another attempt to address false positives but without relying on labor-intensive and potentially subjective hand-coding, in col. (5) we show that our col. (3) specification is robust to using the search term “Negro” instead of Civil Rights terms. In Appendix Table A.5 we show that our results are robust to normalizing the number of Civil Rights articles by total number of articles and to including a *South* linear time trend. The appendix table also shows that, beyond approval of Kennedy, *Democratic identification* among Southern whites also falls significantly relative to others upon news linking Kennedy

is smaller in magnitude in lagged weeks.

³⁸In fact, the RAs on average classify just over half of the expanded “Civil Rights terms” search as false hits, 32 percent as pro- Civil Rights, seven percent as against and six percent mixed. In debriefing the RAs after they submitted their scores, we concluded that they were quite conservative in judging an article to be pro Civil Rights. See Appendix C for a longer discussion and further details, including the instructions we gave to the RAs. Both were blind to our hypothesis of Spring 1963 as the turning point.

to Civil Rights (though as party identification is a more stable outcome than presidential approval, the magnitudes are smaller).

Were Southerners reacting to Kennedy’s *policies*, as we argue, or were they merely blaming the incumbent for events that they found objectionable? Perhaps white Southerners would have graded poorly any executive who presided over the country when the Birmingham demonstrations occurred.³⁹ If Kennedy’s actual involvement was not pivotal, then the coefficients of interest in Table 4 should be sensitive to simultaneously controlling for interactions with *South* and article counts for Civil Rights news that does *not* necessarily mention Kennedy. In fact, as we show in Appendix Table A.5, our coefficient of interest is largely unchanged when we simultaneously control for articles that mention “Civil Rights” (but *not* necessarily mentioning Kennedy) and this variable’s interaction with *South*. Similarly, the appendix table shows that results are also robust to using “Civil Rights” *and* “Martin Luther King” or “Civil Rights” *and* “Republican” in the same manner.

We provide a final piece of evidence against alternative issues as drivers of Southern dealignment by quantifying the share of the variation over Kennedy’s administration in the South-vs-non-South difference in presidential approval explained by Civil Rights relative to placebo issues. We begin by regressing *Democratic identification* on state fixed effects, the average number of articles in the Kennedy and “Civil Rights terms” count during the respondent’s survey window (from col. 3, *without* RA coding) and the interaction of this variable with *South*. We take the estimated coefficients to predict approval at the individual level and then collapse both the predicted and actual approval to *South* \times survey date cells. Figure 7 shows the actual South-non-South approval differences (already depicted in Figure 6) as well as our *predicted* differences, generated from the parsimonious regression described above. The series line up quite well and in fact our predicted series explains 51% of the total variation in the actual South-non-South difference over time.⁴⁰ Consistent with the results in Table 4, when we use the RA-coded version of the broad search in the same prediction exercise, the relationship appears even tighter (the third series of Figure 7) and now explains 56% of the variation.

We repeat this exercise for the number of hits for each placebo issue (each without any hand-coding). The best performing placebo issue (social security and safety net issues) explains only 20% (see Appendix Figure A.7) and completely misses the huge decline in relative approval in the Spring of 1963. In fact seven of nine placebo issues explain under

³⁹See, e.g., Achen and Bartels (2004) on voters punishing incumbents for shark attacks (as well as subsequent papers on natural disasters). Similarly, Southern whites may have punished Kennedy even if in reality he did nothing to promote Civil Rights.

⁴⁰When we instead use the more narrow “Civil Rights” search in our prediction exercise, it also explains 51%. The “Negro” search explains 54%.

five percent of the South-nonSouth variation over time. The overwhelming predictive power of Civil Rights in explaining regional differences in approval for Kennedy undercuts the argument that other issues were triggering dealignment during this key period.

Hypothetical presidential match-ups. Another familiar Gallup question asks voters whom they would prefer in hypothetical election match-ups. We examine how Kennedy fairs in these match-ups against Barry Goldwater, the Republican candidate most identified with Civil Rights opposition. Gallup asks this question roughly monthly beginning in February 1963, with the final poll less than two weeks before Kennedy’s assassination.

Figure 8 shows Goldwater’s support among white Southerners at around 30% through the first week of March. Goldwater then enjoys a steady increase in support through the Spring of 1963, reaching a plateau of around 60% in July. During our key period of the Spring of 1963, Kennedy goes from having a healthy, thirty percentage point lead over Goldwater to being thirty points behind him. White non-Southerners, by contrast, remain rather aloof toward Goldwater, increasing their support by only five percentage points from February to July.

The result from the presidential match-ups suggests that Kennedy’s decline in approval documented in the previous subsection did not reflect mere short term annoyance. Within months of Kennedy’s association with Civil Rights, half of his Southern white supporters shifted their backing to a candidate who was from a party they had shunned for a century but who was not believed to support Civil Rights. As noted in the introduction, those arguing for Civil Rights as the trigger for Southern dealignment typically point to Johnson as the catalyst—our results suggest that Kennedy has been given too little credit (or blame?) for losing the South for his party.

6 Addressing alternative hypotheses

In the previous section we made our “positive case” for Civil Rights as the prime mover of Southern whites out of the Democratic Party. In this section, we more directly address the most commonly raised alternative hypotheses.

6.1 Rising party polarization

Over the past fifty years, the Democratic and Republican parties have moved further apart on most issues, in particular redistribution and social insurance (McCarty *et al.*, 2006). As just one example, roughly half of Republican legislators voted to establish Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, whereas their opposition to the 2010 Affordable Care Act was literally unanimous. If Southern whites have always been more conservative—especially economically—than other

whites, then rising polarization could lead to differential exodus of Southern whites from the increasingly more liberal party. Moreover, if our “black president” question is merely acting as a proxy for general conservatism, then our results could be an artifact of polarization that we mistakenly attribute to reaction to Civil Rights. We investigate both of these claims.

Have white Southerners always been more conservative? We focus on the 1956 ANES, which asks more than a dozen policy questions (some are repeated in 1960 and in those cases we pool the two surveys) scored on a scale from 1 to 5 (strongly agree to strongly disagree). The first panel of Table 5 focuses on economic policy preferences, providing both means and the fraction agreeing or strongly agreeing for each of seven questions. In matters of economic policy (first panel), there was remarkable consensus among whites in the South and elsewhere. We find no significant differences by region on job guarantees, tax cuts, the appropriate influence of big business and (somewhat surprising to us, given Southern legislators’ support for the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act) labor unions, and the regulation of housing and utilities.⁴¹ Southern whites actually supported government provision of affordable medical care at significantly higher rates, though were significantly less likely to support federal financing of local school construction. There was similar regional agreement on foreign policy among whites during this era (second panel), and in fact, the only question yielding a significant difference suggests Southerners were less hawkish. But the third panel reports large and significant differences, as expected, on Civil Rights.

This analysis paints a picture of broad pre-period regional consensus (among whites) on policy issues *outside of civil rights*. In Appendix Table A.6 we further demonstrate that racially conservative views (measured using the two civil rights items in the previous table) do not systematically predict economic views within either region, nor—most importantly for our triple difference strategy—differentially across region. We emphasize that the above analysis is not to deny that Southern whites became more conservative (especially economically) in the post-period, but as scholars have pointed out (see, e.g., Kousser, 2010 and Lee and Roemer, 2006) this trend can potentially be explained by Civil Rights itself, which gave blacks access to the federal social safety net even in Southern states and would thus presumably reduce support for these programs among some racially conservative whites.⁴²

Is “no black president” merely proxying for conservatism? Until now we have

⁴¹Katznelson (2013) argues that while Southern legislators supported the pro-Union Wagner Act in 1935, they then supported the anti-union Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 because in the interim period the labor movement had become more associated with Civil Rights.

⁴²For historical treatment of this question, see Katznelson (2013), who argues that Southern politicians were among the most ardent supporters of redistribution during the New Deal, as New Deal legislation tended to exclude traditionally black occupations and moreover ceded administrative authority to local agencies and thus did not challenge Southern racial norms.

been interpreting our black president question as a measure of racial views, and indeed we showed earlier it is highly correlated with standard questions on racial equality. There are at least two complications to address. First, as until 1960 all U.S. presidents had been white, Protestant men, being against electing a black president may simply be proxying for social or cultural conservatism—a desire to adhere to past norms—not opposition to racial equality *per se*. Second, recall that the question specifies that “your party” nominates a black man—a white Southerner would surely have assumed that had the Democrats nominated a black man, he would have been from the Northern, liberal wing of the party. As such, a white Southerner may have feared a black Democratic president would have been dismissive of regional issues beyond segregation (e.g., agricultural policy).

In many surveys in which Gallup asks the black president question, it also asks whether respondents would refuse to vote for a female, Catholic or Jewish nominee from their party. In the 1960s, a president from any of these groups would have been a large break from tradition and thus refusal should correlate with social conservatism (perhaps especially for a female candidate). Moreover, had the Democratic party nominated a Jewish or Catholic candidate during this period, Southern whites could be very sure he would come from the Northern wing of the party. If our black president is merely proxying for social conservatism or regionalism, then our coefficient of interest should be quite sensitive to simultaneously controlling for views toward these three groups.

For each of these groups, Table 6 shows the results from four regression specifications (ignore the final two columns of the table for the moment). We begin by estimating our standard equation (1) on the subsample of observations that include the “black president question” as well as the “president” question for the group in question, to estimate total pre- versus post-period white Southern dealignment for these respondents (in all cases, the estimate is very similar to that of the baseline estimate in col. 3 of Table 2). In the second column, we then estimate a version of equation (2) where we instead measure the share of total dealignment accounted for by white Southerners opposed to a candidate *from the group in question*. The third specification is our usual “black president” triple-interaction equation on the subsample that includes the president question for the given group. The final specification performs a “horserace” to see if the decline is better explained by those Southerners against voting for blacks or those against voting for the other group.

The results of these exercises are very similar regardless of whether women, Jews or Catholics are the group of interest. Comparing the first and second specifications for each group shows that almost none of the total Southern dealignment is explained by differential movement among Southerners unwilling to vote for members of these other groups. Dealignment among racially conservative white Southerners remains large for all three subsamples

that also include the “president” question for the group in question (the third specification). Moreover, comparing the third and fourth specifications, when we simultaneously control for views toward blacks and views toward the other group (our “horserace” specification), the coefficients on our racial conservatism variables retain their statistical significance and in fact barely move. As such, Southern dealignment during the post-period is driven by those with conservative views on *racial* equality, even after we control for (highly correlated) views toward women and religious minorities.⁴³

6.2 Can economic development or changing demographics explain dealignment?

Even conditional on self-reported ideology, income is a negative predictor of Democratic identification. During our study period, the South and non-South exhibited differential economic growth rates. While we showed in Table 2 that our main results were robust to flexibly controlling for education, age and urbanicity, it is possible that they are confounded by insufficient controls for income. Therefore we explore the alternative hypothesis of income as the cause of dealignment in this section.

As noted, only six of the ten Gallup surveys from 1958 through 1980 include an income control, and in fact only one of the six is from the pre-period. Given the limitations of income measures in Gallup, our main approach to addressing this concern is to return to the ANES, the dataset authors tend to use in support of the income argument.⁴⁴ From 1952 onward, the ANES has the needed state identifiers as well as a consistent income measure: grouping households by where they fall in the U.S. income distribution (bottom 16 percent, between the 17 and 33 percentiles, the middle third, between the 67th and 95th percentiles, or the top five percent).

As noted in Section 2, most of the work that finds evidence of income as a driver actually uses cross tabulations and does not, in a regression sense, partial out what share of the total dealignment is explained by differential income growth in the South. We perform this exercise in Table 7, as usual using our Spring 1963 pivot point (so, 1964 is the first post-period year in the ANES) and otherwise following the specification in equation (1).

To establish a baseline, col. (1) Panel A shows the results with no controls except year and state fixed effects, and we find a 14 percentage-point relative decline in Southern Democratic identification (similar, as we would expect, to the analogous results from Gallup, col. 3 of

⁴³Correlations between the black president question and, respectively, the female, Jewish and Catholic president questions are 0.447, 0.402, and 0.455.

⁴⁴When we perform our standard analysis on the subsample of Gallup surveys that include the income variable, the coefficient of interest on our triple interaction term is not affected by whether income is included as a control.

Table 2).⁴⁵ Col. (2) shows that this estimate is robust to adding fixed effects for each of the ANES income categories. Those arguing for economic development as the prime mover often refer not only to income growth *per se*, but also the decline in the rural share of the Southern population. Col. (3) adds fixed effects for the three urbanicity categories in the ANES and, if anything, the coefficient of interest grows slightly in magnitude. Finally, Col. (4) allows urbanicity and income to have different effects in the South and in the post-period (i.e., fully interacting dummies for each of the urbanicity and income categories with both *South* and *After*). The magnitude of the coefficient on *South* \times *After* doesn't move. In short, we find no role for economic development—even broadly and flexibly defined—in explaining the differential decline in Democratic allegiance among Southern whites after 1963.

As detailed in Section 2, other authors argue that Northern migrants and younger cohorts—two groups which should have little natural loyalty to Jim Crow—drive dealignment. In col. (5) we introduce a “restricted sample”: we drop all respondents (in the South and non-South) born after 1941 as well as all respondents living in the South at the time of the survey but born elsewhere. Relative to the baseline in col. (1), our restricted sample shows a post-period drop in Southern Democratic attachment that is 92% of the size of the drop in the full sample.⁴⁶ The estimated dealignment in fact grows in size when in col. (6) we add the flexible controls for income and urbanicity included in col. (4).

The regressions in Panel A of Table 7 impose our preferred turning point of 1963 and address whether Southern economic development is likely biasing the coefficients on our key triple interaction term in Table 2. A distinct question is whether economic development can explain dealignment more generally. Panel B shows that, just as with *South* \times *After*, almost none of the Southern dealignment linear time trend (roughly one percentage point per year on average during our sample period) is explained by any of the specification checks described above.⁴⁷

⁴⁵All results in Table 7 are robust to using “voted for the Democratic nominee in most recent presidential election” as the outcome instead of Democratic identification. Results available upon request.

⁴⁶Our results support the arguments of Stanley (1988) and Osborne *et al.* (2011) that any effect of migration or cohort-replacement would have simply been too small to explain such a large shift in party identification.

⁴⁷In fact, not only does economic development not explain overall Southern dealignment, but richer and non-rural Southerners (the so-called “New South”) did not drive dealignment (see Appendix Table A.7).

6.3 Does timing of dealignment undermine Civil Rights as the cause?

As Figure 1 shows, while white Southerners continue to trickle out of the Democratic party after 2000, much of the damage to the party was complete by 1970. Between 1960 and 1970, Democrats lost on average over two percentage points per year among white Southerners relative to other whites, whereas there was no additional loss between 1970 and 1980 and the aggregate 1970-2004 rate was below 0.4 percentage points per year. This pattern is broadly consistent with the shock of the Democrats' 1960s Civil Rights engagement leading many racially conservative Southern whites to switch immediately and some amount of inertia that led others to switch later or to die out and be replaced by future non-Democrats.

What is, at first glance, less consistent with our story of 1963 as the turning point is the *earlier* evolution of party identification. We address two key questions. First, why did Kennedy's weakness in the South pre-date his 1963 Civil Rights moves? Second, what caused the (slower, but certainly substantial) pre-1960 dealignment among white Southerners?⁴⁸

Kennedy's weakness in the South pre-dates Civil Rights. As noted in Section 2, some authors have argued that Kennedy's poor performance in the South in the 1960 election undermines the claim that Civil Rights was the key driver of dealignment, as Kennedy's Civil Rights agenda was viewed as cautious until 1963 (Trende, 2012). Indeed, in his razor-thin 1960 election victory, Kennedy captures roughly fifty percent of voters in both the South and elsewhere, compared to a roughly twenty percentage point Southern advantage enjoyed by most previous Democratic candidates in the twentieth century (Appendix Figure A.8). Below we provide a variety of quantitative evidence pointing to the significant role of his Catholicism in both depressing his support among whites in the South and raising it elsewhere.⁴⁹

In a 1958 Gallup poll, 48 percent of Southern whites state unwillingness to vote for a Catholic president, compared to only 22 percent of whites elsewhere. In the 1960 post-election portion of the ANES, 29 percent of whites in the South said *the most important reason* they did not vote for Kennedy was his Catholicism, compared to 15 percent elsewhere. These percentages *include* (in the denominator) all those who *did* vote for him, suggesting anti-Catholic sentiment was a major factor in the election, especially in the South.⁵⁰

⁴⁸It is worth noting that despite the earlier dealignment—which we analyze in detail in this subsection—in a regression with Democratic identification as the outcome variable, our *South × After* coefficient is still significant when we simultaneously control for state fixed effects, year fixed effects and a linear *South* time trend (results available upon request).

⁴⁹Southern opposition to a Catholic president during this era was so substantial that Kennedy delivered a now-famous speech to Southern ministers committing himself to secular government (see <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16920600> for the transcript).

⁵⁰We tabulate only the “most important reason” (respondents can give up to five) and combine those who say “he’s a Catholic” and “Catholic church would control him.” While similar survey

On the other hand, Catholic voters (94% of whom lived outside the South) mobilized in support of Kennedy, further shrinking the South-versus-non-South advantage Kennedy received relative to non-Catholic Democratic nominees.⁵¹ While in the other presidential elections from 1952 to 2000, white Catholics, relative to other whites, favor Democrats by roughly eleven percentage points, the advantage in 1960 was over 45 percentage points (see Appendix Figure A.9). Beginning in 1952, we can use the ANES to “correct” for this pro-Catholic effect by dropping all Catholics. In Figure 9 we plot the South non-South difference in Presidential vote share for all white voters and for white non-Catholic voters. Consistent with past work, we find that in 1960 Kennedy performs more poorly in the South than the Democratic candidates who preceded him, even in our all-white sample. But once we exclude Catholic voters, the candidate’s relative Southern performance is similar to previous Democratic nominees and the clear break emerges between the elections of 1960 and 1964, consistent with our hypothesized 1963 turning point. As there is no consistent way to correct for anti-Catholic sentiment in the ANES as it is not asked regularly, even the non-Catholic series in Figure 9 almost surely understates how well Kennedy would have done in the South versus elsewhere but for his religion.

While the 1960 presidential election has been a focus of the dealignment literature, the focus of our paper is party identification. In that regard, more concerning than Kennedy’s election 1960 performance is that, if one looks carefully at Figure 1, the steep period of decline in white Southern Democratic *party* identification begins in 1961, not 1963, as our hypothesis would predict. Unless white Southerners actually changed their party identification (as opposed to merely their presidential vote), at least temporarily, then the Democrats fielding a Catholic nominee in 1960 cannot explain why we see Southern *party* dealignment beginning in 1961 instead of 1963.

In fact, anti-Catholic sentiment indeed led Southerners to switch party identification in the early years of Kennedy’s administration. In Figure 10, we plot the coefficients from regressing, separately for the South and elsewhere, Democratic identification on a *No Catholic Prez* variable for each survey date (i.e., the “no Catholic president” analogue to our main Figure 5). Those with anti-Catholic sentiment outside the South are always less likely to be Democrats throughout the sample period, with no obvious pattern over time emerging. In the South, the relationship bounces around zero, but 1961 (the first poll following Kennedy’s election) is a huge outlier: those with anti-Catholic views are roughly 27 percentage points

data do not exist from 1928, the only other time before 1960 that Democrats fielded a Catholic candidate (Al Smith), Democrats lost six Southern states that election, five of which had not voted Republican since Reconstruction (see Appendix Figure A.8 for the sharp 1928 drop in the Democrats’ popular vote advantage in the South).

⁵¹State residence of Catholic voters is based on authors’ calculation from the 1960 ANES.

less likely to identify as Democrats. While anti-Catholic sentiment is often noted in the 1960 election, our analysis demonstrates that it also affected white Southerners' party identification, at least in the year after the election.

Figure 10 also shows that, unlike the Figure 5 analogue with black president, outside of 1961, anti-Catholic sentiment fails to predict Southern dealignment, suggesting that it cannot explain the longer-run trend. Indeed, in the final two columns of Table 6 we measure the share of total dealignment that can be explained by Southern whites with anti-Catholic views leaving the party after Kennedy is elected (i.e., "after" is defined as 1961, the year of our first post-Kennedy-election Gallup poll, and beyond). Not surprising, given that Figure 10 shows that the connection between anti-Catholic sentiment and party identification is a one-off effect, anti-Catholic specific dealignment explains only (a statistically insignificant) 15% of total dealignment.

Finally, we show visually the limited predictive power of anti-Catholic relative to anti-black sentiment in Figure 11. The figure depicts three series for white voters: the actual South-vs-non-South difference in party identification, that predicted by racially conservative Southerners leaving the party beginning in 1963, and that predicted by Southerners with anti-Catholic views leaving the party after 1961. For the two prediction equations, we set the coefficient on $South \times After$ to equal zero (i.e., the predicted series *exclude* the residual dealignment that *cannot* be explained by the interactions with *NoBlack prez* or *NoCath prez*, as appropriate). The predicted dealignment arising from the *NoBlack prez* regression equations tightly follows the actual series, with the exception, as expected, of 1961, when a shock (a Catholic nominee) exogenous to our racial views model takes place. In contrast, the prediction arising from the *NoCath prez* equation performs very poorly: it catches part of the dip in 1961, but little else.

What drove pre-1960 Southern dealignment? The 1960s is not the first time white Southerners left the Democratic party. As shown in Figure 1, between 1948 and 1952, the Democrats' Southern advantage shrinks by nearly ten points, before slowing its decline for the rest of the decade.

A priori, Civil Rights as an explanation is consistent with the timing of this early dealignment. As briefly noted in the Introduction, the traditional post-Reconstruction position of the parties had Northern Democrats letting Southern whites deal internally with the "race question" and Republicans, at least in principle, on the side of federal intervention on behalf of Southern blacks. This distinction begins to blur by the late 1940s.⁵² By 1948, "race liberals" had gained some influence in the Northern wing of the Democratic party and in

⁵²In concurrent work, we investigate to what extent black migration out of the South led Northern politicians to support Civil Rights, especially in areas where blacks were swing voters.

fact won a Civil Rights plank in the 1948 national party platform. Truman would nearly lose that election after five Southern states voted for the “Dixiecrat” party, formed when Strom Thurmond (D-SC) walked out of the Democratic convention over the Civil Rights plank. (As shown in Appendix Figure A.8, uncharacteristically for a pre-1964 Democrat, Truman, like Kennedy, did no better in the South than in the non-South.) Democrats tried to reassure their Southern members by nominating in 1952 and 1956 Adlai Stevenson (a “moderate” on Civil Rights) and in particular vice presidential nominees from the South. In the meantime, a nascent Southern Republican party was forming in the 1950s, with candidates generally running as strict segregationists.

Data are far more scarce in the 1940s and early 1950s than during our main sample period. We present below the quantitative evidence we have collected from the pre-1960 period in chronological order.

We begin with the late 1940s and, as with Kennedy, link measures of support for President Truman to *NYT* articles connecting him to Civil Rights. As shown in Appendix Figure A.10, Truman has little connection to Civil Rights until early in 1948, when we see the number of articles linking him to the issue rise and remain high throughout the year (a year which saw him introduce Civil Rights legislation to Congress in February and, via executive order, desegregate the military and the federal workforce in July). Due to data limitations, we cannot use presidential approval as we do with Kennedy in Figure 6 and instead use Gallup data on whether a respondent plans to support Harry Truman in the 1948 presidential election.⁵³ We emphasize upfront that we only have five useable surveys, spanning July 1947 to early October 1948, and thus readers should view the results with some caution. Further, the choices of candidates in the survey, as in the actual election, is evolving.⁵⁴

Appendix Figure A.10 shows the tight, negative correlation between Truman’s relative support among Southern whites and media coverage of his Civil Rights initiative, a correlation that is significant in regression analysis (not shown). Indeed, essentially all of the decline in Truman’s support in the South occurs between the November 1947 and the March 1948 surveys, the last survey before and the first survey after his February 1948 introduction of

⁵³We could not look at presidential approval because there are no usable (non-binary) Gallup surveys on ipoll that include presidential approval between December 1947 and September 1948, a period capturing the peak of Truman’s Civil Rights engagement (see *NYT* article count data presented in Appendix Figure A.10)

⁵⁴See footnote to Appendix Figure A.10 for full listing of candidates in each survey. In particular, Dixiecrat Strom Thurmond is not offered as an explicit choice until September 1948. As Southerners are not offered an explicitly segregationist choice until September 1948 but we find our large Southern drop in Truman approval between November 1947 and April 1948, if anything we expect the late addition of Thurman to create a bias against finding our results.

Civil Rights legislation, respectively.⁵⁵

While we think we have made progress in quantifying the effect of early Democratic Civil Rights engagement on Southern dealignment, this contribution is admittedly small given the historical consensus that the 1948 Southern revolt was indeed over Civil Rights. A more open question is what drove the early 1950s dealignment. Had “the Dixiecrats of 1948 . . . loosened the inhibition against bolting the Democrats” and voting Republican or Independent was “the only vehicle for a protest vote against the national Democrats?” Or were these “earliest steps of the Southern realignment . . . an outgrowth of economic development?”⁵⁶

The 1952 ANES has only one question on racial views but several questions we can use to proxy defection from the Democratic Party. In Appendix Table A.8 we ask whether conservative racial views predict defection from the party among white Southerners (consistent with the “protest vote” story). Being against ensuring fair employment opportunities for Negroes predicts both intragenerational defection (i.e., having once identified as a Democrat but now identifying as a Republican or Independent) and intergenerational defection (having grown up with parents who were both Democrats but identifying as a Republican or Independent), though has little predictive power for defection in terms of current Democrats voting for Eisenhower. In most cases, these correlations retain statistical significance after controlling for gender as well as fixed effects for the age, education, urbanicity and income categories provided in the ANES. Despite the larger sample sizes, Appendix Table A.9 shows that racial views are typically insignificant predictors of Democratic defection among whites outside the South, again consistent with the effects in the South being due to lingering anger at the Democrats’ beginning to challenge racial separation in the region.

In Appendix Table A.10 we explore whether richer Southern whites were differentially leaving the Democratic party. While richer respondents indeed tend to defect from the Democrats (perhaps not surprising, given its redistributive policies), this tendency is often insignificant and moreover is no more marked than in the North.

Finally, it has been argued that the movement toward the Republicans in the 1950s repudiates racial views as the primary trigger of dealignment because of Eisenhower’s many Civil Rights achievements. While historians have debated the actual importance of Civil Rights initiatives under Eisenhower (e.g., the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts famously

⁵⁵When we run regressions parallel to the Kennedy approval analysis in col. (1) of Table 4, the Southern interactions are always negative and significant at at least the five-percent level (with standard errors bootstrapped to adjust for the small number of survey dates on which we are clustering). While our results never flip signs, they do sometimes lose significance when we control for articles on other topics, not surprising given the limited degrees of freedom resulting from the small number of survey dates. All these results are available upon request.

⁵⁶Quotes from Tindall (1972) and Trende (2012), respectively.

had no federal enforcement provisions and he expressly distanced himself from the *Brown v. Board* decision), we put that debate to the side and instead focus on the contemporaneous reaction to these episodes among white Southerners relative to other whites.

Figure 12 is the Eisenhower analogue to Figure 6, tracking his relative popularity in the South versus elsewhere against media mentions of his name alongside Civil Rights terms. There is a clear increase in Eisenhower’s connection to Civil Rights in the fall of 1957; he sent federal troops to enforce the court-ordered desegregation of Little Rock Central High School on September 24th of that year. In fact, his relative approval in the South declines by 25 percentage points between the polls of September 21 and October 12. The relationship between Civil Rights and Eisenhower approval more generally is quantified in the regression analysis shown in Appendix Table A.11. And just like for Kennedy, we see that Eisenhower paid an approval penalty in the South when the news made mention of him alongside Civil Rights (regardless of the search terms we use to identify articles), contradicting the claim that Southerners were not upset by his Civil Rights gestures.⁵⁷

7 Conclusion

The exodus of Southern whites from the Democratic party is one of the most transformative, and controversial, political developments in twentieth century U.S. history. While the qualitative literature has tended to point to the Democratic Party’s 1960s Civil Rights initiatives as the primary cause, more quantitative analysts have challenged this conclusion.

Analyzing little-used Gallup micro-data on racial attitudes dating back to the 1950s, we conclude that 100% (75%) of Southern dealignment from the Democrat party from 1958 to 1980 (2000) can be explained, in a regression sense, by the departure of racially conservative whites after the Spring of 1963, when the party established the clear liberal position on Civil Rights. Gallup’s higher frequency presidential approval and presidential election match-up questions allow us to more finely pinpoint the large drop in Southern support for President Kennedy to the timing of his proposal of Civil Rights legislation. Using a combination of survey and media data we find corroborating evidence for the role of Democratic Civil Rights initiatives in explaining white Southern defection from the Democratic Party in the late 1940s through early 1950s. For neither the 1960s nor this earlier period do these data sources offer any support for the most common alternative hypotheses for Southern dealignment: the

⁵⁷Unlike with Kennedy, media coverage of Eisenhower’s Civil Rights activity had no significant effect of party identification during this period (in most specifications, the coefficient is positive, but very small and insignificant). Given the very high Democratic share in the South during the 1950s, even if Eisenhower’s involvement in Civil Rights increased Southerners’ attachment with the Democratic party, ceiling effects might mask any effect. Results available upon request.

liberalization of the Democratic Party, Southern economic development or other secular, coincident trends.

This paper has provided further evidence in support of the idea that ethnic and racial identity, as opposed to mere class identity, has historically been an important determinant of Americans' political preferences. But do Americans today vote primarily based on racial and ethnic considerations? The current social desirability bias against admitting conservative racial opinions makes mapping these views to political preference more challenging today than during the less politically correct era that we study (see Stephens-Davidowitz, 2014, Mas and Moretti, 2009 and Greenwald *et al.*, 2009 on whether racism cost Barack Obama votes in his presidential elections). This question may take on increasing importance given predicted demographic shifts, but we leave it for now to future work.


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
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WRIGHT, G. (2013). *Sharing the Prize*. Harvard University Press.

Figure 1: Share of Democrats among whites in Southern and non-Southern States




Notes: Individual-level data from Gallup polls (accessed via ipoll), 1944-2004. South is defined throughout as the eleven states of the former Confederacy. Throughout the paper, we restrict ourselves to those ipoll surveys which were originally submitted as ascii files (as opposed to originally binary and converted into ascii by Roper). Roper warns that unreadable characters may have arisen in the conversion process and indeed every binary file we tried to read (roughly a dozen) had characters for some of our key variables that we could not decipher. We thus avoid binary files to ensure data quality. For this figure, we use every non-binary file that includes state and party-id from 1944-1980. From 1980-2004 Gallup surveys become more frequent and we choose just one per quarter to limit the burden of reading-in raw data files.

Figure 2: Share of whites willing to vote for a black president, by region




Notes: Data come from Gallup polls 1958-2003 and GSS 1974-2010. Here and throughout the paper, we count “Don’t know” as unwilling.

Figure 3: Whites' views of which party will ensure school integration, by year and region




Notes: Data are from the ANES 1960, 1964 and 1968 individual year files. Responses to the 1960 question, which asks “which party is more likely to stay out” of school integration, are reoriented so that answers align in party support for school integration with the later year questions which ask which party “is more likely to want the government to see to it” that white and black children go to the same schools. “No difference between the two parties” is not plotted, but can be derived by subtracting the sum of the Republican and Democratic shares from one. We have dropped missing observations, so $Dem + Rep + No\ difference$ sum to 100%.

Figure 4: Frequency of Articles Mentioning “President Kennedy” and Civil Rights terms in *The New York Times*, 1961-1963




Notes: Data are from daily counts of *New York Times* articles using their online search tool and *R* search script. The “Civil Rights” search counts the number of articles that include the phrase “President Kennedy” and “Civil Rights.” The “Civil Rights terms” search counts articles that include the phrase “President Kennedy” and any of the following: “Civil Rights,” any form of the word ‘integrate’ and any form of the word ‘segregate.’

Figure 5: Coefficient from regressing *Democratic identification* on *NoBlackPrez* by region and survey date (whites only)




Notes: Circles denote that the coefficient comes from a Gallup survey and triangles denote a GSS survey. *Democratic identification* is a binary variable coded as one (here and for all other tables and figures) if and only if the respondent identifies as Democrat. (Independent, Republican and “Don’t know” all coded zero). *NoBlackPrez* is coded as one if a respondent is against or unsure about voting for a qualified black nominee from his party. The vertical line marks our ‘pre-’ and ‘post-periods.’ All individuals in the sample are white.

Figure 6: Approval of Kennedy among whites by region as a function of articles with his name alongside Civil Rights terms




Notes: Article count includes the daily number of *NYT* articles that include “President” and “Kennedy” and any “Civil Rights terms” (“civil rights” and any form of the word “integration” and “segregation”). So as not to clutter the graph, we suppress the axis for this variable, but it identical to the y-axis in Figure 4. In the approval data (Gallup), “approve” is coded as one, and disapprove or no opinion (rare) is coded as zero. According to the Roper catalog, Gallup asks about Kennedy approval 39 times, all of which are downloadable on ipoll. However only 25 were originally entered in ASCII format and thus meet our data quality standard.

Figure 7: Predicted and actual regional approval differences for Kennedy




Notes: Data come from Gallup polls 1961-1963. “Survey date” refers to the midpoint of the period each survey was in the field. “Predicted” approval comes from regressing Gallup micro data on state fixed effects, the average number of Civil-rights related articles in the *NYT* in which President Kennedy’s name appears, and this variable interacted with a *South* dummy. Predictions are collapsed to *South* \times *survey date* cells and we subtract the non-South from the South cells to generate the “predicted” series for each date. “Predicted, RA coding” uses the same procedure, but Civil-rights related articles are broken down into those that argue Kennedy is pro-Civil Rights and those that argue he is against Civil Rights (the rest are dropped). See text and Appendix E for further detail.

Figure 8: Whites’ support for Kennedy v. Goldwater in hypothetical 1964 election match-up




Notes: Data come from Gallup polls, 1963. We count “lean toward” a candidate as supporting that candidate.

Figure 9: Share of Democratic votes in Presidential Elections (South minus non-South)




Notes: Data come from ANES cumulative file. Votes for the Democratic presidential candidate are coded as one. Votes for any non-Democratic candidate (including Independents) coded as zero.

Figure 10: Coefficient from regressing *Democratic identification* on *NoCatholicPrez*; by region and year (whites in Gallup)




Notes: Data from Gallup 1958-1980. As with *NoBlackPrez* we code *NoCatholicPrez* as one if the respondent is unwilling to vote or unsure about voting for a qualified Catholic nominee from his party.

Figure 11: Predicted versus actual Southern Democratic advantage among whites



Notes: Gallup 1958-1980. The first series is the actual South-non-South difference in Democratic identification among whites. The second arises from col. (4) of Table 2 after setting the residual dealignment *not* explained by differential dealignment among those against a black president (i.e., the coefficient on $Conf \times After$) to zero. That is, the second series is predicted dealignment if racially conservative views are the only reason individuals switched parties beginning in 1963. The third series instead shows the predicted South-non-South difference if the only reason individuals switched parties were anti-Catholic sentiment beginning in 1961. See Section 6.3 for additional detail.

Figure 12: Frequency of Articles Mentioning “President Eisenhower” with Civil Rights terms and relative Presidential approval (whites in South versus non-South)



Notes: Data come from *New York Times* daily searches and Gallup approval data. According to the Roper catalog, Gallup asks about Eisenhower approval 119 times, all of which are downloadable. However only 52 were originally entered in ASCII format and thus meet our data quality standard.

Table 1: Comparison of summary statistics for whites by time period and region (Gallup and ANES)

	1958-1963		1964-1980	
	(1) Gallup	(2) ANES	(3) Gallup	(4) ANES
<u>Southern states</u>				
Completed high school	0.351	0.482	0.458	0.599
Democrat	0.658	0.661	0.500	0.467
Female	0.515	0.569	0.533	0.552
Resident of urban area	0.434	0.316	0.599	0.378
Observations	1330	1512	3153	3243
<u>Non-Southern states</u>				
Completed high school	0.478	0.509	0.554	0.683
Democrat	0.427	0.412	0.420	0.364
Female	0.517	0.536	0.528	0.561
Resident of urban area	0.674	0.603	0.733	0.660
Observations	5721	5268	10212	10512

Notes: See text for details on the Gallup and ANES data. “Urban area” in Gallup refers to areas with a population greater than 2,500. “Urban area” in ANES refers to “central cities” and “suburban areas” as defined in the original ANES variable VCF 0111. These definitions have changed over time. In general, what we code as an “urban area” designates a Census-defined Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). A full account of how the original ANES variable is coded can be found in the ANES Cumulative Data File (ICPSR 8475) codebook.

Table 2: Democratic Party identification among whites as a function of region and racial views

	Dep't variable: Respondent identifies as a Democrat (all other responses coded as zero)										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
South	0.230*** [0.0485]	0.0835 [0.0684]									
South x Aft	-0.149** [0.0657]	-0.00130 [0.0688]	-0.165** [0.0658]	0.00264 [0.0595]	-0.164** [0.0629]	-0.0151 [0.0612]	-0.153 [0.145]	-0.167*** [0.0624]	-0.00492 [0.0585]	-0.195*** [0.0519]	-0.0436 [0.0618]
No Bl prez		0.0201 [0.0177]		0.00671 [0.0158]		-0.00612 [0.0154]	0.0104 [0.0157]		0.00798 [0.0158]		0.00930 [0.0158]
South x No Bl prez		0.159** [0.0652]		0.187*** [0.0570]		0.172*** [0.0563]	0.158** [0.0744]		0.192*** [0.0570]		0.183*** [0.0605]
No Bl prez x Aft		-0.0216 [0.0244]		-0.0124 [0.0242]		-0.0164 [0.0224]	-0.0287 [0.0223]		-0.00668 [0.0226]		-0.0171 [0.0200]
South x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.161* [0.0809]		-0.186** [0.0745]		-0.171** [0.0764]	-0.158* [0.0923]		-0.174** [0.0718]		-0.147** [0.0716]
Mean, dep. var.	0.452	0.452	0.452	0.452	0.451	0.451	0.451	0.435	0.435	0.391	0.391
State FE?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Interactions?	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Max year	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	2000	2000
GSS?	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	20192	20192	20192	20192	19787	19787	19787	25235	25235	41588	41588

Notes: *Democratic identification* is a binary variable coded one (here and for all other tables and figures) if and only if the respondent identifies as a Democrat. (Independent, Republican and “Don’t Know” all coded zero.) Year fixed effects included in all regressions, and state fixed effects in column (3) and beyond. *Aft* is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. “No Bl prez” is an indicator variable for reporting unwillingness to vote for a qualified black presidential candidate (“don’t know” and “no” are both coded as one). “Controls” indicate that age (in ten-year intervals), gender, education categories (six) and city-size category (twelve) fixed effects have been added. “Interactions” includes each of these controls as well as their interactions with *South* and *Aft*. “Max year” indicates the end point of the sample period (in all cases, the first year of the sample period is 1958) and “GSS” indicates where GSS data have been added to the regression. Standard errors clustered by state. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Testing for composition bias in main regression results

	Dep't variable: Respondent identifies as a Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
South x Aft	-0.161** [0.0690]	0.00485 [0.0644]	-0.165** [0.0712]	0.0471 [0.120]	0.0574 [0.110]	0.00388 [0.0905]
No Bl prez		0.00661 [0.0158]				
South x No Bl prez		0.178*** [0.0578]				
No Bl prez x Aft		-0.00912 [0.0279]				
South x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.188** [0.0758]				
No Bl prez (pr.)				0.0115 [0.0240]	0.00811 [0.0198]	0.00105 [0.0203]
South x No Bl prez (pr.)				-0.0126 [0.108]	0.0177 [0.0979]	0.146* [0.0809]
No Bl prez (pr.) x Aft				-0.00292 [0.0244]	-0.0109 [0.0234]	-0.0178 [0.0240]
South x No Bl prez (pr.) x Aft				-0.218* [0.125]	-0.225* [0.115]	-0.166* [0.0978]
Mean, dept. var	0.458	0.458	0.457	0.457	0.457	0.457
Fixed sample?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
<u>Prediction vars:</u>						
Background	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other views	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	Yes	Yes
Age interactions	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	No	Yes
R-sq for prediction				0.126	0.237	0.247
SEs bootstrapped?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17642	17642	17130	17130	17130	17130

Notes: Year and state fixed effects in all regressions. The first two columns replicate cols. (3) and (4) of Table 2 but truncates the post-period at 1969. *No Bl prez (pr.)* is a predicted value for *No Bl prez* using the pre-period sample and then projecting the estimated coefficients onto the whole sample. We perform this prediction (estimated separately by *South/nonSouth*) for three sets of variables: “background” (gender, age in deciles, education, city-size, occupation for household head, household size, and religion), “Views” (views on hypothetical Jewish or Catholic presidents), and “age interactions” (interacting occupation and education categories with age-in-decile categories). Predictors enter as separate fixed effects for each category (e.g., eight age-in-decile fixed effects, four education categories). We assign each predicted value of “No Bl prez.” to zero (one) if it is below (above) 0.5. The reported R^2 values are based on the pre-period. “Fixed sample” excludes observations with missing values for any variable used in the predictions. Bootstrapped standard errors based on 500 repetitions. The sample period for all regressions is 1958-1969. Standard errors clustered by state. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < 0.01$ ⁴⁵

Table 4: White approval of JFK as function of Civil Rights coverage

	Search terms employed: “President Kennedy” and...				
	“Civil rights”		Civil rights terms		“Negro”
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Article count	-0.0153** [0.00693]				
Article count x South	-0.0560*** [0.00743]	-0.0591*** [0.00441]	-0.0465*** [0.00484]	-0.114*** [0.00863]	-0.0587*** [0.00743]
Conf x Placebo: Foreign Policy, War		0.0101 [0.00832]	0.0197** [0.00816]	0.00623 [0.00914]	0.0162 [0.0121]
Conf x Placebo: Crime, Drugs		-0.00720 [0.0272]	-0.0147 [0.0354]	0.0172 [0.0270]	-0.0136 [0.0249]
Conf x Placebo: USSR		0.0208*** [0.00677]	0.0323*** [0.00751]	0.0157** [0.00646]	0.0194** [0.00901]
Conf x Placebo: Cuba, Castro		-0.0147 [0.00941]	-0.00849 [0.00957]	0.00676 [0.0102]	-0.00657 [0.0100]
Conf x Placebo: Communism, Socialism		-0.00353 [0.00683]	-0.0125* [0.00662]	-0.0142 [0.00961]	-0.00583 [0.0129]
Conf x Placebo: Taxes, Budget		0.0136 [0.00894]	0.0183** [0.00870]	-0.0125 [0.0107]	0.0147 [0.0122]
Conf x Placebo: Employment		0.00288 [0.0120]	-0.0220 [0.0151]	0.0134 [0.0126]	-0.0172 [0.0144]
Conf x Placebo: Social Security		-0.00576 [0.0132]	0.00706 [0.0124]	0.0341* [0.0166]	0.00685 [0.0227]
Conf x Placebo: Agriculture		0.0178** [0.00721]	0.0191** [0.00731]	0.0177** [0.00785]	0.0182* [0.00964]
Mean, dept. var.	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673
Survey date FE?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RA coding?	No	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365

Notes: Data taken from all useable Gallup surveys that ask presidential approval during Kennedy’s administration (Jan. 1961 – Nov. 1963). Dependent variable is a dummy coded as one if respondent approves of Kennedy’s performance. State fixed effects are included in all regressions. “Civil Rights” denotes the frequency of *NYT* articles containing “President Kennedy” and “civil rights.” “Civil Rights terms” adds to that count articles that contain “President Kennedy” and any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate”. “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “negro”. Placebo searches are articles containing “President Kennedy” and variations of the terms summarized in the coefficient labels (see Appendix C for details). We average these daily count over seven days centered on the midpoint of the time the survey is in the field. In col. (4), we use data generated by two research assistants reading each article and judging whether it painted Kennedy as pro-Civil Rights (and average their determinations so that coefficients are comparable to other columns). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Pre-period policy differences between whites in South and non-South (ANES)

	South	<i>N</i>	Non-South	<i>N</i>	Diff
<i>—Economic policy</i>					
Gov't should guarantee jobs	3.63	483	3.57	1914	0.067
Agree that gov't should guarantee jobs	0.56	547	0.55	2116	0.0094
Gov't sd not cut taxes if causes cuts elsewhere	3.47	267	3.49	1063	-0.018
Agree gov't should not cut taxes	0.46	326	0.48	1282	-0.020
Gov't sd help ppl get medical care at low cost	3.64	501	3.53	1885	0.11
Agree gov't sd help with medical care	0.59	547	0.53	2115	0.058**
Gov't sd limit pol. influ. of big business	4.00	241	3.84	954	0.16
Agree that gov't should limit infl. of business	0.54	327	0.51	1280	0.024
Gov't sd. *not* limit pol. influ. of unions	2.23	241	2.20	1002	0.028
Agree gov't sd. *not* limit infl. of unions	0.19	326	0.20	1276	-0.0035
Gov't sd *not* leave utilities, housing to priv. biz.	2.46	404	2.41	1623	0.046
Agree that gov't sd *not* leave...to priv biz.	0.22	546	0.23	2114	-0.0045
Fed gov't sd help finance local school construction	3.63	500	3.79	1906	-0.16**
Agree fed gov't sd help finance schools	0.59	547	0.61	2114	-0.026
<i>—Foreign policy, communism</i>					
Gov't cannot fire suspected communists	3.71	285	3.78	1111	-0.069
Agree gov't cannot fire susp. communists	0.57	327	0.59	1279	-0.021
Keep soldiers abroad to help countries fight comm.	4.14	456	4.05	1772	0.090
Agree we sd keep soldiers abroad....	0.65	547	0.63	2112	0.012
We sd give aid to poor countries even if can't pay back	3.28	479	3.40	1829	-0.12
Agree we sd. give aid to poor countries	0.46	546	0.48	2110	-0.015
Give for. aid even if country not anti-communist	2.74	247	2.85	954	-0.10
Agree give for. aid even if country...	0.28	327	0.30	1279	-0.020
Best way to deal with commun. countries is get tough	4.04	255	4.15	1078	-0.11
Agree best way is to get tough	0.58	326	0.65	1278	-0.067**
<i>—Civil rights</i>					
Gov't sd enforce fair jobs/housing for Negroes	3.33	477	3.86	1832	-0.53***
Agree that gov't should enforce fair...	0.51	546	0.62	2111	-0.11***
Fed gov't sd. get involved in sch. integration	2.15	305	2.99	1118	-0.84***
Agree that fed gov't sd get involved...	0.25	325	0.41	1277	-0.15***

Notes: All questions taken from the 1956 and 1960 ANES. If the ideological orientation of the question is obvious, we reorient the question if needed so that answers are *increasing* in the *liberal* position. The wording we use to label each question has been lightly edited to limit total characters while retaining the meaning of the question. Each question is presented in two ways: first, as continuous agreement with the statement from one to five (“don’t know” is dropped) and second, as a binary variable indicating agreement or strong agreement (“don’t know” is included). Sample sizes vary because while all questions appear in 1956, but only some are repeated in 1960. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 6: Do negative views toward other minority groups explain white Southern dealignment?

	Female				Jewish				Catholic				Cath (Aft=1961)	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
South x Aft	-0.188*** [0.0662]	-0.166** [0.0673]	-0.0295 [0.0799]	-0.0167 [0.0782]	-0.173** [0.0664]	-0.179** [0.0670]	-0.00395 [0.0615]	-0.0107 [0.0580]	-0.173** [0.0661]	-0.166** [0.0716]	-0.00782 [0.0625]	-0.00751 [0.0548]	-0.184*** [0.0450]	-0.156*** [0.0528]
No __ prez		-0.0391 [0.0243]		-0.0434 [0.0259]		-0.0185 [0.0165]		-0.0253 [0.0184]		-0.158*** [0.0237]		-0.167*** [0.0249]		-0.132*** [0.0191]
South x No __ prez		0.00749 [0.0527]		-0.00248 [0.0554]		0.0305 [0.0330]		0.00531 [0.0368]		0.125** [0.0538]		0.110* [0.0577]		0.134** [0.0502]
No __ prez x Aft		0.0488 [0.0295]		0.0525* [0.0296]		-0.0173 [0.0180]		-0.0118 [0.0223]		-0.0636** [0.0297]		-0.0664* [0.0342]		-0.104*** [0.0190]
South x No __ prez x Aft		-0.0595 [0.0708]		-0.0482 [0.0745]		0.0459 [0.0483]		0.0864 [0.0582]		0.0699 [0.0505]		0.100* [0.0587]		0.0387 [0.0519]
No Bl prez			0.0144 [0.0209]	0.0228 [0.0224]		0.00720 [0.0160]	0.0161 [0.0178]				0.00719 [0.0157]	0.0379** [0.0169]		
South x No Bl prez			0.162** [0.0686]	0.163** [0.0708]		0.185*** [0.0594]	0.184*** [0.0674]				0.181*** [0.0615]	0.164** [0.0736]		
No Bl prez x Aft			-0.00934 [0.0278]	-0.0198 [0.0281]		-0.0132 [0.0250]	-0.0128 [0.0283]				-0.0133 [0.0247]	-0.00777 [0.0267]		
South x No Bl prez x Aft			-0.182* [0.0922]	-0.171* [0.0945]		-0.189** [0.0790]	-0.219** [0.0843]				-0.185** [0.0808]	-0.198** [0.0904]		
Mean, d. var.	0.447	0.447	0.447	0.447	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456
Observations	11693	11693	11693	11693	18883	18883	18883	18883	18884	18884	18884	18884	20361	20361

Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy variable for Democratic identification. State and year FE included; the sample period used runs from 1958 to 1980, with 1963 as the first year of the 'after' period Gallup dataset, except in columns (13) and (14), where the first period of the after period is 1961. Analysis in columns (1) through (12) was conducted only on Gallup poll data for which both the "no to black president" and the no to other president questions were present. Together with the "no black president" question: the "no Catholic president" question was asked in Gallup polls from 1958, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, and 1978; the "no Jewish president" question was asked in 1958, 1959, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1967, 1969, and 1978; the "no woman president" question was asked in 1958, 1959, 1963, 1967, 1969, and 1978. For columns (13) and (14), the sample was expanded to Gallup poll data for which the "no Catholic president" question was asked. Standard errors clustered by state in parenthesis. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$


Table 7: Explanatory power of income and urbanicity in explaining white Southern dealignment (ANES, 1952-1980)

	Dep't variable: Respondent identifies as a Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<hr/>						
Panel A (Diff-in-diff spec.)						
South x After	-0.142*** [0.0425]	-0.141*** [0.0408]	-0.150*** [0.0434]	-0.150*** [0.0377]	-0.130** [0.0528]	-0.155*** [0.0477]
<hr/>						
Panel B (Diff. trend spec.)						
South x (Year/100)	-0.967*** [0.179]	-0.950*** [0.171]	-1.000*** [0.184]	-0.964*** [0.166]	-0.816*** [0.230]	-0.886*** [0.211]
<hr/>						
Dept. var mean	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.442	0.442
Income FE?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
City-size FE?	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Interactions?	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Restricted sample?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	19543	19543	19543	19543	13523	13523

Notes: The twelve coefficients above are each from a separate regression. The first panel take the form $Dem_{its} = \beta South \times After + \gamma X_{its} + \mu_s + \eta_t + e_{its}$ and the second panel take the form $Dem_{its} = \beta South \times Year + \gamma X_{its} + \mu_s + \eta_t + e_{its}$, where $South \times After$ is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963 and residing in one of the eleven Southern states at the time of the survey, $South \cdot Year$ is a $South$ -specific linear time trend, μ_s are state fixed effects, η_t are year fixed effects, and X_{its} is a vector of controls that we vary to test robustness. Income (five categories) and city-type (three categories) fixed effects are included where specified in the table footer. Where “Interactions” are specified, income and city-type fixed effects have each been interacted with $South$ and (separately) with $After$ (when $South \times After$ is the explanatory variable of interest) or $Year$ (when $South \times Year$ is the explanatory variable of interest). The “Restricted” sample used in columns 5 and 6 excludes those younger than 21 years in 1963 and current Southern residents who were not born in the South. (These specifications, therefore, exclude those with missing values for place of birth). Standard errors clustered by state. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix A. Supplementary figures and tables noted in the text


Appendix Figure A.1: Would vote for a black president (including non-white respondents)




Notes: Data from Gallup polls 1958-2003 and GSS surveys 1974-2010. The ‘o’ symbol denotes data from Gallup and the ‘x’ symbol data from the GSS.

Appendix Figure A.2: Share of whites who would *not* move if...

(a) Black family moved next door




(b) Neighborhood became half black




Notes: For both subfigures data are taken from Gallup polls 1958-1978.

Appendix Figure A.3: “Civil Rights” articles by month, Southern papers (1963)

(a) *Dallas Morning News*




(b) *N. Orleans Times-Picayune*



Notes: We count articles that include the phrase “Civil Rights.” Searches performed in the summer of 2014 using Library of Congress state newspapers as well as Yale University subscriptions to ProQuest Historical Newspapers and 20th Century American Newspapers.

Appendix Figure A.4: Share of respondents identifying Civil Rights as the most important problem




Notes: Gallup polls 1950-1979. This item has at least four limitations to note. First, it is not asked on a regular schedule. The question is fielded six times in 1962 but only once in the key year of 1963. Second, we are unable to produce analysis by race and region. In order to retain as many data points as possible, we graph the frequencies using the website Gallup Brain rather than reading in the data ourselves, which would mean losing those surveys without usable data on ipoll. Third, in some surveys Gallup allows individuals to provide more than one response to the most important problem question, which adds noise to our analysis. Finally, Gallup does not code the responses consistently from survey to survey. In some surveys the frequency responding “civil rights” is reported alone. In other surveys “civil rights” responses are grouped with, “racial problems, discrimination and states rights,” in other surveys with “integration,” and in still others with “demonstrations.” For each survey, we graph the frequency responding to the category that includes “civil rights,” so inconsistencies arise year-to-year.

Given these data limitations, we cannot replicate the analysis for all surveys by race and region, but below we do so for four key surveys: two from the low-importance early 1960s and two from the high-importance mid-1960s.

	Pre-period		Post-period	
	Feb. 1961	June-July 1962	Apr. 1964	June 1964
Whites, South	.095	.140	.400	.510
Blacks, South	.310	.270	.640	.730
Whites, Non-South	.036	.058	.380	.420
Blacks, Non-South	.170	.230	.650	.670


The levels differ in the expected manner. Southern whites rate Civil Rights as more important than non-Southern whites, consistent with the targets of proposed Civil Rights legislation—discrimination in public accommodations and voting—existing only in the South and thus only Southern whites being affected. Not surprisingly, blacks care more about the issue than whites, regardless of region.

Appendix Figure A.5: Coefficient from regressing *Democratic identification* on *NoBlackPrez* by region and survey date (Figure 5 with 95-percent confidence intervals)




Notes: Circles denote that the coefficient comes from a Gallup survey and triangles denote a GSS survey. *Democratic identification* is a binary variable coded as one (here and for all other tables and figures) if and only if the respondent identifies as Democrat. (Independent, Republican and “Don’t know” all coded zero). *NoBlackPrez* is coded as one if a respondent is against or unsure about voting for a qualified black nominee from his party. The vertical line marks our ‘pre-’ and ‘post-periods.’ All individuals in the sample are white.

Appendix Figure A.6: Approval of JFK among black Gallup respondents, 1961-1963




Notes: We plot approval by survey date, calculated as the midpoint of the window that each survey was in the field. The dotted vertical line marks June 11, 1963, the date of Kennedy’s televised Civil Rights address.

Appendix Figure A.7: Actual and predicted (using Social Security and safety net issues) regional approval differences for JFK among white Gallup respondents, 1961-1963




Notes: “Predicted” approval comes from regressing Gallup micro data on state fixed effects, the average number of Social Security and safety net articles in the *NYT* in which President Kennedy’s name appears during the survey window, and this variable interacted with a *South* dummy. Predictions are collapsed to *South* \times *survey date* cells and we subtract the non-South from the South cells to generate the “predicted” series for each date. See text for further detail.

Appendix Figure A.8: Democratic share of votes in presidential elections




Notes: Data are from U.S. election returns data as tabulated at the state-election-year level by David Leip, 1900-2012. Data available for purchase here: <http://uselectionatlas.org/>.

Appendix Figure A.9: Democrats' advantage among Catholics in presidential elections



Notes: Data are from the cumulative ANES, 1952-2008, only white respondents. Respondents reporting support for the Democratic candidate are coded as one, and all other responses (Republican, Independent, “don’t know”) are coded as zero.

Appendix Figure A.10: Share of whites who plan to vote for Truman in 1948 election as a function of *NYT* articles containing his name alongside Civil Rights terms



Notes: Hypothetical vote data are from the five readable Gallup surveys on iPoll that ask about planned votes in the 1948 election. Our first two surveys (July and November/December 1947) pit Truman against Governor Thomas Dewey (R-NY), our second two (March and September, 1948) also include Henry Wallace, the Progressive party nominee and a staunch integrationist challenger and our final survey (in late September/early October 1948) includes, for Southern respondents only, the segregationist Strom Thurmond (D-SC), the Dixiecrat nominee on the ballot only in Southern states. Respondents planning to support Truman are coded as one and all other responses (“don’t know,” Thomas Dewey (R-NY), Henry Wallace (Independent) and Strom Thurmond (Dixiecrat-SC)) as zero. Newspaper article counts are based on *NYT* searches. The first counts articles that include the terms “President Truman” and “Civil Rights” anywhere in the article. The second counts articles with “President Truman” and *any* of the following terms: “Civil Rights,” “lynching,” any form of the word “segregate” and any form of the word “integrate.”

Appendix Table A.1: Comparison of demographics of main Gallup analysis sample to IPUMS

	1960		1970	
	(1) Gallup	(2) IPUMS	(3) Gallup	(4) IPUMS
<u>Southern states</u>				
Completed high school	0.351	0.418	0.497	0.516
Female	0.515	0.516	0.533	0.524
Resident of urban area	0.434	0.603	0.572	0.652
Observations	1330	199391	673	244145
<u>Non-Southern states</u>				
Completed high school	0.478	0.458	0.579	0.586
Female	0.517	0.517	0.530	0.527
Resident of urban area	0.674	0.687	0.743	0.708
Observations	5721	772823	2116	848060

Notes: Gallup weights and IPUMS person-weights used in all summary statistics. Gallup statistics reported above are limited to surveys that include the *black president* question and fall within two years of the given Census year. In particular, for 1960, we have two surveys from 1958 and one each from 1959 and 1961. For 1970 we have one each from 1969 and 1971. Our earlier Gallup surveys tended to have larger samples.

Appendix Table A.2: Whites' opinions on race-related questions, by response to black president question (GSS, 1972-1980)

	Would vote for a a black president	Would not vote for a black president
Strongly agree that blacks shouldn't push themselves where they are not wanted	.3671737 [N=2827]	.6797642 [N=1018]
Agree that government does too much to improve condition of blacks	.2325276 [N=3806]	.4933712 [N=1056]
Against busing of black and white school children from one district to another	.8347466 [N=4835]	.9147287 [N=1548]
Agree that white and black children should go to separate schools	.0562566 [N=1902]	.3559557 [N=722]
Object to sending children to a school where a few of the children are black?	.0278278 [N=4995]	.1737747 [N=1571]
Favors laws against marriages between blacks and whites	.2575914 [N=3886]	.640031 [N=1289]
Would object to family member bringing black friend for dinner	.1835052 [N=2910]	.561245 [N=996]

Notes: Gallup survey weights (variable *wtss*) used in all summary statistics. We chose GSS racial attitude variables based on the number of observations during our main sample period.

Appendix Table A.3: Congressional support for the Civil Rights Act, by region and party

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Democrat	-0.159** [0.0788]	0.0962** [0.0417]	0.0851** [0.0348]	0.124** [0.0487]	0.0985* [0.0526]	0.128*** [0.0439]	0.114** [0.0430]	0.294* [0.159]
South		-0.825*** [0.0411]						
Mean, dept. var.	0.671	0.671	0.0762	0.671	0.693	0.684	0.708	0.730
House or Senate	House	House	House	House	House	House	House	Senate
States included	All	All	South	All	All	All	All	All
State FE included?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Alt. yeas coded as...	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Missing	One	One	Zero
Alt. nays coded as...	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Missing	Zero	Zero	Zero
Abstentions coded as....	Zero	Zero	Zero	Zero	Missing	Zero	Missing	Zero
Observations	431	431	105	431	374	431	380	100

Notes: Data taken from voteview.com. ‘Alternative’ votes refer to ‘paired’ and ‘announced’ votes, which did not in fact count officially. Note that for the Senate regression, only a single pair of Senators—John Tower (R-TX), who voted against the CRA, and Ralph Yarborough (D-TX), who voted for it—identify the *Democratic* coefficient in the South, and for this reason, our analysis focuses on the House (Senator Strom Thurmond also voted against the CRA and in fact switched from the Democratic to the Republican party in September of 1964 because of the CRA, but at the time of the vote was still officially a Democrat and is coded as such in the above table).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.4: Robustness of main triple-interaction results to estimating model, control group and outcome variable

	Dependent variable: Respondent identifies as a....											
	Democrat										Republican	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
South x Aft	-0.432**	0.00673	-0.178**	-0.00260	-0.152**	-0.0146	-0.162**	0.00166	-0.148*	0.0690	0.0774**	0.00668
	[0.179]	[0.153]	[0.0697]	[0.0735]	[0.0680]	[0.0614]	[0.0687]	[0.0632]	[0.0727]	[0.0796]	[0.0311]	[0.0729]
No Bl prez		0.0173		-0.0235		0.0450		0.0164		-0.0757		0.0479***
		[0.0414]		[0.0344]		[0.0398]		[0.0220]		[0.0696]		[0.0151]
South x No Bl prez		0.494***		0.210***		0.137*		0.180***		0.250**		-0.130**
		[0.153]		[0.0690]		[0.0745]		[0.0595]		[0.0909]		[0.0572]
No Bl prez x Aft		-0.0326		0.0198		-0.0523		-0.0319		0.0862*		0.0121
		[0.0630]		[0.0690]		[0.0324]		[0.0199]		[0.0442]		[0.0237]
South x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.492**		-0.210*		-0.132		-0.177**		-0.262***		0.0606
		[0.198]		[0.107]		[0.0808]		[0.0718]		[0.0884]		[0.0784]
Mean, dept. var.	0.452	0.452	0.478	0.478	0.504	0.504	0.459	0.459	0.565	0.565	0.296	0.296
Model	Probit	Probit	OLS	OLS	OLS							
Regions used as control group	All	All	NE	NE	West	West	MW	MW	South	South	All	All
Observations	20192	20192	9660	9660	7651	7651	10639	10639	5511	5511	20192	20192

Notes: These specifications replicate cols. (3) and (4) of Table 2 (i.e., year and State fixed are included; the sample period starts in 1958, with 1963 as the first year of the ‘after’ period, and continues through 1980). Probit specifications report marginal effects. Controls groups in cols. (3) through (10) are based on U.S. Census definition of region (‘NE’ being Northeast, ‘MW’ being the Midwest, and ‘South’ in this case referring to the *Census* definition of the South, so the control group are those states of the peripheral South counted a Southern in the Census, but not part of the Confederacy). Standard errors clustered by state in brackets. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.5: Whites' views of Kennedy as function of *NYT* Civil Rights articles, 1961 to 1963 (additional regressions)

	Dependent variable equal to...						
	Approval						Dem ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
South x (JFK + Civil Rights)	-0.0591*** [0.00441]	-0.0653*** [0.00220]	-21.66*** [3.050]	-0.0549*** [0.00417]	-0.0579*** [0.00401]	-0.0593*** [0.00424]	-0.0113** [0.00474]
South x Civil Rights				-0.0121** [0.00499]			
South x (Civil Rights + MLK)					-0.132 [0.0958]		
South x (Civil Rights + Republican)						-0.00780 [0.0159]	
Mean, dept. var.	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.469
Southern time trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Article count measurement	Absolute	Absolute	Relative	Absolute	Absolute	Absolute	Absolute
Observations	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365	80805

Notes: This table provides robustness checks of the results in Table 4. Data from Gallup and *NYT* searches (see Section 5.2 for more detail). To provide a baseline, col. (1) replicates col. (2) of Table 4 (that is, we include state and survey date fixed effects as well as a vector of *South* times placebo search interactions (but do not report these coefficients in the interest of space). All remaining specifications include these controls as well. In col. (2) we add a *South*-specific linear time trend. In col. (3), instead of using the absolute number of *NYT* articles mentioning “Civil Rights” (or placebo topics) during the survey window, we divide this absolute number by the total number of *NYT* articles (on any subject) during the window (note that coefficient units are no longer comparable). In col. (4) we return to our absolute measures of articles, but now include as a control *South* × *NYT* articles mentioning “Civil Rights”, *regardless of whether they also mention Kennedy*. A similar check is performed in col. (5), where we add to the col. (1) specification the interaction between *South* and *NYT* articles that mention “Civil Rights” and “Martin Luther King.” Col. (6) is identical, but instead includes the interaction between *South* and *NYT* articles that mention “Civil Rights” and “Republican.” Finally, col. (7) is identical to col. (1) but an indicator variable for whether the Gallup respondent identifies as a Democrat is the outcome variable. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.6: Do racially conservative views differentially predict policy preferences in the South v. elsewhere?

Dependent variable	Expl. var: No fair jobs/housing		Expl. var: No school integration	
	South x Continuous	South x Binary	South x Continuous	South x Binary
Govt should guarantee jobs	0.0753	-0.0262	0.0685	0.116
Agree that govt sd. guarantee jobs	0.0189	0.0101	0.0234	0.0662
Govt sd *not* cut taxes if causes cuts elsewhere	-0.0379	-0.0958	-0.00592	0.0514
Agree govt sd. *not* cut taxes...	-0.0537**	-0.114*	0.00279	0.0557
Govt sd help ppl get medical care at low cost	0.00266	-0.0262	0.0600	0.184
Agree govt sd help with medical care	-0.0208	-0.0315	0.0181	0.0882
Govt sd limit pol. influ. of big business	0.129*	0.195	0.0247	0.207
Agree govt sd. limit infl. of business	0.0244	0.0244	0.0286	0.138**
Govt sd. *not* limit pol. influ. of unions	-0.117	-0.224	0.00293	0.146
Agree govt sd. *not* limit infl. of unions	-0.0260	-0.0348	0.0134	0.108*
Govt sd *not* leave utilities, housing to priv. biz.	0.0325	0.0320	0.0348	0.168
Agree that govt sd *not* leave...to priv biz.	0.00435	0.0192	0.0235	0.0970
Fed govt sd help finance local school construction	0.000666	-0.0123	0.110**	0.357*
Agree fed govt sd help finance schools	-0.00669	-0.00954	0.0257	0.104
Govt cannot fire suspected communists	-0.0906	-0.223	-0.0235	-0.136
Agree govt cannot fire susp. communists	-0.0325	-0.0666	-0.00135	0.0246
Keep soldiers abroad to help countries fight comm.	-0.0538	-0.0308	0.0308	0.0420
Agree we sd keep soldiears abroad...	-0.0263*	-0.00972	-0.000784	-0.00747
Sd give aid to poor countries even if cant pay back	-0.00693	-0.00640	0.00800	-0.0227
Agree we sd give aid to poor countries...	-0.00278	0.0187	0.0232	0.109
Give for. aid even if country not anti-communist	-0.0557	-0.264	0.0716	0.185
Agree give for. aid even if country...	-0.0131	-0.0488	0.0386**	0.142**
Best to get tough with commun. countries	0.135**	0.189	0.0668	0.238
Agree best to get tough...	0.0488**	0.135**	0.0345*	0.130*

Notes: We estimate 96 regressions of the form $y_{is} = \beta_1 South_s \times X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \eta_s + e_{is}$, where y is the policy preference listed in each row, X is the racial attitude question listed in the columns, $South$ is a dummy for residence in the South, and η_s are state fixed effects. Each entry in the table is the estimate for β_1 . “No fair jobs/housing” is short-hand for being *against* the idea that the government should enforce fair treatment for negroes in jobs and housing, and is measured both continuously and as a binary (agree/disagree) variable. “No school integration” is short-hand for agreeing that the federal government should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children attend the same schools. Average N for the 96 regressions is 1459 (min. N is 1175, max. N is 1601).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.7: Did richer and non-rural whites drive Southern dealignment?

	Dept. variable: Respondent identifies as a Democrat							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rich x South x Aft	-0.0187 [0.0478]	-0.0968 [0.0709]						
Rich x South x Year			-0.00123 [0.00217]	-0.00496 [0.00351]				
Nonrural x South x Aft					0.0299 [0.0805]	-0.104 [0.0746]		
Nonrural x South x Year							0.00213 [0.00403]	-0.00273 [0.00397]
South x After	-0.138*** [0.0496]	-0.106 [0.0648]			-0.157*** [0.0535]	-0.110* [0.0623]		
South x Year			-0.923*** [0.196]	-0.694** [0.276]			-1.022*** [0.241]	-0.730** [0.283]
Mean, dept. var.	0.416	0.442	0.416	0.442	0.413	0.439	0.413	0.439
Restricted?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	19543	13523	19543	13523	20594	14180	20594	14180

Notes: Data are from 1952-1980 cumulative ANES. State and year FE and all lower-order terms of any triple interactions are included in all regressions. “Rich” is defined as self-reported income in the top third of the U.S. household income distribution (this variable provided by ANES). “Nonrural” defined as living in a city or suburb. The “Restricted” sample excludes those younger than 21 years in 1963 and current Southern residents who were not born in the South. (These specifications, therefore, exclude those with missing values for place of birth).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.8: Do conservative racial views predict defection from Democratic party (Southern whites, 1952 ANES)?

Dep't var. (N , mean)	Sample restrictions	Explanatory vars.: Preferred gov't role in employment discrimination					
		Wants anti-Negro employment laws		Anti-Negro laws or no gov't role		Anti-Negro laws or no <i>Fed.</i> gov't role	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Switched from Democrats ($N=403$, $\mu = .0471$)	None	0.0827* [0.0433] ($\mu=0.0814$)	0.0854* [0.0470] ($\mu=0.0814$)	0.0572** [0.0252] ($\mu=0.371$)	0.0572** [0.0282] ($\mu=0.371$)	0.0473* [0.0252] ($\mu=0.590$)	0.0422 [0.0277] ($\mu=0.590$)
Switched from Democrats ($N=298$, $\mu = .0637$)	Ex. never-Dems	0.0942* [0.0538] ($\mu=0.0813$)	0.0979* [0.0590] ($\mu=0.0813$)	0.0727** [0.0313] ($\mu=0.354$)	0.0734** [0.0357] ($\mu=0.354$)	0.0571* [0.0312] ($\mu=0.585$)	0.0607* [0.0347] ($\mu=0.585$)
Republican or independent ($N=403$, $\mu = .3076$)	Parents were Dems	0.0488 [0.0910] ($\mu=0.0814$)	0.0610 [0.0932] ($\mu=0.0814$)	0.136*** [0.0525] ($\mu=0.371$)	0.112** [0.0556] ($\mu=0.371$)	0.0986* [0.0528] ($\mu=0.590$)	0.103* [0.0544] ($\mu=0.590$)
Will vote for Eisenhower ($N=188$, $\mu = .3085$)	Current Dem	-0.251 [0.165] ($\mu=0.0520$)	-0.224 [0.187] ($\mu=0.0520$)	-0.0412 [0.0779] ($\mu=0.341$)	-0.0850 [0.0891] ($\mu=0.341$)	0.0126 [0.0780] ($\mu=0.601$)	-0.0140 [0.0886] ($\mu=0.601$)
Controls?		No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Each entry represents the results from a separate regression of the form $Defection_{is} = \beta Racial\ views_i + \eta_s + \gamma X_i + e_{is}$, where $Defection$ takes the various forms of leaving or voting against the Democratic party (listed in the row titles), $Racial\ views$ (listed in column titles) are various views on government's proper role in addressing anti-Negro employment discrimination, η_s are state fixed effects, and X are controls (which we vary to probe robustness). For each regression we report the estimate and standard error of β and the mean μ of $Racial\ views$. The explanatory variable for cols. (1) and (2) is coded as one iff the respondent favors government action to *enforce* anti-Negro employment discrimination; the dependent var. for cols. (3) and (4) is the same except "government (federal or state) should stay out entirely" is also coded as one; the dependent var. for cols. (5) and (6) is the same as (3) and (4) except "national gov't should stay out; state gov't can take action" is also coded as one. Even-numbered cols. include fixed effects for gender as well as each education, urbanicity, income and age category used in the ANES. We code missing observations for these controls as a separate category, so the samples within each pair of columns (and in fact across an entire row) are identical. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.9: Do conservative racial views predict defection from Democratic party (non-Southern whites, 1952 ANES)?

Dep't var. (N , mean)	Sample restrictions	Explanatory vars.: Preferred gov't role in employment discrimination					
		Wants anti-Negro employment laws		Anti-Negro laws or no gov't role		Anti-Negro laws or no <i>Fed.</i> gov't role	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Switched from Democrats ($N=1364$, $\mu= .1422$)	None	-0.0139 [0.0444] ($\mu=0.0523$)	-0.000491 [0.0453] ($\mu=0.0523$)	0.00864 [0.0231] ($\mu=0.247$)	-0.00384 [0.0235] ($\mu=0.247$)	0.0220 [0.0204] ($\mu=0.403$)	0.00134 [0.0210] ($\mu=0.403$)
Switched from Democrats ($N=745$, $\mu= .2604$)	Ex. never-Dems	0.00897 [0.0809] ($\mu=0.0462$)	0.0624 [0.0807] ($\mu=0.0462$)	0.0313 [0.0406] ($\mu=0.234$)	0.0000418 [0.0406] ($\mu=0.234$)	0.0760** [0.0356] ($\mu=0.367$)	0.0549 [0.0357] ($\mu=0.367$)
Republican or independent ($N=1364$, $\mu= .5960$)	Parents were Dems	0.0438 [0.0614] ($\mu=0.0523$)	0.0561 [0.0606] ($\mu=0.0523$)	0.0397 [0.0320] ($\mu=0.247$)	0.0201 [0.0314] ($\mu=0.247$)	0.0944*** [0.0281] ($\mu=0.403$)	0.0692** [0.0280] ($\mu=0.403$)
Will vote for Eisenhower ($N=470$, $\mu= .1638$)	Current Dem	0.0293 [0.0882] ($\mu=0.0460$)	0.0864 [0.0921] ($\mu=0.0460$)	-0.0540 [0.0443] ($\mu=0.225$)	-0.0720 [0.0475] ($\mu=0.225$)	0.0425 [0.0393] ($\mu=0.338$)	0.0286 [0.0419] ($\mu=0.338$)
Controls?		No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Each entry represents the results from a separate regression of the form $Defection_{is} = \beta Racial\ views_i + \eta_s + \gamma X_i + e_{is}$, where $Defection$ takes the various forms of leaving or voting against the Democratic party (listed in the row titles), $Racial\ views$ (listed in column titles) are various views on government's proper role in addressing anti-Negro employment discrimination, η_s are state fixed effects, and X are controls (which we vary to probe robustness). For each regression we report the estimate and standard error of β and the mean μ of $Racial\ views$. The explanatory variable for cols. (1) and (2) is coded as one iff the respondent favors government action to *enforce* anti-Negro employment discrimination; the dependent var. for cols. (3) and (4) is the same except "government (federal or state) should stay out entirely" is also coded as one; the dependent var. for cols. (5) and (6) is the same as (3) and (4) except "national gov't should stay out; state gov't can take action" is also coded as one. Even-numbered cols. include fixed effects for gender as well as each education, urbanicity, income and age category used in the ANES. We code missing observations for these controls as a separate category, so the samples within each pair of columns (and in fact across an entire row) are identical. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.10: Does income predict defection from Democratic party in early 1950s (1952 ANES)?

Dep't variable	Sample restrictions	South		Non-South	
		Top half inc. dist.	Income (categorical)	Top half inc. dist.	Income (categorical)
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Switched from Dem	None	0.0249 [0.0259]	0.00961* [0.00564]	0.0342* [0.0206]	0.00717 [0.00500]
Switched	Ex. never-Dems	0.0315 [0.0318]	0.0112 [0.00711]	0.0665* [0.0350]	0.00869 [0.00897]
Republican or Independent	Parents were Dems	0.0275 [0.0550]	-0.00215 [0.0120]	0.0515* [0.0285]	-0.00126 [0.00692]
Will vote for Ike	Current Dem	0.123 [0.0762]	0.0335* [0.0182]	0.000286 [0.0378]	0.00799 [0.0103]
Controls?		No	No	No	No

Notes: Each entry represents the results from a separate regression of the form $Defection_{is} = \beta Income_i + \eta_s + \gamma X_i + e_{is}$, where *Defection* takes the various forms of leaving or voting against the Democratic party (listed in the row titles), *Income* is parameterized in two ways (listed in column titles). We use either a linear measure taking the midpoints of the nine categories used in the 1952 ANES (and 0.75 and 1.25 times the lowest and highest category) or a binary variable for being in the top half of the distribution. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.11: White approval of Eisenhower as a function of Civil Rights coverage

	Search terms employed: “President Eisenhower” and...					
	“Civil rights”		Civil rights terms		“Negro”	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Article count	-0.0168		-0.0187***		-0.0145	
	[0.0128]		[0.00667]		[0.0129]	
South x Article count	-0.0225	-0.0378***	-0.0282**	-0.0293***	-0.0586**	-0.0525***
	[0.0142]	[0.0140]	[0.0113]	[0.00774]	[0.0233]	[0.0148]
South x Placebo: Foreign Policy, War		0.0172***		0.0167***		0.0132***
		[0.00568]		[0.00481]		[0.00449]
South x Placebo: Crime, Drugs		0.0520		0.0419		0.0321
		[0.0376]		[0.0308]		[0.0325]
South x Placebo: USSR		-0.0316***		-0.0277***		-0.0224***
		[0.00865]		[0.00719]		[0.00578]
South x Placebo: Cuba, Castro		-0.00397		-0.00971		-0.00743
		[0.00730]		[0.00766]		[0.00574]
South x Placebo: Communism, Socialism		-0.00869		-0.00483		-0.00460
		[0.00934]		[0.00782]		[0.00679]
South x Placebo: Taxes, Budget		0.00134		-0.00370		-0.00719
		[0.00701]		[0.00760]		[0.00634]
South x Placebo: Employment		-0.00289		0.00292		-0.00772
		[0.00980]		[0.0102]		[0.00981]
South x Placebo: Social Security		0.00682		0.00235		0.00650
		[0.0136]		[0.0125]		[0.0118]
South x Placebo: Agriculture		0.000297		0.00302		0.00153
		[0.0104]		[0.00982]		[0.00897]
South x Placebo: Korea		0.0111		0.00768		0.0180**
		[0.00940]		[0.00833]		[0.00777]
South x Placebo: Highways		0.0810*		0.0698*		0.0848**
		[0.0432]		[0.0373]		[0.0336]
Dept. var. mean	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651
Survey date FE?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	83963	83963	83963	83963	83963	83963

Notes: Data taken from all useable Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval data during Eisenhower administration (Jan 1953-Jan 1961). State fixed effects included in all regressions. The “Civil Rights” variable is the number of *NYT* articles containing “President Eisenhower” and “civil rights” anywhere in the article. “Civil Rights Terms” is identical except articles containing “President Eisenhower” and any of a list of Civil Rights terms (“civil rights,” “integration,” “segregated,” etc) are counted. “Negro” is the number of articles containing “President Eisenhower” and “negro.” We average this daily count over the seven day period whose midpoint includes the midpoint of the time (typically six days) the survey is in the field. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix B. ANES analysis

This section is not necessary in understanding any of the analysis in the main text. For completeness and for readers interested in using the ANES to further research this topic, we detail the questions that the ANES includes on racial equality during the Civil Rights era and explore how viable they are to use in an analysis similar to that in the main text of the paper (i.e., Figure 5 and Table 2). We conclude they are not suitable for this type of analysis.

B.1 Questions on school integration

As noted earlier, the ANES cumulative file includes questions from its individual year files *if those questions are deemed reasonably comparable and were repeated with sufficient frequency*. The only question related to civil rights that spans our pre- and post-periods that the ANES deems comparable over time asks whether the federal government should ensure school integration. It covers only a single pre-period year (1962) and is then asked most years from 1964 through 2000. The online appendix gives the exact wording of the question each year it is asked (ignore 1956–1960 for the moment). Even though the ANES deems the question comparable from 1962 onward, non-trivial differences arise year to year. For example, in 1962 supporting integration but “not by force” is an option (and coded as support), whereas in 1964 that option is not offered. In 1964, the justification of it not being the “government’s business” is introduced, but this wording is not included in 1962.

These caveats aside, in Appendix Table B.1 we replicate our main analysis, using opposition to school integration in the same manner we used refusal to vote for a black president (those who answer “don’t know” or “unsure” are coded as being against integration). Again, we use only data from the ANES cumulative file. Col. (1) shows that the decline in Southern white support for the Democrats relative to other whites is smaller when we use this very abbreviated pre-period. As noted in Section 6, Catholics (almost all of whom lived outside the South) reacted to JFK’s administration with unprecedented support, whereas nearly half of white Southerners told Gallup they would never vote for a Catholic. As such, the small coefficient on *South* \times *After* is likely an artifact of our single pre-period year being 1962 (the middle of JFK’s administration).

Nonetheless, while the small sample size reduces precision, the sign and magnitude of the triple interaction term reported in col. (2) supports the Gallup analysis. Relative to 1962, white Southerners against integration are nine percentage points less likely to identify as Democrats in 1964–1980, compared to their non-Southern counterparts. Whereas the Gallup analysis showed non-Southern whites with conservative racial views only slightly moving away from the party, the effect in the ANES is larger and achieves significance. These patterns of coefficients hold when we extend the post-period to 2000 (cols. 3 and 4) or end it in 1970 (cols. 5 and 6).

The key drawback to restricting ourselves to the cumulative file is that its one question on racial attitudes that spans our two periods provides only a single pre-period year. We thus explore the viability of adding additional data from the *individual* year files, even though ANES did not deem these questions sufficiently comparable. The closest candidate is a question asked in 1956, 1958 and 1960. As detailed in the Online Appendix , the question

asks for respondents' agreement with the statement: "The government in Washington should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same school" and unlike the version in the cumulative file offers respondents five possible answers based on the strength of their opinion.

Given evidence that question wording significantly affects survey answers (see, e.g., Gaines *et al.*, 2007) flipping the default between 1960 and 1962 is certainly not ideal (agreement with the pre-1962 statement would generally signal opposition to integration, whereas agreement with the 1962 and later versions would signal support of integration). Moreover, especially in 1956, it is not clear whether the government in Washington "staying out" of the question would signal opposition or support of school integration. In reaction to *Brown*, U.S. Senators and Representatives from the South drafted the Southern Manifesto in March of 1956, calling on all possible legal action to circumvent *Brown*.⁵⁸ It is thus quite possible that Southerners especially could interpret Washington "staying out" as in fact allowing *Brown* to progress.

These caveats notwithstanding, we attempt to combine these additional years, coding any degree of agreement that the government should "stay out" as opposition to integration. Appendix Figure B.1 (a) plots the share of whites against school integration by year and region. Overall, those outside the South are uniformly more in support of integration throughout the sample period. In 1956, the difference between regions is unusually small, consistent, perhaps, with our concern that some Southerners assume federal intervention might be on the side of school segregation. There is a very large decline in support for segregation among non-Southerners in 1962, perhaps due to the change in the way the question is asked by ANES.

Cols. (7) through (12) of Appendix Table B.1 replicate the analysis in the first six columns, but include the three additional pre-period years from the individual year data files. Adding these additional years adds power as well as makes the *South* \times *After* coefficient larger in magnitude. Essentially, the results look very similar to the main Gallup analysis.

However, examining coefficients year-by-year paints a noisier picture (Appendix Figure B.2). Perhaps because of the Southern Manifesto, 1956 appears to be an extreme outlier, where white Southerners who wanted the government to involve themselves in school integration were also staunchly Democratic. Nor do we see a sharp drop in the Southern coefficient estimate between 1962 and 1964. Overall, however, we continue to see that in the pre-period, opposition to integration positively predicts Democratic identification in the South relative to elsewhere, and that this difference for the most part disappears in the post-period.

Given that the ANES cautions against longitudinal analysis with variables they do not include in the cumulative file, we show these results mostly for the sake of completeness and emphasize that we prefer the Gallup given the serious issues of question consistency highlighted above.

⁵⁸Richard Russell (D-GA) was its main author.

B.2 Questions on jobs and housing

The ANES cumulative file contains two questions on fair treatment of blacks in the areas of employment *and* housing (pre 1964) and employment alone (1964 and beyond), and thus in isolation we cannot use them to replicate the Gallup analysis. As the Online Appendix documents, besides the inconsistent inclusion of housing, there are other non-trivial differences between these two series, likely the reason why ANES does not combine them into a single question in the cumulative file. First, whereas before 1964 it is left unclear as to which level (federal, state or local) “the government” refers, the “the federal government” is specified in 1964 and later. Second, as with the school integration question, more flexibility on the degree of one’s agreement or disagreement are offered in the earlier years. Third, though not a fault of the question, the way that one answers is likely very different before and after the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, which in principle would have addressed many of these issues.

A final issue with this question unrelated to its consistency across time is that “fair treatment” is vague. If one believes that blacks are innately inferior or that the races should not mix, then limiting blacks to low-status jobs and segregated housing could be viewed as “fair.” Indeed, in 1958, the ANES specifically asks respondents to *explain* their views about school integration. Among those whose views were classified by ANES as “anti-Negro,” still only 32% percent disagreed that government should ensure “fair treatment” for blacks in the area of jobs and housing.⁵⁹ This cross-tabulation suggests the notion of fairness in the jobs/housing question may be so vague as to be meaningless.


Indeed, Appendix Figure B.1 (b) is consistent with many of these concerns. First, regional differences on this question are very small relative to those for school integration. A sizable majority of Southerners agree that the government should guarantee “fair” treatment in jobs and housing, suggesting the notion is vague enough for most people to support. Unlike the black president question, whites in both regions become *less* supportive of the idea of time, perhaps because of a presumption CRA64 took care of the problem or because the understanding of “fair treatment” became broader over time. In any case, whether it is the addition of “federal government” to the wording of the question, the change in the number of options given as potential answers, or the passage of the CRA that summer, the new version of the question beginning in 1964 elicits significantly less support among whites than did the older question.

Despite these serious reservations and ANES classifying them as incomparable questions, for the sake of completeness we replicate our standard analysis by combining these two jobs/housing questions in Appendix Table B.2. Not surprising given that the question changes just at the point when our post-period begins, we do not find that including our triple interaction decreases the coefficient on *South* \times *After* nor is the triple interaction term itself significant.


⁵⁹Authors’ calculation from 1958 ANES individual year file.

Appendix Figure B.1: Evolution of whites' racial attitudes (ANES)

(a) Share against the gov't enforcing school integration




(b) Share against the government ensuring blacks fair treatment in jobs/housing



Notes: For subfigure (a), data come from individual year files of the ANES for 1956, 1958 and 1960 and the cumulative file for all late years. For subfigure (b), data from before 1964 come from the ANES cumulative file variable *VCF0818* and from 1964 and later from the variable *VCF9037*. See Appendix Tables C.1(a) and C.1(b) for exact wording each year.

Appendix Figure B.2: Coefficient from regressing *Dem* on *Against school integration* by region and year (whites in ANES)



Notes: Data come from ANES (cumulative file for 1964 and later, individual year files for 1956, 1958 and 1960). *Dem* is a binary variable for identifying as a member of the Democratic party (all other responses coded as zero).

Appendix Table B.1: Regressing Democratic identification on views on school integration, by time and region

	Cumulative File Only						Cumulative File + Indiv. Year Files					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
South x Aft	-0.0143 [0.0495]	0.0788 [0.0824]	-0.0566 [0.0554]	0.0430 [0.0810]	0.0113 [0.0618]	0.0938 [0.0578]	-0.105** [0.0502]	-0.00696 [0.0524]	-0.142** [0.0575]	-0.0420 [0.0676]	-0.0704 [0.0575]	0.00650 [0.0665]
No school integ		0.0289 [0.0280]		0.0288 [0.0281]		0.0316 [0.0281]		-0.00348 [0.0140]		-0.00430 [0.0140]		-0.00348 [0.0135]
South x No school integ		0.108 [0.0943]		0.112 [0.0990]		0.105 [0.0971]		0.135*** [0.0419]		0.132*** [0.0425]		0.131*** [0.0424]
No school integ x Aft		-0.0654* [0.0358]		-0.0914*** [0.0335]		-0.0779* [0.0421]		-0.0330 [0.0203]		-0.0579*** [0.0174]		-0.0444* [0.0248]
South x No school integ x Aft		-0.0896 [0.118]		-0.0952 [0.109]		-0.0693 [0.101]		-0.114*** [0.0358]		-0.115*** [0.0350]		-0.0805* [0.0472]
Observations	11396	11396	17190	17190	5583	5583	15255	15255	21049	21049	9442	9442
Max Year	1980	1980	2000	2000	1970	1970	1980	1980	2000	2000	1970	1970
Mean	0.404	0.404	0.374	0.374	0.449	0.449	0.422	0.422	0.394	0.394	0.457	0.457

Notes: Year and State FE are included in all columns. "After" is 1963 and later (so, in ANES, first post-period year is 1964).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table B.2: Regressing Democrat on views on jobs/housing, by time and region

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
South x Aft	-0.114** [0.0534]	-0.110** [0.0511]	-0.173** [0.0649]	-0.151* [0.0801]	-0.0880 [0.0666]	-0.116 [0.0891]
No fair jobs		-0.0391 [0.0278]		-0.0425 [0.0276]		-0.0377 [0.0278]
South x No fair jobs		0.118** [0.0553]		0.113* [0.0573]		0.120** [0.0562]
No fair jobs x Aft		-0.0252 [0.0313]		-0.0454 [0.0308]		-0.0611* [0.0328]
South x No fair jobs x Aft		-0.0436 [0.0559]		-0.0653 [0.0625]		0.00403 [0.0835]
Observations	7561	7561	11669	11669	5745	5745
Max Year	1980	1980	2000	2000	1970	1970
Mean	0.439	0.439	0.397	0.397	0.458	0.458

Notes: Year and State FE are included in all columns. “After” is 1963 and later (so, in ANES, first post-period year is 1964). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix C. Details on media searches

C.1 NYT searches

The full code (in R) used to generate the article counts is available upon request. Table C.1 provides the exact search terms used for each of the Civil Rights searches as well as the searches for “placebo issues.” Searches were performed for each date of Kennedy’s administration.

C.2 Research assistant article coding

Each RA received a spreadsheet that included the title of the article and its link (which they read via the *NYT* TimesMachine option). Both RAs were unaware of our hypothesis of a Spring 1963 turning point in Kennedy’s position on Civil Rights. The instructions were given via email as follows (note that, sadly, typos indeed appear in the original):

Please skim each article. We are interested in your assessment of the article after reading the headline, first few paragraphs, and skimming the rest.

Please categorize each article into one of the following four categories:

1. False hit (main subject of article is NOT civil rights).
2. Pro civil-rights (article suggests that Kennedy administration or Democrats more generally are pushing toward greater racial equality, that Southerners are unhappy about JFK/Dem stance on this issue, that Southerners worry that JFK/Dems are about to push forward on this issue, etc.)
3. Anti civil-rights (article suggests that Kennedy administration or Democrats are holding the status quo on the issue of racial equality, that Southerners are NOT worried or are even pleased about JFK/Dems on this issue relative to Republicans, etc.)
4. Mixed (article suggests that JFK/Dem efforts on issue of racial equality are mixed or unclear)

Note that there many articles will probably offer at east some “on the one hand....on the other” analysis, but when possible try to decide if it is general more “pro” or “anti” (though certainly if you feel it is truly mixed, you should categorize it as such).

Excel instructions:

1. For “false hit” enter “F”
2. For “pro civil rights” enter “P”
3. For “anti civil rights” enter “A”
4. For “mixed” enter “M”

Thank you!

A basic summary of the RAs’ coding outcomes is presented in Table C.2. In the regressions, we always average their counts so that regression coefficients are comparable to those without RA hand-coding. That is, for each day j of our sample period, we generate the variables $articles_j^c = \frac{RA1_j^c + RA2_j^c}{2}$, the total number of articles from day j that the first RA put in category c plus the total number that the second RA put in category c , divided by two.

After their task was complete, we asked the RAs for feedback on how they went about their task. Our biggest ex-post regret is that we did not make clearer that articles *not literally about Civil Rights but that nonetheless would have made racially conservative Southerners worried about Kennedy’s loyalty* should have been coded as “pro” Civil Rights and instead were coded as false hits (not about Civil Rights). For example, RA1 wrote: “I was moderately literal in interpreting the instructions—in the case of a black artist visiting [the White House] I probably would have marked that as false [hit] unless the article said something like ‘this is a step forward re: civil rights.’ ” As such, it is not surprising that Southern whites react negatively to articles that our RAs coded as false hits (Appendix Table C.3).

Appendix Table C.1: Details on *NYT* article searches

Category	Search terms
“Civil Rights” (narrow)	“Civil Rights”
Civil Rights terms (broad)	“civil rights,” “segregation,” “segregate,” “segregated,” “integration,” “integrate,” “integrated”
Negro	“Negro”
Foreign Policy, War	“war,” “peace,” “atomic,” “security,” “defense,” “foreign policy,” “international relations,” “international tensions”
Crime, Drugs	“crime,” “juvenile delinquency,” “narcotics”
USSR	“russia,” “soviet,” “soviets,” “russian,” “ussr”
Cuba, Castro	“cuban,” “cuba,” “castro”
Communism, Socialism	“communism,” “socialism,” “communist,” “socialist”
Taxes, Budget	“tax,” “taxes,” “budget”
Employment	“Employment,” “recession,” “unemployment,” “cost of living,” “wages,” “inflation”
Social Security	“Social security,” “social services,” “welfare,” “old age”
Agriculture	“farm,” “agriculture,” “agricultural”

For each search, “President” and “Kennedy” was also appended. Full code available upon request. Searches are not case-sensitive.

Appendix Table C.2: Statistics from RA hand-coding of *NYT* article content

	Daily Average (RA1)	Daily Average (RA2)	Total
Anti	0.0821	0.218	0.150
False positive	1.121	1.238	1.179
Mixed	0.165	0.105	0.135
Pro	0.786	0.593	0.690

Notes: Results from RA hand-coding of 2,290 articles over the 1,036 days of the Kennedy administration (roughly 2.15 per day).

Appendix Table C.3: Predicting approval of JFK using RA's article codes

	RA1		RA2		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anti	-0.103 [0.0797]	-0.103 [0.0811]	0.0316 [0.0487]	0.0626 [0.0538]	-0.0333 [0.0699]
False Positive	-0.0358* [0.0200]	-0.0708*** [0.00945]	-0.0369** [0.0144]	-0.0435*** [0.0133]	-0.0734*** [0.0171]
Mixed	0.0426 [0.0608]	0.0823 [0.0506]	-0.00777 [0.0379]	-0.0546 [0.0595]	0.000518 [0.0520]
Pro	-0.00988 [0.00761]	-0.00782 [0.00674]	-0.00734 [0.00985]	-0.00610 [0.0123]	0.00800 [0.0203]
South × Anti	0.0519 [0.109]	0.0288 [0.0959]	0.147** [0.0633]	0.165** [0.0753]	0.0182 [0.123]
South × False Positive	-0.0480** [0.0198]	-0.0901*** [0.0219]	-0.0687*** [0.0166]	-0.0726*** [0.0133]	-0.0681** [0.0325]
South × Mixed	0.138* [0.0730]	0.250*** [0.0669]	0.0894 [0.0711]	0.110 [0.0732]	-0.107 [0.131]
South × Pro	-0.0836*** [0.00693]	-0.100*** [0.00635]	-0.109*** [0.0127]	-0.150*** [0.0137]	-0.0766** [0.0347]
Observations	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365
Search	Civil Rights	Civil Rights	Civil Rights	Civil Rights	Negro
Mean	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673

Notes: Each RA classified an article as: suggesting that Kennedy was against Civil Rights (“anti”), unrelated to Civil Rights (“false hit”), suggesting that Kennedy was giving mixed signals on Civil Rights (“mixed”) or that Kennedy was moving in favor of Civil Rights (“pro”). RA1 had already been informed of the hypothesis by the time that we decided to classify all articles from the “Negro” search, so only RA2 performed that classification. Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval question between January 1961 and November 1963. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$