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TZID:Europe/Paris
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DTSTART:20241027T030000
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BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:calendar.104694.field_date.0@www.iast.fr
DTSTAMP:20260615T073530Z
CREATED:20250408T072001Z
DESCRIPTION:Ahmed Ezzeldin Mohamed\, “Monopolizing Clientelism During Regim
 e Transition: Implications for Regime Stability”\, IAST Lunch Seminar\, To
 ulouse: IAST\, May 16\, 2025\, 12:45–13:45\, room Auditorium 4 (First floo
 r - TSE Building).\n\nHow do autocratic regimes regulate clientelism durin
 g their consolidation? What are the impacts of their regulations on regime
  stability? This paper investigates the -overlooked- role of clientelistic
  institutions and their regulation during regime transitions towards autoc
 ratic rule.  During autocratization\, the opposition could utilize its cli
 entelistic networks to mobilize against the new regime. To inhibit the opp
 osition\, the emerging regime might pursue a monopoly over the provision o
 f clientelistic services by restricting non-state providers of clientelism
 . I argue that these discriminatory restrictions would boost the oppositio
 n's mobilization in the early phase of the transition\, but this effect wo
 uld dissipate and shift in favor of the regime as it consolidates power. I
  relate these changes to the regulations' informational functions. Empiric
 ally\, I test this argument using an original district-level dataset of Is
 lamist charities (i.e.\, clientelistic institutions) in Egypt (2012-2015) 
 during its autocratization. The findings show that the new regime's crackd
 own on Islamist charities initially boosted anti-transition mobilization\,
  but these effects disappeared with the regime's consolidation. Even more\
 , dismantling the opposition's clientelistic machine enabled the regime to
  coopt their clients and shift their loyalties toward the new regime. Thus
 \, the pursuit of clientelistic monopolies might backfire in the short ter
 m\,  but stabilize the new regime in the medium/long term.
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250516T134500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20250516T144500
LAST-MODIFIED:20260424T002001Z
LOCATION:Toulouse: IAST\, May 16\, 2025\, 12:45–13:45\, room Auditorium 4 (
 First floor - TSE Building)
SUMMARY:IAST Lunch Seminar
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.iast.fr/seminars/2025-monopolizing-clientelism-dur
 ing-regime-transition-implications-regime-stability
END:VEVENT
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