Seminar

On the politics of non-contributory social policy in the developing world

Irene Menendez

February 20, 2018, 12:45–13:45

Room MS003

Abstract

In countries where informality and precariousness are widespread, why do some governments choose to provide non-contributory social protection that benefits the working poor and others do not? In this project, I examine this puzzle using cross-national data on policy adoption and micro-level data on individual preferences. Theoretically, I argue that informality and Left control of government, two central explanations in the political science literature, do not generally translate into more social protection. Rather, labor market institutions shape public demand and partisan strategies. I posit that the interaction between informality, labor market rules and partisanship explains differences in the provision of non-contributory social protection. I examine the empirical implications of the argument at the macro-level using a panel of developing countries. The findings show that Left governments are likely to implement non-contributory social policies targeted to outsiders under rigid labor markets and high informality, but not otherwise. Consistent with the demand-side mechanism, findings from a cross-sectional analysis of survey data in Latin America and a survey experiment in Argentina show that low-skill insiders support transfers when labour markets are rigid. Together, these results shed light on the puzzle of why some governments redistribute to the bulk of the working poor in the developing world and others do not.

Reference

Irene Menendez, On the politics of non-contributory social policy in the developing world, Lunch Seminar, London School of Economics, February 20, 2018, 12:45–13:45, room MS003.