Miméo

Party Bans

Carlo Horz

Résumé

Political elites often employ propaganda that attempts to affect the behaviorof a particular social group by altering its members’ social identities. Yet when,and why, this kind of “identity propaganda” is effective is not well understood. Inthis paper, I construct and analyze a game-theoretic model where a political eliteuses identity propaganda to affect an interaction between a co-group member anda member of a different social group. While identity propaganda always prescribesa change in behavior by the co-group member, I show that its effectiveness dependson “strategic adaptation:” the co-group member accepts the propaganda when sheanticipates that the other group will change its behavior in response, and that thischange will increases her welfare. I use the model to determine the circumstancesunder which a political elite can use identity propaganda to mobilize or demobilizemembers of his social group, and discuss when this might lead to antagonism andintense conflict, and when it might permit cooperation. I also find that mobilizingpropaganda, while beneficial to the propagandist, never improves the welfare of hisco-group members. However, de-mobilizing propaganda (for example, propagandaencouraging shirking) improves the welfare of both the propagandist and his co-group members.

Publié dans

2017