



Toulouse
School of
Economics



Toulouse Summer School in Quantitative Social Sciences

May 30 – June 24, 2022 – TOULOUSE

May 30/June 10 – Part 1 – *The evolution of human sociality*

June 13/June 24 – Part 2 – *Economic and political institutions*

Economics
+
Social Sciences

A program in economics and the social sciences

In pursuit of the common good, through excellence in new economic knowledge

The Toulouse Summer School in Quantitative Social Sciences at Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) and the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse (IAST) offers an interdisciplinary program in economics and the social sciences. The summer school is open to PhD students in economics and other disciplines.

Applicants should provide a CV, a copy of their most advanced degree, a proof of student status, a short cover letter and a recommendation letter (optional) on the online application form. Applicants should specify if they will attend part 1, part 2, or both.

Credits: 3 ECTS credits per part.

Fees: 275€ for the whole program.

Waiver and funding: All students will be provided with university accommodation on site throughout the length of the program they are registered for. PhD students *in other disciplines than economics* will further have their registration fees waived and their travel expenses funded.

Application deadlines: Early applications are encouraged and will be given priority in the event of excess demand.

- *Early application deadline:* **February 4, 2022**
- *Regular application deadline:* **March 18, 2022**

Location: Classes will be *in-presence only* and located in the new TSE building at 1 Esplanade de l'Université, 31000, Toulouse, France.

- **June 2 / June 3:** Economics and Biology Workshop
- **June 22 / June 23:** Political Economy Workshop

Program:

PART 1 - May 30 > June 10 - **The evolution of human sociality**

PART 2 - June 13 > June 24 - **Economic and political institutions**

Online application platform: www.tse-fr.eu/toulouse-summer-school-quantitative-social-sciences

Contact: summerschool@tse-fr.eu

Organizers: Victor Gay (victor.gay@tse-fr.eu) and Jorge Peña (jorge.pena@iast.fr)



Part 1 (May 30 ▶ June 10, 2022)

The evolution of human sociality

Jorge Peña and Jonathan Stieglitz

Overview

Evolutionary theory provides a powerful organizing conceptual framework for understanding human social behavior that spans several academic disciplines (e.g., anthropology, biology, and economics), levels of explanation (e.g., proximate, ultimate, developmental, and phylogenetic) and levels of social organization (dyads, families, communities, and beyond). In so doing, this framework helps explain variation in human sociality across space and time.

This first part of the summer school will provide an overview of evolutionary approaches to understanding human sociality from an interdisciplinary perspective, incorporating the most recent theoretical and empirical advances. The first week comprises a course by Jorge Peña on mathematical models of social evolution, and the second week, a course by Jonathan Stieglitz on human social evolution from an evolutionary anthropology perspective

Instructors



• **Jonathan Stieglitz** is Professor Anthropology at University of Toulouse 1 Capitole and a member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse. He is also co-director of the Tsimane Health and Life History Project (<http://tsimane.anth.ucsb.edu/index.html>), a joint health and anthropology project aimed at understanding human life course evolution.

Dr. Stieglitz's research aims to understand how ecological and social factors interact to influence human behavior. Specifically, his research addresses three questions: **1)** Why do families form and function the way they do? **2)** How does variability in family functioning affect well-being of household members? and **3)** Why and how do social relationships (family and other) interact with local ecology to influence behavior over the life course? To address these questions Dr. Stieglitz uses principles from behavioral ecology and life history theory, which attempt to explain modern human variation as an adaptive response to trade-offs between investments in competing demands.

Dr. Stieglitz received his PhD in Anthropology (concentration: Human Evolutionary Ecology) from the University of New Mexico

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• **Jorge Peña** is Assistant Professor at University Toulouse 1 Capitole and a member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse. His research focuses on social evolution theory and collective action problems from a theoretical and interdisciplinary perspective. His work has been published in *The American Naturalist*, *Evolution*, *Games and Economic Behavior*, *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, *Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Science*, and *Trends in Ecology and Evolution*, among others. Originally trained as an engineer, he received his PhD in Applied Mathematics from the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Lausanne, and has previously held postdoctoral research positions at the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Basel, at the Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, and at the GEOMAR Helmholtz Centre for Ocean Research Kiel.

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• **Péter Bayer** is a postdoctoral researcher at Toulouse School of Economics and Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse. His research focus is on game theory, networks, and the application of game theory to fight cancer. His research has been published in *Journal of Economic Theory*, *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*, and *Journal of Theoretical Biology*. Dr. Bayer received his PhD at Maastricht University in 2019.

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Course structure, part 1 / week 1

(Monday, May 30 – Friday, June 3)

Mathematical models of social evolution

Social evolution is the subfield of the evolutionary sciences concerned with the evolution (be it genetic or cultural) of social behaviors, that is, behaviors having fitness consequences for individuals other than the actor. Although most research in the evolutionary (human) sciences is empirical, predictions and intuitions are often derived from mathematical models drawing upon evolutionary theory and game theory. In this course, we introduce students to ideas and models used in social evolution theory, and apply them to the general question of the evolution of human cooperation. In particular, we will review models of indirect reciprocity and institutional sanctioning. The format will consist of lectures in the mornings (by Jorge Peña) and tutorials in the afternoons (by Péter Bayer).

	Monday, May 30	Tuesday, June 1	Wednesday, June 2
9.00 am - 10.30 am	Methods 1	Indirect reciprocity 1	Institutional sanctioning 1
10.30 am - 11.00 am	Break	Break	Break
11.00 am - 12.30 am	Methods 2	Indirect reciprocity 2	Institutional sanctioning 2
12.30 am - 2.00 pm	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch
2.00 pm - 5.00 pm	No class	No class	No class
5.00 pm - 6.30 pm	Tutorial Péter Bayer	Tutorial Péter Bayer	Tutorial Péter Bayer

References

Methods

- Boyd R. & Richerson P. J. (1985) Culture and the evolutionary process. *University of Chicago Press*.
- Gintis, H. (2009) Game theory evolving: A problem-centered introduction to evolutionary game theory. *Princeton University Press*.
- McElreath R. & Boyd R. (2008) Mathematical models of social evolution: A guide for the perplexed. *University of Chicago Press*.
- Peña J., Lehmann L. & Nöldeke G. (2014) Gains from switching and evolutionary stability in multi-player matrix games. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 346, 23-33.

Indirect reciprocity

- Alexander R. D. (1987) The biology of moral systems. *Aldine de Gruyter*.
- Nowak M. A. & Sigmund K. (1998) Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. *Nature*, 393(6685):573–577.
- Nowak M. A. & Sigmund K. (2005) Evolution of indirect reciprocity. *Nature*, 437(7063):1291–1298.
- Ohtsuki H. & Iwasa Y. (2006) The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 239(4):435–444.
- Okada I. (2020) A review of theoretical studies on indirect reciprocity. *Games*, 11(3):27, 2020.

Course structure, part 1 / week 1

(Monday, May 30 – Friday, June 3)

Thursday, June 3	Friday, June 4
Toulouse Economics and Biology Workshop	

Evaluation

To be announced.

Workshop

Students will have the opportunity to attend the 9th Toulouse Economics and Biology Workshop held on Thursday June 2 and Friday, June 3. More information is available at:

www.iast.fr/fr/9th-toulouse-economics-and-biology-workshop

- Panchanathan K. & Boyd R. (2003) A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity. *Journal of Theoretical Biology*, 224(1):115–126, 2003.
- Sigmund K. (2016) The calculus of selfishness. *Princeton University Press*.

Institutional sanctioning

- Boyd, R. & Richerson, P. J. (1992) Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. *Ethol. Sociobiol.* 13, 171–195.
- Boyd, R., Gintis, H., Bowles, S. & Richerson, P. J. (2003) The evolution of altruistic punishment. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.* 100, 3531.
- Boyd, R., Gintis, H. & Bowles, S. (2010) Coordinated punishment of defectors sustains cooperation and can proliferate when rare. *Science* 328, 617–620.
- Kosfeld, M., Okada, A. & Riedl, A. (2009) Institution formation in public goods games. *Am. Econ. Rev.* 99, 1335–1355.
- Okada, A. (1993) The possibility of cooperation in an n-person prisoners' dilemma with institutional arrangements. *Public Choice* 77, 629–656.
- Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A. & Hauert, C. (2010) Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons. *Nature* 466, 861–863.



Course structure, part 1 / week 2

(Tuesday, June 7 – Friday, June 10)

Human social evolution

Human social behavior has been shaped by evolutionary processes. This course reviews the relevant theory and primary approaches for investigating human social behavior from an evolutionary perspective. We will explore universal and variable features of human sociality across time and space, with a primary focus on subsistence-level populations but also including modern industrialized economies. Topics addressed will include cooperation, mating and parenting, life history theory and the demographic transition to low fertility.

The format will consist of lectures (morning) and workshops (afternoon) taught by Jonathan Stieglitz. Workshops will include class discussions (for example, about how to design novel research) and individual and/or group projects.

LECTURE TOPICS

- Human social organization: an overview • Human life histories: diet, intelligence and sociality
- Food sharing: conceptual models and empirical evidence • Marriage and the division of labor • Life history theory
- Demographic transition

	Monday, June 6	Tuesday, June 7	Wednesday, June 8
9.00 am - 10.30 am	Pentecost holiday	Social contract theory in light of human evolutionary social science	Life history theory
10.30 am - 11.00 am		Break	Break
11.00 am - 12.30 am		Inequality, competition and reproduction	Evolution of human cooperation
12.30 am - 2.00 pm		Lunch	Lunch
2.00 pm - 5.30 pm		No class	No class
	Thursday, June 9	Friday, June 10	
9.00 am - 10.30 am	Complementarity in human families	Cumulative culture: Pedagogy	
10.30 am - 11.00 am	Break	Break	
11.00 am - 12.30 am	Sexual conflict	Norm enforcement	
12.30 am - 2.00 pm	Lunch	Lunch	
2.00 pm - 5.30 pm	Dissertation proposal workshop (student presentations and feedback)	Dissertation proposal workshop (student presentations and feedback)	

Evaluation

Students will be evaluated based on research proposals presented during the workshops on Thursday and Friday.

Course structure, part 1 / week 2

(Tuesday, June 7 – Friday, June 10)

References

Human social organization

- Boehm, C. (1999). Hierarchy in the Forest: The Evolution of Egalitarian Behavior. *Harvard University Press*.
- Boone, J. (1992). Competition, Conflict, and the Development of Social Hierarchies. In *Evolutionary Ecology and Human Behavior* (Smith, E. A., & Winterhalder, B. Eds), 301–337. *Aldine de Gruyter*.
- Kaplan, H. S., Hooper, P. L., & Gurven, M. (2009). The Evolutionary and Ecological Roots of Human Social Organization. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 364(1533), 3289–3299.
- Summers, K. (2005). The Evolutionary Ecology of Despotism. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 26(1), 106–135.

Food sharing

- Gurven, M. (2004). To Give and to Give Not: The Behavioral Ecology of Human Food Transfers. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 27(4), 543–559
- Hooper, P. L., Gurven, M., Winking, J., & Kaplan, H. S. (2015). Inclusive Fitness and Differential Productivity Across the Life Course Determine Intergenerational Transfers in a Small-Scale Human Society. *Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences*, 282(1803), 20142808.
- Wood, B. M., & Marlowe, F. W. (2013). Household and Kin Provisioning by Hadza Men. *Human Nature*, 24(3), 280–317..

Life history theory

- Thompson E. M., et al. (2007). Aging and Fertility Patterns in Wild Chimpanzees Provide Insights Into the Evolution of Menopause. *Current Biology*, 17(24), 2150-2156.
- Hawkes K., O'Connel, J. F., Jones, N. B., Alvarez, H., & Charnov, E. L. (1998). Grandmothering, Menopause, and the Evolution of Human Life Histories. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 95(3), 1336–1339.
- Hill, K., Barton, M., & Hurtado, A. M. (2009). The Emergence of Human Uniqueness: Characters Underlying Behavioral Modernity. *Evolutionary Anthropology*, 18(5), 187–200.
- Hill, K., & Kaplan, H. (1999). Life History Traits in Humans: Theory and Empirical Studies. *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 28(1), 397–430.
- Kaplan H. (1997). The Evolution of the Human Life Course. In *Between Zeus and the Salmon: The Biodemography of Aging* (Wachter, K, & Finch, C., Eds), 175–211. *National Academy of Sciences*.

Demographic transition

- Colleran, H. (2016). The Cultural Evolution of Fertility Decline. *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences*, 371(1692), 20150152.
- Shenk, M. K., Towner, M. C., Kress, H. C., & Alam, N. (2013). A Model Comparison Approach Shows Stronger Support for Economic Models of Fertility Decline. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences*, 110(20), 8045–8050.



Part 2 *(June 13 ▶ June 24, 2022)*

Economic and political institutions

Horacio Larreguy and Mohamed Saleh

Overview

Economic and political institutions are fundamental determinants of development, inequality, and human well-being. In this course, we introduce students to recent conceptual, methodological, and data advances in the study of institutions in economic history, political economics, and political science. While the study of institutions has been central to political science since its inception, economics has seen a revival of interest in the impact of historical and political institutions on long-run development and inequality, and political scientists are paying more attention to political economy issues. Today, work on the research frontier often concerns the interaction of politics and the economy, historically and contemporaneously, and spans multiple disciplines.

Methodological advances concern the analysis of natural and field experiments that may enable scholars to make stronger causal inferences by employing techniques such as difference-in-differences, instrumental variables, randomized control trials, and regression discontinuity. The introduction of “big data” (e.g., micro-level and large-scale administrative data, or social media data) makes it possible to study the origins and consequences of institutions in history and politics at the micro level, as well as the profound consequences of more modern institutions, such as social media, on politics. We consider these issues through the discussion of several substantive topics: institutions and development, democracy, and social media.



Instructors

- **Horacio Larreguy** is Associate Professor of Government at Harvard University and a Visiting Researcher at the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse and Toulouse School of Economics. His research focuses on issues related to political economy of development. His work has been published, among others, in the AEJ: Applied Economics, American Journal of Political Science, the American Political Science Review, Econometrica, Journal of the European Economic Association and Review of Economics and Statistics.

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- **Mohamed Saleh** is Professor of Economics at the Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole, Member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, and Research Affiliate in Economic History at the Centre for Economic Policy Research. His research focuses on Economic History and Political Economy. His research has been published in Econometrica, Journal of Economic History, and Explorations in Economic History, among others.

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Course structure, part 2 / week 3

(Monday, June 13 – Friday, June 17)

	Monday, June 13 Mohamed Saleh	Tuesday, June 14 Mohamed Saleh	Wednesday, June 15 Mohamed Saleh
9.00 am - 10.30 am	Institutions and economic development	Methods and Data	Migration
10.30 am - 11.00 am	Break	Break	Break
11.00 am - 12.30 am	Institutions and economic development	Methods and Data	Migration
10.30 am - 11.00 am	Lunch	Lunch	Lunch
2.00 pm - 3.30 pm	TA Session	TA Session	TA Session
	Thursday, June 16 Mohamed Saleh	Friday, June 17 Horacio Larreguy	
9.00 am - 10.30 am	Intergenerational mobility and big data	Democracy and inequality	
10.30 am - 11.00 am	Break	Break	
11.00 am - 12.30 am	Intergenerational mobility and big data	Democracy and inequality	
10.30 am - 11.00 am	Lunch	Lunch	
2.00 pm - 3.30 pm	TA Session	TA Session	

Evaluation

To be announced.



Course structure, part 2 / week 3

(Monday, June 13 – Friday, June 17)

References

Institutions and economic development (M. Saleh)

- McCloskey, D. (1976). Does the Past Have Useful Economics? *Journal of Economic Literature*, 14(2), 434–461.
- Clark, G. (2005). The Condition of the Working-Class in England, 1209–2004. *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(6), 1307–1340.
- Coase, R. H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. *The Journal of Law and Economics*, 3, 1–44.
- North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989). Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England. *The Journal of Economic History*, 49(4), 803–832.
- North, D. C. (1997). Institutions. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5(1), 97–112.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer A., & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and Finance. *Journal of Political Economy*, 106(6), 1113–1155.
- Sokoloff, K. L., & Engerman S. A. (2000). History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14(3), 217–232.
- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2000). Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 115(4), 1167–1199.
- Acemoglu, D., Johnson S., & Robinson J.A. (2001). The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review*, 91(5), 1369–1401.
- Banerjee, A., & Iyer, L. (2005). History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India. *American Economic Review*, 95(4), 1190–1213.
- Nunn, N. (2008). The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1), 139–176.

Methods and data (M. Saleh)

Difference-in-differences and applications in economic history. Randomized Control Trials (RCTs) and experiments in economic history.

- Hornbeck, R. (2010). Barbed Wire: Property Rights and Agricultural Development. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 125(2), 767–810.
- Cantoni, D., & Yuchtman, N. (2014). Medieval Universities, Legal Institutions, and the Commercial Revolution. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(2), 823–887.
- Juhasz, R. (2018). Temporary Protection and Technology Adoption: Evidence from the Napoleonic Blockade. *American Economic Review*, 108(11), 3339–3376.
- Dittmar, J. E. (2011). Information Technology and Economic Change: The Impact of the Printing Press. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126(3), 1133–1172.
- Hanlon, W. W. (2015). Necessity is the Mother of Invention: Input Supplies and Directed Technical Change. *Econometrica*, 83(1), 67–100.
- De La Sierra, R. S. (forthcoming). On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo. *Journal of Political Economy*.
- Giusti, G., Noussair, C. N., & Voth, H. J. (2013). Recreating the South Sea Bubble: Lessons from an Experiment in Financial History. *Mimeo*.
- Pascali, Luigi. (2013). The Wind of Change: Maritime Technology, Trade, and Economic Development, *American Economic Review*, 2017, 107 (9), 2821–2854.

Migration (M. Saleh)

- Abramitzky, R., Boustan, L. P., & Eriksson, K. (2012). Europe's Tired, Poor, Huddled Masses: Self-Selection and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration. *American Economic Review*, 102(5), 1832–1856.
- Borjas, G. (1987). Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants. *American Economic Review*, 77(4), 531–553.
- Abramitzky, R., Boustan, L. P., & Eriksson, K. (2014). A Nation of Immigrants: Assimilation and Economic Outcomes in the Age of Mass Migration. *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(3), 467–506.
- Fouka, V. (forthcoming). Backlash: The Unintended Effects of Language Prohibition in US schools after World War I. *The Review of Economic Studies*.
- Abramitzky, R., Boustan, L. P., & Eriksson, K. (forthcoming). Do Immigrants Assimilate More Slowly Today than in the Past? *American Economic Review: Insights*.

- Tabellini, M. (forthcoming). Gifts of the Immigrants, Woes of the Natives: Lessons from the Age of Mass Migration. *The Review of Economic Studies*.
- Fouka, V., Mazumder, S., & Tabellini, M. (2018). From Immigrants to Americans: Race and Assimilation during the Great Migration. *Harvard Business School BGIE Unit Working Paper 19-018*.

Intergenerational mobility and big data (M. Saleh)

- Ferrie, J., & Long, J. (2008). A Tale of Two Labor Markets: Intergenerational Occupational Mobility in Britain and the U.S. Since 1850. *NBER Working Paper 11253*.
- Becker, G. S., & Tomes, N. (1979). An Equilibrium Theory of the Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility. *Journal of Political Economy*, 87(6), 1153–1189.
- Solon, G. (2004). A Model of Intergenerational Mobility Variation over Time and Place. In *Generational Income Mobility in North America and Europe*. Miles Corak (Ed.), Cambridge University Press, 38–47.
- Feigenbaum, J. J. (2015). Intergenerational mobility during the great depression. *Mimeo*.
- Collins, W. J., & Wanamaker, M. H. (2017). Up from Slavery? African American Intergenerational Economic Mobility Since 1880. *NBER Working Paper 23395*.
- Olivetti, C., & Paserman, M. D. (2015). In the Name of the Son (and the Daughter): Intergenerational Mobility in the United States, 1850–1940. *American Economic Review*, 105(8), 2695–2724.

Democracy and inequality (H. Larreguy)

Lecture 1

- Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2001) A Theory of Political Transitions. *American Economic Review*, 91, 938-963
- Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2006) Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. *Cambridge University Press*.
- Acemoglu, D. & Robinson, J. A. (2008) Persistence of Power, Elites and Institutions. *American Economic Review*, 98(1), 267-93.
- Acemoglu, D., Naidu, S., Restrepo, P., & Robinson, J. A. (2014) Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality. In *Handbook of Income Distribution, Volume 2, 1885–1966*. Elsevier.
- Aidt, T. S. & Franck, R. (2015) Democratization Under the Threat of Revolution: Evidence From the Great Reform Act of 1832. *Econometrica* 83(2), 505–547
- Cascio, E. U., & Washington, E. (2013) Valuing the Vote: The Redistribution of Voting Rights and State Funds Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 129(1), 379–433.
- Castañeda-Dower, P., Finkel, E. & Gehlbach, S. & Nafziger, S. (2018) Collective Action and Representation in Autocracies: Evidence from Russia's Great Reforms. *American Political Science Review*, 112(1), 125-147.
- Jha, Saumitra. (2015) Financial Asset Holdings and Political Attitudes: Evidence from Revolutionary England. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 103(3), 1485–1545.
- Lizzeri, A. & Persico, N. (2004) Why Did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, With an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(2), 707–765.

Lecture 2

- Besley, T., Folke, O., Persson, T., & Rickne, J. (2017). Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden. *American Economic Review*, 107(8), 2204–2242.
- Blattman, C. & Larreguy, H & Marx, B. & Reid, O. (2020) Eat Widely, Vote Wisely? Lessons from a Campaign Against Vote Buying in Uganda.
- Bowles, J. & Larreguy, H. & Woller, A. (2020) Information Versus Control: The Electoral Consequences of Polling Place Creation.
- Chattopadhyay, R. & Duflo, E. (2004) Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. *Econometrica* 72(5), 1409-1443.
- Duarte, R. & Finan, F. & Larreguy, H. & Schechter, L. (2019) Brokering Votes with Information Spread Via Social Networks.
- Finan, F. & Schechter, L. (2012) Vote-buying and Reciprocity. *Econometrica*, 80(2): 863-882.
- Fujiwara, T. (2015). Voting Technology, Political Responsiveness, and Infant Health: Evidence From Brazil. *Econometrica*, 83(2), 423–464.
- Lawson, C. & Greene, K. F. (2014) Making Clientelism Work: How Norms of Reciprocity Increase Voter Compliance. *Comparative Politics* 47(1): 61–85.
- Nichter, S. (2008) Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot. *American Political Science Review*, 102(1):19-31.
- Vicente, P. C. (2014) Is Vote Buying Effective? Evidence from a Field Experiment in West Africa. *The Economic Journal*, 124(574), 356–387.



Course structure, part 2 / week 4

(Tuesday, June 20 – Friday, June 24)

	Monday, June 20	Tuesday, June 21	Wednesday, June 22
9.00 am - 10.30 am	Methods and data	Political selection	Political Economy Workshop
10.30 am - 11.00 am	Break	Break	
11.00 am - 12.30 am	Methods and data	Social media and politics	
10.30 am - 11.00 am	Lunch	Lunch	
2.00 pm - 3.30 pm	Political selection	Social media and politics	
	Thursday, June 23	Friday, June 24	Workshop Students will have the opportunity to attend the Political Economy Workshop held on Wednesday, June 22, and on Thursday, June 23. More information soon available.
9.00 am - 10.30 am	Political Economy Workshop	TA Session	
10.30 am - 11.00 am		Lunch	
11.00 am - 12.30 am		TA Session	
10.30 am - 11.00 am		Lunch	
2.00 pm - 3.30 pm			

References

Methods and data

Lecture 1

- Abadie, A. & Diamond, A. & Hainmueller, J. (2010) Synthetic Control Methods for Comparative Case Studies: Estimating the Effect of California's Tobacco Control Program. *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 105 (490), 493-505.
- Bertrand, M. & Duflo, E. & Mullainathan, S. (2004) How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates? *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 119(1), 249-275.
- Callaway, B. & Sant'Anna, P. H.C. (2020) Difference-in-Differences with multiple time periods. *Journal of Econometrics*
- De Chaisemartin, C. & D'Haultfoeuille, X. (2018) Two-way fixed effects estimators with heterogeneous treatment effects. *American Economic Review*, 110(9), 2964-96.
- Duflo, E. (2001) Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment. *The American Economic Review*, 91(4), 795-813.
- Goodman-Bacon, A. (2018) *Difference-in-Differences with Variation in Treatment Timing*
- Hazlett, C. & Xu, Y. (2018) Trajectory Balancing: A general reweighting approach to causal inference with time-series cross-sectional data.
- Humphreys, M. & Weinstein, J. (2009) Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12:367-378.

Course structure, part 2 / week 4

(Tuesday, June 20 – Friday, June 24)

Lecture 2

- Calonico, S. & Cattaneo, M. D. & Titiunik, R. Robust (2014) Nonparametric Confidence Intervals for Regression-Discontinuity Designs. *Econometrica*, 82(6), 2295-2326.
- De la Cuesta, B., & Imai, K. (2016). Misunderstandings about the Regression Discontinuity Design in the Study of Close Elections. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 19, 375–396.
- Dell, M. (2019) The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita. *Econometrica*, 78(6):1863-1903.
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